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INTRODUCTION

A rapist chokes a distraught child victim to silence her. To his
surprise, the child dies.' A robber holds up a motel clerk at gunpoint.
His finger slips and he "accidentally" shoots his target dead. 2 Intent
on selfish aims, these killers do not recognize the obvious risks their
conduct imposes on their victims. Though unintended, these killings
are hardly accidental: such inadvertent but foreseeable killings are
negligent. Yet, "negligence" does not seem a sufficient epithet to capture the depravity of these killings, nor does "negligent homicide"
seem a serious enough charge. These offenders callously impose risks
of death in order to achieve additional serious wrongs. In each case,
the offender's felonious motive for imposing a risk of death aggravates
his guilt for unintentionally, but nevertheless culpably, causing the
resulting death. Accordingly, in most American jurisdictions, these
killings would be punished as murder.
Reasonable as this treatment may seem, the doctrine required to
achieve it-felony murder-is one of the most widely criticized features of American criminal law. Legal scholars are almost unanimous
in condemning felony murder as a morally indefensible form of strict
liability. 3 Most are convinced it is an anomaly, a primitive relic of
medieval law that unaccountably survived the Enlightenment and the
nineteenth-century codification of criminal law. Some will concede
that modern "reforms" have ameliorated the doctrine, but they regard
these rules as pearl earrings on a pig, merely ornamenting an essentially barbaric principle of liability without fault. Most criminal law
scholars have assumed there is nothing to say on behalf of the felony
murder doctrine, no way to rationalize its rules to the lawyers who will
apply it, and no reforms worth urging on courts and legislatures short
1 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hanlon, 3 Brewster's Rep. 461, 470-76 (Pa. Ct.
Oyer & Terminer 1870).
2 See, e.g., Slater v. State, 316 So. 2d 539, 540 (Fla. 1975).
3 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6, at 31-32 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985); SAMUEL H. PILLSBURYJUDGING EVIL 106-08 (1998); Charles Liebert
Crum, Causal Relations and the Felony-MurderRule, 1952 WASH. U. L.Q. 191, 203-10;
George P. Fletcher, Reflections on Felony-Murder,12 Sw. U. L. REv. 413, 415-16 (1981);
Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observationson the Role of Motive in the Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 706-08; Sanford H. Kadish, Foreword:
The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84J. Crim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679, 695-97
(1994); H.L. Packer, Criminal Code Revision, 23 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 3-4 (1973); Nelson
E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 446, 490-91 (1985); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the CriminalLaw, 122 U. PA. L.
REv. 1497, 1498-99 & n.2 (1974).
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of its utter abolition. 4 Sanford Kadish, author of the leading criminal
law textbook, called the felony murder doctrine "rationally indefensible, ' 5 and the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code Commentaries observed that "[p]rincipled argument in favor of the felony'6
murder doctrine is hard to find."

This Article provides the long-missing principled defense of the
felony murder doctrine. It argues that felony murder liability is
deserved for those who negligently cause death by attempting felonies
inherently involving (1) violence or destruction and (2) an additional
malign purpose independent of injury to the victim killed. How can
merely negligent homicide deserve punishment as murder? Because
the felon's additional depraved purpose aggravates his culpability for
causing death carelessly. To impose a foreseeable risk of death for
such a purpose deserves severe punishment because it expresses a
commitment to particularly reprehensible values. In defending felony
murder liability as deserved in cases like those described above, I will
be defending an expressive theory of culpability that assesses blame for
harm on the basis of two dimensions of culpability: (1) the actor's
expectation of causing harm and (2) the moral worth of the ends for
7
which the actor imposes this risk.
4 But see Kevin Cole, Killings During Crime: Toward a DiscriminatingTheory of Strict
Liability, 28 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 73 (1990) (defending a limited felony murder rule on
utilitarian grounds); David Crump & Susan Waite Crump, In Defense of the Felony MurderDoctrine, 8 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 359 (1985) (defending felony murder liability as
deserved based on harm alone, regardless of culpability); Kenneth W. Simons, When
Is Strict Criminal Liability Just ?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1075, 1121-24 (1997)
(defending felony murder liability as a form of negligence when predicated on inherently dangerous felonies) ;James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-MurderRule:
A Study of the Forces that Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1429 (1994)
(acknowledging and trying to account for the persistent legislative popularity of felony murder).
5 Kadish, supra note 3, at 695-96.
6 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6, at 37 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
7 For previous works recognizing the expressive dimension of culpability, see
HYMAN GROss, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 77-88, 103-06 (1979); Guyora Binder,
The Rhetoric of Motive and Intent, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 56-59 (2002) [hereinafter
Binder, Rhetoric of Motive]; Claire 0. Finkelstein, Duress: A PhilosophicalAccount of the
Defense in Law, 37 Aluz. L. REv. 251, 270-75 (1995);John Gardner, The Gist of Excuses,
1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 575, 575 (1998);Jean Hampton, Mens Rea, Soc. PHIL. & POL'V,
Spring 1990, at 1, 1-2; Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 208, 238 (1984) [hereinafter Hampton, Moral Education Theory];
Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1423, 1424 (1995); Dan M.
Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM.
L. REv. 269, 273 (1996); Alan C. Michaels, Acceptance: The Missing Mental State, 71 S.
CAL. L. REv. 953 (1998); Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REv.
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Thus felony murder liability rests on a simple and powerful idea:
that the guilt incurred in attacking or endangering others depends on
one's reasons for doing so. Killing to prevent a rape is justifiable,
while killing to avenge a rape is not. And yet killing to redress a verbal
insult is worse, and killing to enable a rape worse still. Even when
inflicting harm is wrong, a good motive can mitigate that wrong and a
bad motive can aggravate it.
The same considerations can affect our evaluations of risk-taking.
We justify speeding a critically injured patient to a hospital; we condemn the same behavior in the context of drag racing or flight from
arrest. As a society, we tolerate the nontrivial risks of death that ordinarily attend driving, light plane aviation, hunting, boxing, and construction as costs worth paying. For reasons that are far from obvious,
our society views the risks of recreational drug use very differently.
We are quicker to condemn failure to provide medical care to a child
if motivated by cruelty or indifference than if motivated by religious
conviction.8 And, most pertinently, we regard the risk of death associated with robbery as less acceptable than the greaterrisk of death associated with resistingrobbery.9 Thus, we evaluate action based not only
on its expected danger, but also on the moral worth of its motives.
This principle that guilt depends on reasons for action justifies aggravating homicide liability on the basis of a felonious motive. A bad
enough motive can make even a negligent killing culpable enough to
merit murder liability.
Based on such intuitions, legislatures have made felony murder
liability part of the law of almost every American jurisdiction. 10 In so
463, 495-522 (1992) [hereinafter Simons, Rethinking]; Simons, supra note 4, at
1120-33; Guyora Binder, Meaning and Motive in the Law of Homicide, 3 BUFF. ClM. L.
REv. 755, 761-66 (2000) (book review); Victoria Nourse, The New Normativity: The
Abuse Excuse and the Resurgence of Judgment in the CriminalLaw, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1435,
1456-57 (1998) (book review).
8 See Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609, 612-13 (Mass. 1993).
9 See RICHARD BLOCK, VIOLErrr CRIME 83 (1977); Franklin E. Zimring & James
Zuehl, Victim Injury and Death in Urban Robbery: A Chicago Study, 15J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 8
tbl.1 (1986) (noting "probable" robbery killings of 5.2 per 1000).
Loss of life in robbery is strongly associated with active victim resistance.
Only 8 percent of the robbery cases resulted in this classification compared
with 55 percent of the death cases. Put another way, active noncooperation
is associated with a death risk from robbery approximately fourteen times as
great as cooperation or passive noncooperation.
Id. at 18. Together these two statistics suggest a death rate for unresisted robberies of
2.2 per 1000, and a death rate for resisted robberies of 30 per 1000.
10 SeeJOSHUA DEsstLER, UNDERSTANDING CRiMINAL LAW § 31.06(A), at 557 (4th
ed. 2006).
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doing, they have acted in accord with the views of many Americans.
Opinion research shows that most respondents think homicides
deserve more punishment if they occur in the course of crime. I This
is not to say that public opinion would support every felony murder
rule currently in force. For example, public opinion distinguishes
between felons who kill and their accomplices, supporting much less
liability for the latter. 12 Nevertheless, public opinion supports some
degree of penalty enhancement for criminally motivated homicides.
So when criminal law theorists dismiss felony murder liability as
rationally indefensible, they ignore popular ideas ofjustice and fail to
give legislators guidance on how to realize those ideas in a principled
way.

If felony murder liability rests on the intuitively plausible moral
principle that bad motives should aggravate liability for culpably causing harm, why do criminal law theorists so often dismiss it as irrational? There are two main reasons. One is a distorted picture of
felony murder liability as imposing strict liability for accidental death
in the course of all felonies. While most scholars recognize that no
such rule is currently in force, they mistakenly assume that it once was;
and that the persistence of what they suppose to be such a rule in
diluted form reflects an irrational adherence to this benighted past.
My previous research has debunked these widespread assumptions
about the origins and development of felony murder liability. It
11 See PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME
169-81 (1995). Darley's subjects thought that while a negligent killing merited only
about ten months of imprisonment, id. at 174, a negligent killing in the course of a
robbery merited about twenty-two to twenty-seven years of imprisonment, id. at 178.
This effect disappeared, however, when the victim was a co-felon and the killer was a
resister. Id. at 179. Subjects were also willing to imprison negligent robbers whose
accomplices killed for only about six to nine years. Id. at 178; see also NORMAN J.
FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE 164-71 (1995) (analyzing the responses of study participants to felony murder hypothetical cases, among others). Finkel's data is harder
to interpret because he placed his subjects in the roles of juror and appellate judge,
so that it is difficult to tell whether their decisions enforcing felony murder rules
reflected their opinions or their perceived role obligations. In a hypothetical case
involving a robbery victim dropping dead of a heart attack, 63% were willing to find
first-degree murder (even though the law requires this in only a few jurisdictions),
60% were willing to uphold such a verdict as constitutional, and 84% imposed some
form of homicide liability. See id. at 166. In a more realistic felony murder scenario,
where a victim is shot dead while struggling with a robber for a gun, 100% found the
gunman guilty of homicide, 79% found the gunman guilty of first-degree murder,
and 79% were willing to uphold such a verdict. See id. at 166-67. In both scenarios,
about 50% held accomplices of the gunman guilty of first-degree murder. See id. at
167-68.
12 See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 11, at 176-78.
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shows that prior to the American Revolution, English law punished all
fatal, intentionally inflicted wounds and injuries as murder absent
provocation or self-defense and punished no accidentally caused
deaths as murder. 13 Resistance to crime was excluded from provocation, and participation in an armed assault made each assailant
responsible for the killings of each. Felony murder liability first developed in nineteenth-century America as a legislative reform aimed at
increasing the culpability required for capital murders. It was generally conditioned only on dangerous felonies involving a wrongful end
independent of the injury to the victim, such as robbery, rape, burglary, or arson. It usually required an armed attack or an act of mass
destruction like burning down a building or wrecking a train. The
assailants were always participants in the crime; the victims were never
participants. 14 Part L.A of this Article reviews this history, and Part I.B
shows that such rules should not be seen as imposing strict liability.
Instead they condition murder liability on criminal negligence with
respect to death, aggravated by a felonious motive independent of
that negligence.
A second reason for the persistent view of felony murder as
rationally indefensible is the narrowly cognitive view of culpability that
prevails in contemporary criminal law theory. According to this view,
culpability is purely a function of the expectation of harm attributable
to an actor at the time he or she acts. Thus, the actor's purposes,
motives, meanings, and values are irrelevant. In particular, such goals
as completing a rape, demeaning a victim because of her race, or
intimidating political opponents are irrelevant to culpability for a killing. All that matters is the death and the expectation of causing it.
This cognitive conception of culpability reflects a restrictive view of
the role of criminal law in a liberal state-as opposing harmful conduct, but taking no sides in disagreements about values.
This ideal of a value-neutral criminal law has at least two distinct
sources in liberal political thought. One is rights theory, concerned
with protecting liberty. Rights theorists tend to see state coercion as
presumptively illegitimate, and justified only by a delegation to the
state of an individual right of self-defense against private coercion.
On such a view, the state is presumptively authorized to use coercion
to prevent interference with liberty, but not to perfect the characters
13 See Guyora Binder, The Meaningof Killing, in MODERN HIsToRIES OF CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT 88, 90-93 (Markus D. Dubber & Lindsay Farmer eds., 2007) [hereinafter
Binder, The Meaning of Killing]; Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder
Rules, 57 STAN. L. REV. 59, 98 (2004) [hereinafter Binder, Origins].
14

See Binder, Origins, supra note 13, at 186-201.
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of individuals, which would violate their liberty. Some in this tradition
see political liberty as a means to achieving the moral good of autonomous self-development. A second source of the cognitive culpability
theory is utilitarianism, which interprets action as the rational pursuit
of gratification. From this morally skeptical perspective, desire is the
only source of value and so cannot be judged as better or worse on the
basis of its content. The state's role is to maximize gratification, which
requires it to discourage actions that impose more pain and frustration than gratification. In short, the state can regulate conduct to
minimize harm but cannot stand in judgment of the desires motivating conduct.

15

Both traditions support the liberal "harm principle," which permits the state to punish only conduct which causes harm to others but
16
not to interfere with each individual's selection of her own ends.
The cognitive theory of culpability draws on this eclectic harm principle, reasoning that the liberal state can blame actors for predictably
harmful actions, but not for their ends, which are intrinsically valuable
expressions of autonomy or utility. Actors can be blamed for their
choices, but not for the values that guide choice.
The cognitive view of culpability invokes these disparate ideas in
barring the criminal law from judging the reasons and values motivating the choice to cause harm. To the extent that felony murder liability requires us to judge actions based on the moral worth of their
motives, it is incompatible with such a cognitive view of culpability.
Thus when criminal law scholars insist that no rational defense of felony murder liability is possible, they mean it cannot be justified on the
basis of a purely cognitive theory of culpability. If one (1) assumes
that felony murder rules impose strict liability for accidental death
and (2) dismisses the reasons motivating risk imposition as morally
irrelevant, felony murder liability does indeed look irrational. Based
on these assumptions, scholars and courts attribute felony murder liability to one of two morally primitive ideas: that one is morally culpa-

15

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEC188 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Univ. of London 1970) (1789) (discussing the harm principle); id. at 100 (suggesting that there is no point in condemning
motives).
16 SeeJOHN STUART MILL, ON LBERTY 9-11, 75 (Alburey Costell ed., Harlan
Davidson Inc. 1947) (1859) (formulating the harm principle and deriving it from
individuals' sovereignty over self and from utility); Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse
of the Harm Principle,90J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109, 120-21 (1999) (noting that
Mill based the harm principle on rights and utility).
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ble for all of the harmful consequences of any wrongful act, 1 7 or that
law can constructively "transfer" culpability from any wrongful aim to
any wrongful but unintended result. 18
The shortcomings of this cognitive view of culpability are the
major focus of this Article. It argues that the cognitive view does not
offer a persuasive value-neutral account of homicide, and indeed that
a value-neutral account of culpability for harmful consequences like
death is impossible. The cognitivist charge that felony murder
depends on morally primitive formalism is exposed as hyperbole,
obscuring the necessary role of normative judgment in ascriptions of
culpability. Thus, while one certainly should not be held culpable for
all of the harms resulting from a wrongful act, determinations of culpability for causing harm always require evaluation of the underlying
conduct. And while we cannot transfer culpability from just any
wrongful aim to just any unfortunate result, determinations of culpability for causing harm always require contestable judgments of moral
equivalence between intentions and results.
Part I.C introduces the cognitive conception of culpability and
contrasts it with the expressive conception of culpability that supports
liability for felony murder, hate crimes, and other crimes of motive.
Cognitive theories are described as taking two possible forms, reflecting two interpretations of the liberal harm principle: one based on
utilitarianism and one based on rights theory.
17 See, e.g., People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 316-19 (Mich. 1980); Gardner,
supra note 3, at 656; Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARv. L. REV. 974, 979-80
(1932). These authors attribute this position to medieval Catholic ethicists without
appreciating the dialectical nature of scholastic methods of argument in which one
initially posits contradictory propositions before reconciling them. See Binder, Origins, supra note 13, at 73-76 (suggesting that Aquinas, Gratian, Gregory, and Bracton
may not have regarded unlawful acts as sources of liability for resulting deaths unless
the acts were also careless).
18 See generally State v. Madden, 294 A.2d 609, 612 (N.J. 1972) (claiming that, at
common law, "killing in the course of the commission of a felony" could support a
murder conviction because "the intent to commit the felony sufficed even though
there was no intent to kill"); State v. O'Blasney, 297 N.W.2d 797, 798-99 (S.D. 1980)
(discussing the "transferred or constructive intent theory" as one rationale for felony
murder liability); Anthony M. Dillof, Transferred Intent: An Inquiry into the Nature of
Criminal Culpability, I BuF. CRIM. L. REv. 501 (1998) (reviewing the contours of the
doctrine of transferred intent). The idea that intent can be transferred from an
unconsummated crime to an unintended, but proscribed, result has a venerable history. See, e.g.,
FRANcis BACON, THE ELEMENTS OF THE COMMON LAWS OF ENGLAND
(1596), reprintedin 3 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 219, 238 (Phila., Pa., Carey & Hart
1850); 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW §§ 254-260, at
223-29 (Boston, Mass., Brown, Little & Co. 1856); 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF
THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 78-87 (photo. reprint 1972) (2d ed. 1724).
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Part II.A explicates a utilitarian version of cognitive culpability
that conceives culpability as deterrability and defines it in terms of
expected utility loss. This approach appears to achieve a value-free
assessment of culpability by defining it in terms of various kinds of
psychological facts. Part II.B argues that identifying these psychological facts requires hidden value judgments which undermine the theory's claim to value neutrality. More significantly, Part II.C argues that
a utilitarian conception of cognitive culpability can only be applied
coherently to inchoate crimes of risk rather than to crimes of result,
like homicide. The root problem is that utilitarianism conceives harm
in abstract and speculative terms, as the net future welfare cost for all
persons resulting from one choice as compared to the net welfare
expected from alternatives. Such harm is not a particular injury, but
an aggregate of many consequences, some hypothetical and some in
the distant future. A utilitarian approach to criminal law can therefore condemn a class of acts as predictably harmful but cannot condemn a particular act for actually causing harm. Thus a utilitarian
cognitive culpability theory "proves too much": it condemns not just
felony murder liability, but murder liability itself.
A cognitive theory of culpability for homicide must be based on an
account of the harms that justify coercion by the liberal state as discrete injuries to particular entitlements or, in short, rights. Part III.A
explicates a version of cognitive culpability based on contractarianism,
the most influential form of rights theory and an important source of
retributivist accounts of punishment. 19 This contractarian model conceives culpability as blameworthy choice and defines it in terms of
expected violations of rights and public duties. This Part argues that
attributions of causal responsibility for particular harmful results
require evaluations of the actor's ends. Since injuries arise from the
interaction of conflicting activities, we cannot assign culpability for a
particular result without normative criteria to determine which of the
contributing acts was wrongful. Rights theory responds to this "social
cost" problem by privileging certain activities as protected by rights.
Claiming to prioritize the right over the good, contractarianism
appears to define these rights in a value-neutral way. The contractarian can hope to extend this value neutrality to the penal
19 See IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 80 (John Ladd trans.,
Hackett Publ'g Co. 2d ed. 1999) (1797); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE,
AND THERAPY 77-80 (Wilfrid Sellars & Keith Lehrer eds., 1979); Guyora Binder, Punishment Theoiy: Moral or Political?, 5 BUFF. CRM. L. REV. 321, 362-63 (2002); Michael
Davis, How to Make the PunishmentFit the Crime, 93 ETHICS 726, 736-46 (1983); Herbert
Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475 (1968), reprinted in HERBERT MORRiS,
ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 31, 31-58 (1976).
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enforcement of rights by conditioning punishment on purely cogni-

tive culpability.
The remainder of Part III denies that such a contractarian model
of retributive justice can maintain value neutrality. It argues that contractarian retributivism evaluates actors' ends at four stages. Part III.B
argues that a contractarian state must evaluate ends in assigning
rights, in determining causal responsibility for injuries to rights, and
in determining whether individuals expected to cause such injuries.
Part III.C argues that contractarianism can best explain why actual
harm affects desert on the assumption that harm alters the values
expressed by the offender's act. 20

In other words, a contractarian

state must evaluate ends again in deciding how much punishment is
deserved. Thus, Part III concludes, an account of culpability for
homicide based on contractarian rights theory cannot remain purely
cognitive but must evaluate the actor's ends.
A second major aim of this Article is to offer an appealing alternative to the cognitive view of culpability which can account for felony
murder liability. Part IV.A explicates an expressive theory of culpability that evaluates the ends motivating the offender's actions and
assigns causal responsibility for harms insofar as they express or symbolize the values for which the offender acted. This theory inculpates
offenders, not for having bad values, but for choosing to express them
through action; not for having bad characters, but for choosing to
play a reprehensible role. This expressive theory of culpability justifies
holding offenders responsible for some unintended results of some
felonies, particularly those felonies that use force or the threat of
force to recruit victims as unwilling instruments of an independent
felonious purpose.
Part 1V.B proceeds to argue that such a theory of culpability provides a better descriptive account of our actual criminal law than does
the cognitive view, because existing criminal law is permeated by evaluations of motive. Finally, Part IV.C defends the expressive theory of
culpability as compatible with liberalism by denying that liberalism
requires a value-neutral criminal law. It argues that the liberal state
20 SeeJEAN HAMPTON, THE INTRINSIC WORTH OF PERSONS 108-51 (Daniel Farnham
ed., 2007) [hereinafter HAMPTON, INTRINS IC WORTH] (discussing the "goal of retribution"); Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIsT 397 (1965),
reprinted in JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 95, 98-105 (1974) (cataloguing
expressive functions of punishment including symbolic nonacquiescence and authoritative disavowal); Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN
HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111, 124-38 (1988) [hereinafter Hampton, The
Retributive Idea] (arguing that punishment is a "defeat" of an offender's domination of
victims).
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cannot avoid influencing values and has a duty to regulate and evaluate the ends for which violence is used. It argues that liberalism
entails commitments to such values as autonomy and equality of status, and that neutrality is a contingent rather than a necessary feature
of institutions serving these values.
A conclusion summarizes the defense of felony murder liability
offered here in response to the charge that felony murder is rationally
indefensible. Murder liability is justified for causing death negligently
in furtherance of a felony that inherently involves both (a) force or
destruction and (b) a malign purpose independent of injury to a person. Such liability is justified on the basis of an expressive theory of
culpability that assesses not only the offender's expectation of causing
harm, but also the reasons motivating and the values expressed by the
offender's act. Felony murder liability is particularly appropriate for
offenders who fatally endanger others in order to coerce or demean
them. Although such a theory of culpability conditions punishment
on the offender's ends, it is compatible with the obligations of a liberal state to respect and protect autonomy and equal status.
I.

THE FELONY MURDER PROBLEM

A.

Felony Murder Mythology

American lawyers have long been taught that the English common law imposed strict murder liability on felons for all deaths
caused-even accidentally-in the course of all felonies. 2 1 They have
long learned that this cruel and ancient common law rule was automatically received into American law with independence, 22 and produced terrible injustice as legislative proscription of new felonies
expanded its already sweeping scope. 23 According to this mythology,
the English rule remained in force in every jurisdiction until ameliorated by legislatures or courts and indeed remains authoritative to this
day in default of such "reform." 24 In contemporary explanations of
felony murder, the intent to commit a felony substitutes for the intent
to kill to supply the requisite malice for murder; 25 or the law "transfers
21

See 1 WILLIAM L. CLARK & WILLIAM L. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
supra note 10, § 31.06(A), at 556-57;
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 14.5(a), at 744 (4th ed. 2003); ARNOLD H. LOEWy,
CRIMES § 248, at 514-16 (1900); DRESSLER,
CRIMINAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL

45 (4th ed. 2003).

22
23

See 1 CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 21, § 248, at 514-16.
See LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 14.5(a), at 744-45.

24

Id.

25 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6, at 31, 36 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
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intent" from the felony to the resulting death and thereby "con26
structs" malice.
Yet this conventional account of the history of felony murder is
misleading in almost every respect. Thus, felony murder liability was
not an ancient rule of the English common law. Indeed, it was not
part of the law of England at any time before the American Revolution and so could not have been received into American law from
England. 27 In fact, English constitutional law held that the English
common law of crimes had no authority in the American colonies
except insofar as received and adapted in each jurisdiction. 28 So we
have no reason to think felony murder was part of colonial American
law unless we find it enacted in colonial statutes or applied by colonial
courts-and we don't.29 American felony murder rules were enacted
primarily by legislatures in the mid-nineteenth century.3 0 England
developed its felony murder rule even later in the nineteenth century. 31 In both countries, felony murder liability developed in the
effort to reform the law of homicide by codifying its objective and
subjective elements. In both countries the rule was limited by concerns about culpability from the very outset. The ameliorative
"reform" of the felony murder doctrine was contemporaneous with its
enactment into law.
In seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England, murder liability
depended primarily on the characteristics of the act. The required act
was not the causation of death, but "killing," a term historically associated with striking a blow. 32 If death resulted from an intentional and
unprovoked blow with an implement customarily used as a weapon, it
was murder whether the intent was to cause death or merely pain and
injury. 33 Such an attack was conventionally understood as an expression of "malice," that is, gratuitous hostility undiluted by the respect
implied in a challenge to duel and unmitigated by the righteous indignation provoked by a prior attack.3 4 A merely dangerous act-driving
26 See State v. Martin, 573 A.2d 1359, 1368 (N.J. 1990); State v. Madden, 294 A.2d
609, 612 (N.J. 1972); State v. O'Blasney, 297 N.W.2d 797, 798-99 (S.D. 1980);
DRESSLER,

supra note 10, § 31.06(B) (4), at 560.

27
28
29

See Binder, Origins, supra note 13, at 63, 98.
See id. at 107-08.
See id. at 109-13.

30
31
32

See id. at 118-23, 132-34.
See id. at 99-107.
See Binder, The Meaning of Killing, supra note 13, at 93.

33

See id. at 95-101.

34

See id. at 97-101.
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a coach at an unsafe speed down a narrow street, for example-might
35
cause death but was not therefore a killing and expressed no malice.
These rules were unaffected by the context of a felony. A fatal
stabbing during a robbery was murder; a fatal cart collision during a
robbery was not. The chief significance of a criminal context for
homicide was that resistance to a crime-any crime, not just a felony-could not constitute provocation. Thus, the attempted commission of a felony did not substitute for intent to kill, because no intent
to kill was required for murder. 36 It did not substitute for recklessness
because no recklessness was required. It did not substitute for intent
to injure, because even in the context of a felony, murder ordinarily
required a blow with a weapon, which expressed intent to wound or
injure. So the English common law did punish unintended killings in
the course of felonies as murder because it punished most unintended killings as murder.3 7 But it did not punish accidental deaths in the course
of felonies as murder. It is likely that colonial Americans understood
murder in the same way. Colonial statutes simply punished "willful"
or "malicious" murder, with these terms likely signifying intentionally
wounding with a weapon, followed by fatal results, rather than inten38
tionally producing death.
While a criminal context could not turn an accidental death into
murder in eighteenth-century England, it could implicate the participants in an accomplice's culpable killing. A pair of sixteenth-century
cases held that co-felons who joined in or agreed to violence against
resisting victims were liable for any resulting deaths.3 9 By the eighteenth century, some judges had suggested that mere participation in a
4 0 It
crime sufficed to implicate one in a codefendant's murder.
appears that by the late eighteenth century, a few judges were applying this sweeping standard, but most limited accomplice liability for
41
murder to those who had actually participated in the fatal violence.
The reform of homicide law in nineteenth-century England and
America took place against this background. Already during the early
eighteenth century, religiously motivated reformers had sought to
restrict the number of capital crimes in some colonies, and such views
35
36

See id. at 101-06.
See id. at 95-101.

37

See id.

38 See Binder, Origins, supra note 13, at 109-11.
39 Mansell & Herbert's Case, (1558) 2 Dy. 128b, 128b, 73 Eng. Rep. 279, 279-80
(K.B.); Lord Dacres' Case, (1535) Moo. KB. 86, 86, 72 Eng. Rep. 458, 458.
40 See R v. Plummer, (1701) Kel. J. 109, 112-18, 84 Eng. Rep. 1103, 1105-07
(K.B.).
41 See Binder, Origins, supra note 13, at 97.

NOTRE DAME

LAW

[VOL. 83:3

REVIEW

became common among enlightened reformers during the revolutionary period. 42 In post-revolutionary Pennsylvania, reformers
sought to increase reliance on incarceration and reduce the scope of
capital punishment. Thus, in 1794, Pennsylvania enacted an influential statute restricting capital murder to premeditated intentional
murder or murder in the course of robbery, rape, burglary, or arson. 43
This reform, adopted in many other states, 4 4 left the definition of
murder unaffected, but reduced its punishment in most cases. 4 5
Thus, murder still included unprovoked batteries with weapons that
happened to prove fatal. Murder still did not include accidental
death. 4 6 Many other states adopted statutes defining murder as killing
either intentionally, or in the course of enumerated felonies, or with
an abandoned and malignant heart. 47 American reformers did not,
by and large, see felony murder liability as strict liability, but instead
saw felonious motive as one of a number of forms of culpability aggravating already culpable homicides to murder, or to murder of a higher
degree. Felony murder liability was limited from the outset to deaths
resulting from acts of violence committed in the furtherance of particularly dangerous felonies. 48 These felonies almost always involved a
felonious purpose independent of injury to the victim.

49

Accomplice liability for felony murder was quite limited in nineteenth-century England and America. Early nineteenth-century
English cases established the principle that an accomplice in a felony
was not liable for a killing by a co-felon unless he joined in or agreed
to the fatal violence. 50 In the United States, few jurisdictions clarified
rules governing accomplice liability for felony murder. But where
they did articulate standards, courts usually required that the killing
be in furtherance of the felony or a foreseeable or probable result of
the felony. 5 1 In almost every case where a felon was held liable for
murder without having struck the fatal blow, he either participated in
the fatal assault, or the felony inherently involved violence or great
42 STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY 89-100 (2002).
43 Act of Apr. 22, 1794, ch. 1766, 1794 Pa. Laws 186.
44 See Binder, Origins, supra note 13, at 120-22.
45 See Act of Apr. 22, 1794 § 2, 1794 Pa. Laws at 187.
46 See Binder, Origins, supra note 13, at 142-44.
47 See id. at 120-22.
48 See id. at 187-97.
49 See State v. Shock, 68 Mo. 552, 556 (1878); People v. Rector, 19 Wend. 569, 605
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838).
50 R v. Lee, (1864) 4 F. & F. 63, 66-67, 176 Eng. Rep. 468, 469-70 (Q.B.); R v.
Collison, (1831) 4 Car. & P. 565, 565-66, 172 Eng. Rep. 827, 827-28 (K.B.); Duffey's
& Hunt's Case, (1830) 1 Lewin. 194, 194-95, 168 Eng. Rep. 1009, 1009 (K.B.).
51 See Binder, Origins, supra note 13, at 197-200.
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I have found only one reported case in nine-

teenth-century America involving a fatal blow possibly struck by a
nonparticipant in the felony (the defendant forced a robbery victim
into the path of fire during a gun battle). 53 I have found no nine-

teenth-century American cases holding felons liable for the killing of
54
co-felons by resisting victims or interveners.
During the later twentieth century, most states adopted new
codes. 55 These codes were often influenced by the Model Penal
Code's overall approach to homicide, but most rejected its abolition
of felony murder.5 6 During this extended process of code reform, felony murder liability remained limited to culpable killings in most
jurisdictions, but the devices used by legislatures and courts to impose
this requirement of culpability changed somewhat. While most jurisdictions continued to predicate felony murder liability only on enumerated dangerous felonies, many changed the required conduct
57
from "killing" or "murder" to any act foreseeably causing death.
Some incorporated a requirement of at least negligence into rules of
construction for offense definitions generally, or homicide in particular. 58 In these ways, the new codes effectively substituted a require-

ment of negligence with respect to the risk of death for an earlier
requirement of intent to injure or wound. As a result, felony murder
liability was rarely imposed for deaths that anyone would call accidental. These few, sporadic cases arose in a minority of jurisdictions. 59 A
52
53
54

See id. at 200.
See Keaton v. State, 57 S.W. 1125, 1125 (Tex. Crim. App. 1900).
See Binder, Origins, supra note 13, at 196.

55

See Sanford H. Kadish, The Model Penal Code's HistoricalAntecedents, 19

RUTGERS

L.J. 521, 538 (1988).
56 See Guyora Binder, Felony Murderand Mens Rea Default Rules: A Study in Statutory
Interpretation,4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 399, 400-01 (2000);John L. Diamond, The Myth of
Morality and Fault in Criminal Law Doctrine, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 111, 128 (1996).
57 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-C:11-1, 11-3 (West 2005); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25
(McKinney 2004 & Supp. 2008); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2501 (West 1998); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.01 (Vernon 2003).
58 See Binder, supra note 56, at 405-16.
59 These cases fall into two main groups: (1) Cases involving a victim who has a
heart attack without any battery, see, e.g., People v. Hernandez, 215 Cal. Rptr. 166, 167
(Ct. App. 1985); People v. Stamp, 82 Cal. Rptr. 598, 601 (Ct. App. 1969); Adams v.
State, 310 So. 2d 782, 782-83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Durden v. State, 297 S.E.2d
237, 239 (Ga. 1982); State v. Shaw, 921 P.2d 779, 781-82 (Kan. 1996); State v. Reardon, 486 A.2d 112, 115 (Me. 1984), and (2) overdoses from voluntarily ingested drugs
resulting from drug felonies, see, e.g., State v. Forsman, 260 N.W.2d 160, 163 (Minn.
1977); Heacock v. Commonwealth, 323 S.E.2d 90, 92-93 (Va. 1984); Hickman v.
Commonwealth, 398 S.E.2d 698, 699 (Va. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Rodoussakis, 511
S.E.2d 469, 473-74 (W. Va. 1998); State v. Wade, 490 S.E.2d 724, 729-30 (W. Va.
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few jurisdictions held felons liable for killings by resisters, 60 but most
61

did not.

An emerging cause of undeserved felony murder liability in the
twentieth century was the tendency of some courts to expand the
scope of accomplice liability for culpable killings, 6 2 or to find increas63
ingly attenuated connections between felonies and such killings.
Another troubling development was legislative expansion of predicate
felonies 64 combined with reluctance by some courts to require an
66
65
independent felonious purpose, or a genuinely dangerous felony.

Notwithstanding these troubling developments, in the twentieth cen1997). Outside of these categories, egregious cases include State v. Colenburg, 773
S.W.2d 184, 185-86 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989), which involved a nonreckless car collision
months after the felonious theft of a car, and People v. Matos, 634 N.E.2d 157, 157
(N.Y. 1994), where a police officer fell down an airshaft while chasing a suspect.
60 See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 845 P.2d 478, 479-81 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Pizano v.
Superior Court, 577 P.2d 659, 660-62 (Cal. 1978) (en banc); People v. Lowery, 687
N.E.2d 973, 975-79 (Ill. 1997);Jackson v. State, 408 A.2d 711, 712 (Md. 1979); State v.
Moore, 580 S.W.2d 747, 751-53 (Mo. 1979); Dickens v. State, 106 P.3d 599, 601
(Okla. Crim. App. 2005); State v. Oimen, 516 N.W.2d 399, 401 (Wis. 1994).
61 See, e.g., People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 133-34 (Cal. 1965) (en banc);
Weick v. State, 420 A.2d 159, 161-63 (Del. 1980); Hill v. State, 295 S.E.2d 518, 521
(Ga. 1982); Commonwealth v. Balliro, 209 N.E.2d 308, 314 (Mass. 1965); People v.
Austin, 120 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Mich. 1963); Sheriff, Clark County v. Hicks, 506 P.2d
766, 769-70 (Nev. 1973); Jackson v. State, 589 P.2d 1052, 1052 (N.M. 1979); State v.
Severs, 759 S.W.2d 935, 938 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988); Wooden v. Commonwealth,
284 S.E.2d 811, 814-16 (Va. 1981).
62 See, e.g., State v.James, 678 A.2d 1338, 1340-42 (Conn. 1996); Commonwealth
v. Cruz, 714 N.E.2d 813, 817 (Mass. 1999); State v. Tesack, 383 S.E.2d 54, 56-57 (W.
Va. 1989).
63 See State v. Jimenez, 634 P.2d 950, 953 (Ariz. 1981); People v. Gladman, 359
N.E.2d 420, 424-25 (N.Y. 1979).
64 Felony murder statutes with nontraditional predicate felonies include FLA.
STAT. § 782.04(1)(a)(2) (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1(c) (2007); ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/2-8 (2006); IOWA CODE § 707.2 (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 202 (2006);
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-201(a) (4) (Lexis Nexis 2002); MINN. STAT. § 609.185
(2006); Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.021 (2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (2005); S.D. CODI.
FIED LAWS § 22-16-4 (2006); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 (Vernon 2003); WASH.
REV. CODE § 9A.32.030(1) (c) (2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-1 (West 2005).
65 See, e.g., Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 53-54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (aggravated child abuse); Chapman v. State, 467 S.E.2d 497, 499 (Ga. 1996) (unsafe hunting); Pcoplc v. Jenkins, 545 N.E.2d 986, 994 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (battery); State v.
Ragland, 420 N.W.2d 791, 793 (Iowa 1988) (willful injury), overruled by State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549, 558 (Iowa 2006); State v. Trott, 289 A.2d 414, 419 (Me. 1972)
(assault and battery); Fisher v. State, 786 A.2d 706, 733 n.14 (Md. 2001) (child abuse);
State v. Gorman, 532 N.W.2d 229, 233-34 (Minn. 1995) (assault); State v. Anderson,
513 S.E.2d 296, 311-12 (N.C. 1999) (child abuse); State v. O'Blasney, 297 N.W.2d
797, 799-800 (S.D. 1980) (child abuse); Lawson v. State, 64 S.W.3d 396, 400 & n.20
(Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (aggravated assault); State v. Brigham, 758 P.2d 559, 560
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tury-as in the nineteenth-most impositions of felony murder liability were fair and morally defensible. This is not because modern
reformers preserved an ancient barbaric rule by blunting its worst
implications. It is because no such rule ever existed. Where contemporary felony murder rules are fair, they should not be condemned by
association with some different rule that has existed only in myth.
And where they are unfair, they should be reformed to conform to
principles that can justify felony murder liability as deserved. The
expressive theory of culpability developed in this Article supplies such
principles.
B.

Felony Murder and the Charge of Strict Liability

As noted above, criminal law theorists have almost unanimously
condemned felony murder as a form of strict liability, imposing undeserved punishment for causing death without culpability. Courts,
obliged to impose felony murder liability despite these criticisms, have
sought to defend it as a useful deterrent. 67 Do these deterrence rationales justify felony murder liability? I will argue that they do not.
Courts have sometimes argued that felony murder liability, even
if undeserved, deters predicate felonies. 68 To threaten prospective
felons with a small chance of a large penalty would subject them to a
punishment lottery. 69 There is little reason to expect such punishment lotteries to deter efficiently, however. To be sure, some legal
economists have urged the efficiency of inflicting greater punishment
on a smaller number of offenders, in order to reduce apprehension,
(Wash. 1988) (assault); State v. Smith, No. 21526-8-II, 1998 Wash. App. LEXIS 1106,

*17-18, n.1 (Wash. Ct. App. July 23, 1998) (assault).
66 See cases cited supra note 59.
67 See, e.g., People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 133 (Cal. 1965) (en banc); Baker
v. State, 377 So. 2d 17, 19-20 (Fla. 1979); State v. Allen, 875 A.2d 724, 729-30 (Md.
2005); State v. Maldonado, 645 A.2d 1165, 1172 (N.J. 1994); State v. Martin, 573 A.2d
1359, 1368 (N.J. 1990); State v. Ervin, 577 A.2d 1273, 1277 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1990).
68 See, e.g., People v. Patterson, 778 P.2d 549, 558 (Cal. 1989); Linehan v. State,
442 So. 2d 244, 254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Goodseal, 553 P.2d 279, 286
(Kan. 1976), overruled by State v. Underwood, 615 P.2d 153, 163 (Kan. 1980); Martin,
573 A.2d at 1368.
69 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 48 (Neill H. Alford, Jr. et al.
eds., Gryphon Eds., Ltd. 1982) (1881); THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY ET AL., NOTES
ON THE INDIAN PENAL CODE (1837), reprinted in 7 THE MISCELLANEOUS WORKS OF LORD
MACAULAY 221, 313 n.M (Lady Trevelyan ed., Phila., Univ. Library Ass'n 1890); FRANCIS WHARTON,

A

TREATISE ON THE LAw OF HOMICIDE IN THE UNITED STATES

§ 56, at 39

n.3 (Phila., Kay & Bro. 2d ed. 1875); Roth & Sundby, supra note 3, at 452 & n.35.
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litigation, and administrative costs. 7 0 In addition, criminal law theo-

rist Kevin Cole has argued that a small risk of felony murder liability
may be more salient to potential felons than a slight increase in liability for the underlying felony. 7 1 Such intuitions about the salience of
severe penalties also support the widespread assumption that a small
chance of capital punishment must deter murder. However, despite
some recent claims to the contrary, 72 this assumption has never been
73
confirmed empirically.
In any case, most analysts consider punishment lotteries an inefficient deterrent strategy. Empirical investigations indicate that
increases in the certainty of punishment are more effective deterrents
than increases in the severity of punishment. 74 Many reasons have
been proposed for this effect. One is a widespread psychological disposition to discount low probability dangers. 75 In addition, we may
expect a decline in the marginal disutility of imprisonment as
sentences lengthen, for three reasons. First, there are some psychic
costs of imprisonment that do not depend on length of sentence. For
example, incarceration may have a permanently stigmatic effect irrespective of the length of imprisonment. Second, because of adaptive
preference formation, inmates may find the status degradation they
experience upon entering prison much harder than the low status
70 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the
Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 880, 883-85 (1979).
71

See Cole, supra note 4, at 113-15.

72 See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is CapitalPunishment Morally Required?
Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703, 713 (2005).
73 SeeJ.J. TOBIAS, CRIME AND POLICE IN ENGLAND 1700-1900, at 139-47 (1979);
John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death
Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 841-45 (2005); Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 1536;
John Donohue &Justin J. Wolfers, The Death Penalty:No Evidencefor Deterrence,ECONOMISTS' VOICE, Apr. 2006, http://bepress.com/ev/vol3/iss5/art3 (follow "Download"
hyperlink).
74 See 3 LEON RADZINOWiCZ, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750, at 452-56 (1957); Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 1546; see
also Johannes Andenaes, General Prevention-Illusion or Reality?, 43J. CRIM. L. CPuMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 176, 192 (1952) ("[M]aximum deterrence does not follow from
the severest punishment . . . ."); Anthony Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence
Severity and Crime: Accepting the Null Hypothesis, in 30 CRIME AND JUSTICE 143, 143
(Michael Tonry ed., 2003) ("[V]ariation in the severity of sanctions is unrelated to
levels of crime."); Isaac Ehrlich, Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and
Empirical Investigation, 81 J. POL. ECON. 521, 544-47 (1973) (noting that the
probability of punishment negatively correlated with crime rate more than the severity of punishment for murder, rape, and robbery, although not necessarily for
burglary).
75 See Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 1540.
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they experience in prison.76 Indeed, criminologist John Darley has
even suggested that short-term inmates are relatively more likely to
remember and describe their incarceration as harsh. 77 Third,
because everyone discounts future welfare to some extent and because
offenders may discount the future more than most, offenders should
78
be less deterred by the last years of a sentence than by the first years.
In addition to the declining marginal disutility of incarceration,
severe but uncertain punishment may undermine deterrence in other
ways. Uncertain punishment may create the impression that extraneous factors, such as corruption or prejudice, determine punishment.
Excessive punishment may erode the moral authority of the law,
reducing voluntary obedience to law. 79 This reduction in the law's
moral authority may also discourage cooperation with law enforcement or provoke resistance among law enforcement officials and so
further undermine certainty of punishment. Thus, insofar as felony
murder liability imposes severe but uncertain punishment, it appears
poorly designed as a device for deterring predicate felonies.
Other courts have said that felony murder liability deters reckless
and negligent killing by felons. 80 This seems true if felony murder is
clearly predicated on recklessness or negligence. Yet it does not
explain why manslaughter liability suffices as a deterrent for reckless
nonfelons, but not for reckless felons. It does not justify the distinctive feature of felony murder liability, which aggravates liability for
unintended homicide based on certain felonious motives.
Legal scholar Kevin Cole offers three deterrence arguments for
enhancing the penalty for culpable killers based on their participation
in enumerated felonies. First, he speculates that felons may be more
deterrable because their predicate felonies involve planning and cal76 SeeJohn Collins Coffee, Jr., Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View
of the Economics of Criminal Sanctions, 17 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 419, 432 (1980).
77 SeeJohn M. Darley, On the Unlikely Prospect of Reducing Crime Rates by Increasing
the Severity of Prison Sentences, 13J.L. & POL'Y 189, 201-02 (2005).
78 See Michael K. Block & Robert C. Lind, An Economic Analysis of Crimes Punishable
by Imprisonment, 4J. LEGAL STUD. 479, 481 (1975); Alon Harel & Uzi Segal, Criminal
Law and BehavioralLaw and Economics: Observations on the Neglected Role of Uncertainty in
DeterringCrime, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 276, 280, 296-97 (1999); A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence, 28J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 12 (1999).
79 See Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory
and the Problem of Crime Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315, 347-48 (1984).
80 See, e.g., People v. Smith, 678 P.2d 886, 891-92 (Cal. 1984) (en banc); People v.
Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 133 (Cal. 1965) (en banc); People v. Hernandez, 215 Cal.
Rptr. 166, 168 (Ct. App. 1985).
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culation. 81 This assumption is dubious, however, based on criminologist Jack Katz's research on armed robbers. Katz shows that their
crimes are sometimes impulsive and are often pursued for expressive
rather than instrumental reasons.8 2 If robbers act against their own
welfare to enact a role or claim a reputation, they are unlikely to be
unusually responsive to deterrent threats. Second, Cole speculates
that those who culpably cause death in the course of felonies may be
more likely to do so again than those who culpably cause death in the
course of other activities. 83 He offers no empirical support for this
intuition and it is hard to see why it should be so. Third, he argues
that felons are harder to deter from culpable killing because they
already face a stiff sentence for the underlying felony. An additional
sentence for homicide will have a lower marginal disutility for all the
reasons explored above. 8 4 This is a clever argument, but it directly
contradicts Cole's earlier argument that felons are easier to deter
from homicide because they calculate. Moreover, if we are concerned
with cost-efficient deterrence, arguably we should ration punishment
to those who will be most easily deterred rather than those who are
hardest to deter.
Courts sometimes claim that deterring culpable killing by felons
justifies strict liability, reasoning that punishment is more certain if
the prosecution need not prove the killer's culpability.8 5 If this argument presumes that prosecutors will charge only culpable killers, it
identifies no incentives for them to do so. And if determining culpability on the basis of prosecutorial suspicion rather than jury conviction really serves utility, why do so only in this class of cases? So let us
instead interpret the argument that strict liability deters culpable killing by felons as presuming that faultless as well as culpable felons will
indeed be punished for causing death under such a rule. Thus construed, the argument is that strict liability for causing harm in the
course of otherwise beneficial activities always has the benefit of deterring culpable harm but comes at the cost of also deterring the beneficial underlying conduct. However, since the underlying activity of
committing felonies is also harmful, there is no cost to deterring it.
86
Kevin Cole offers a version of this argument.
81

See Cole, supra note 4, at 90-92.

82
83
84

SeeJACK KATZ, SEDUCTIONS OF CRIME

175 (1988).

See Cole, supra note 4, at 93.
See id. at 94-95.

85 See, e.g., State v. Martin, 573 A.2d 1359, 1368 (N.J. 1990); Cole, supra note 4, at
89, 96-97.
86 See Cole, supra note 4, at 102.
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985

While this cleaned-up argument for strict liability as a deterrent
to negligence has a certain intuitive appeal, it has two problems. First,
it proves too much: it appears tojustify strict murder liability for causing death in the course of any crime, not just a few very serious and
dangerous felonies. 8 7 But there is a deeper problem that undermines
every form of the argument that felony murder liability deters negligent killing by felons. This is that, as we shall later see, the punishment lottery argument not only disfavors murder liability as a way of
deterring felonies, but it also disfavors punishing any harm as a way of
deterring the imposition of risk.88 Thus, the most efficient deterrent
for negligent conduct-by felons or anyone else-is attaching a small
but certain penalty to each negligent act, rather than imposing murder liability on the much smaller number of negligent acts that happen to result in death. Deterrence theory favors punishing risk rather
than harm. With apologies to Herbert Wechsler, architect of the
Model Penal Code, when the end is to rationalize the law of homicide,
deterrence theory is the wrong place to start. 89
Even if deterrence rationales for felony murder made sense on
their own terms, they would not justify the imposition of felony murder liability. Felony murder liability can only be justified if it is
deserved. In making this claim I take no position on the controversy
as to whether punishment is ultimately justified by desert or utility.
Even if we punish to advance the public welfare by preventing crime,
we can best do so by restricting punishment to the deserving. Most
people obey the criminal law because they approve its demands and
see themselves as law abiding rather than because they fear punishment. 90 Legal scholar Louis Seidman illustrates this by pointing to
high levels of compliance with obligations of military service during
wartime, despite the fact that such service is often more burdensome
87 About half the states predicate manslaughter on an unlawful act, although the
trend is away from such rules. See LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 15.5, at 800-01. Moreover, unlawful-act manslaughter is generally premised on the danger of the unlawful
act or the foreseeability of death. See id. § 15.5(a), at 801-04.
88 See infra text accompanying notes 226-32.
89 See generally Herbert Wechsler &Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUM. L. Rv. 701, 730-61 (1937) (providing a normative analysis of homicide law based on considerations of deterrence). This article is generally seen as the
origin of the culpability scheme incorporated into the Model Penal Code.
90 See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 62-66 (1968);
ALF Ross, ON GUILT, RESPONSIBILITY AND PUNISHMENT 37-38 (1975); Johannes
Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 949, 950
(1966); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
401, 406, 409-13 (1958); Paul H. Robinson &John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91
Nw. U. L. REv. 453, 468-70 (1997); Seidman, supra note 79, at 333-36.
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than incarceration. 9' Seidman reasons that punishment motivates
compliance more by threatening to impose deserved blame than by
threatening to inflict suffering. 9 2 By eroding the law's moral authority
and obscuring its commands, undeserved punishment may therefore
provoke more crime than it deters. 93 Moreover, the anxiety aroused
by the prospect of undeserved punishment may outweigh the security
provided by any reduction in crime. 94 As I have elsewhere shown,Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism was centrally concerned with assuring
citizens they would not be oppressed by public officials. 9 5 Thus, even
if systematically punishing the undeserving deterred crime, that would
not mean it would maximize utility.96 Other things being equal, punishment discourages crime more effectively, and with less damage to
public confidence in government, when it is deserved. Thus even utilitarian defenders of felony murder must meet its critics on the ground
of desert and refute the claim that it imposes punishment without
culpability.
The widespread view of felony murder as strict liability rests on
three contestable premises: the myth of the common law felony murder rule, discussed above; 9 7 a narrowly formalistic conception of strict
liability; and the cognitive conception of culpability. The myth of a
common law rule imposing liability for all unintended deaths in the
course of all felonies supports the prevailing view of felony murder as
a strict liability crime. Murder liability for truly accidental death during felonies neither violent nor dangerous would have constituted
strict liability on any definition of that contested term. Yet the history
summarized above reveals that felony murder has generally been
predicated on a narrow class of dangerous felonies, and has usually
required an act of violence or an act foreseeably dangerous to human
91 See Seidman, supra note 79, at 333.
92 See id. at 334-35.
93 See, e.g., ANDREW SINCLAIR, ERA OF EXCESS 220-41 (Harper & Row 1964) (1962)
(describing the creation of speakeasies and the widespread bootlegging of the 1920s
as part of a system of organized crime that became respectable after the passage of
prohibition laws and the closing of saloons).
94

See ROBERT E. GOODIN, UTILITARIANISM AS A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 70 (1995);

(1962), reprinted in
158, 181-82 (1968); John Rawls, Two Concepts of
Rules, 44 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955), reprintedin PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT
82, 90-91 (Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972).
95 See Guyora Binder & Nicholas J. Smith, Framed: Utilitarianismand Punishment of
the Innocent, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 115, 174-76 (2000).
96 See id. at 211-12; Binder, supra note 19, at 325-27.
97 See supra Part I.A.
H.L.A.
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life. 98 Once we acknowledge felony murder's relatively benign history, we can see that the validity of the strict liability charge depends
on what we mean by "strict liability."
The meaning of strict liability is contested, particularly in crimi-

nal law.9 9 Broadly speaking, "strict liability" means liability without
moral fault. In private and regulatory law, where there are social costs
of profitable activities to be distributed, strict liability may be useful
and not unfair. In criminal law, however, where liability implies
blame and imposes uncompensated suffering, liability without moral
fault seems contradictory. In this area of law, "strict liability" is an
epithet implying "undeserved punishment." Accordingly, the power
to define the concept of strict liability is the power to define the limits
of legitimate criminal law making.
The drafters of the Model Penal Code developed an influential
scheme for defining and analyzing offense elements that includes a
technical definition of strict liability. In this scheme, a criminal
offense consists of one or more objective elements, with a culpable

mental state corresponding to each.' 00 Thus every offense must
involve at least one act or omission and possibly additional circumstance and result elements.' 0 ' To be guilty the offender must have a
culpable mental state of negligence, recklessness, knowledge, or purpose.with respect to each of these objective elements. 10 2 According to
this scheme, failure to require proof of a culpable mental state with
respect to each objective element makes an offense strict liability. 1 3
Criminal law theorist Ken Simons has dubbed this esoteric conception (punishment for an offense containing an objective element
without a corresponding mental state) "formal" strict liability. 10 4 He
calls the more familiar conception (liability without moral fault) "substantive" strict liability. 10 5 Formal strict liability need not entail sub-

stantive strict liability. Thus, a legislature may impose deserved
punishment for carelessly causing harm by two different means: by
conditioning punishment on awareness of risk, or by conditioning it
98
99

See supra Part I.A.
See Mark Kelman, Strict Liability: An Unorthodox View, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CRIME AND JUSTICE 1512, 1512-14 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983); Simons, supra note
4, at 1079-83.
100 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (1962).
101 See id.
102 See id.
103 See id. § 2.05(2)(a) (using the phrase "absolute liability" rather than "strict
liability").
104 See Simons, supra note 4, at 1085-88.
105 See id.
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on particularly dangerous conduct that the legislature regards as culpable per se. The second approach does not require proof of a culpable mental state with respect to the proscribed harm, and adds an
additional objective element-the dangerous conduct-without a corresponding culpable mental state. 10 6 As such, it imposes strict liability
in the formal sense, but not in the substantive sense.
If felony murder requires no proof of any culpable mental state
with respect to death, it imposes strict liability in the formal sense. Yet
it may nevertheless condition liability on moral fault by substituting a
per se culpability rule for a culpability standard. A legislature may
conclude that certain conduct poses a significant enough risk of death
that its commission implies negligence or recklessness with respect to
death. By providing notice of thisjudgment through a statutory rule,
the legislature estops a defendant from pleading ignorance of this
risk. A dangerous felonies limitation provides such a per se rule.
Another way of conditioning felony murder liability on conduct inherently dangerous to life is to condition the element of "killing" on violent methods of causing death, as eighteenth-century English law did.
In these ways, felony murder rules can substantively require culpability
with respect to a risk of death, even when they do not do so formally.
Finally, a felony murder rule can require a foreseeable risk of death as
part of the proof of causation rather than as a separate mental element. Although formally a crime of strict liability, such a felony murder rule nevertheless requires culpability.
The charge that felony murder liability is a form of strict liability
may have a different meaning, however. A critic of felony murder
rules might concede that they effectively condition murder liability on
negligence with respect to a risk of death, but object that negligence is
not a legitimate form of culpability. According to the Model Penal
Code's influential definitions of culpable mental states, the imposition
of risk is negligent when the actor should be aware that she is imposing a substantial and unjustifiable risk.' 0 7 Thus a requirement of negligence can be satisfied by conduct a reasonable person would
recognize as dangerous, even if the actor fails-presumably unreasonably-to advert to the danger. For example, an armed robber who
threatens a victim with a loaded gun might simply expect that he can
control the weapon, the victim will obey, the robbery will go according
to plan, and no one will get hurt-and so might never advert to the
various ways creating such a volatile situation could result in death.
The motel clerk killer described in the introduction is such a rob106
107

See Kelman, supra note 99, at 1516-18.
§ 2.02(2)(d).
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ber. 0 8 For criminal law theorists with a strictly cognitive view of culpability, such unreasonably inadvertent risk imposition is merely stupid,
but not morally culpable. 0 9 On this cognitive view, if criminal negligence does not require actual awareness of risk, it cannot be a form of
culpability. It follows that, if felony murder is conditioned on negligent imposition of a risk of death, it imposes strict liability, even in the
substantive sense. The negligent actor might be morally at fault for a
wrongful act that inadvertently causes harm, but not for the harm
itself.
The defender of negligence liability may respond in one of two
ways: either she may insist that negligence is a form of cognitive culpability, or she may offer some alternative conception of culpability. If
she takes the first approach, she may define negligence as actual
awareness of some unjustified risk less substantial than that required
for recklessness. Or she might argue that negligence is a second
order cognitive failure. Thus, one who fails to inform herself about
the risks of an activity or who impairs her own capacity to perceive
risks might be seen as cognitively culpable for resulting harms. Some
commentators have tried to develop cognitive accounts of unreasonable failure to perceive risks. 110 According to these accounts, actors are
cognitively culpable if they are aware of facts from which they would
infer risk if they thought about it.11 We might say they have notice
rather than knowledge of risk, or that their knowledge of risk is
"tacit." This might describe an unreflective armed robber like our
motel clerk killer. If asked, he might acknowledge that a gun pointed
at a victim might go off if he fumbles it, or if the victim, a witness, or a
law enforcement officer startles him, or that one of these parties
might pull a gun and fire, perhaps hitting a bystander.
Yet I am not sure this hypothetical knowledge or notice really
suffices to justify holding the robber culpable for a foreseeable death.
After all, he might never pose questions to himself about how things
might go wrong. He might habitually act, not on the basis of reasoned expectations about the consequences of his actions, but instead
on the basis of desired or wished for consequences. This certainly
108 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
109 See Larry Alexander, Reconsidering the Relationship Among Voluntary Acts, Strict
Liability, and Negligence in CriminalLaw, 7 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y, Spring 1990, at 84, 101;
Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63 COLUM. L.
REv. 632, 634-37 (1963).
110 See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Opaque Recklessness, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
597, 600 (2001); Stephen P. Garvey, What's Wrong with Involuntary Manslaughter?, 85
TEX. L. REv. 333, 335-38 (2006).
111 See Ferzan, supra note 110, at 600; Garvey, supra note 110, at 335-38.
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seems true of many bank robbers, for example, who perform their
dramas on camera and in front of dozens of witnesses, and consequently face an eighty percent prospect of apprehension.' 12 In other
words, the risks robbers unthinkingly impose on themselves are far
greater and more apparent than the risks they impose on others. But
when someone systematically tries to enact unrealistic fantasies rather
than thinking about likely consequences, does her moral fault really
depend upon tacit knowledge of risk? Or does it depend, as some
"character theorists" claim, on a faulty process of practical reasoning
that dismisses risk as irrelevant?11 3 If so, negligence seems to depend
on character or motivation, not just on cognition.
This reasoning pushes us to broaden our conception of culpability beyond the cognitive, so as to include the robber's negligence
toward victims. On the expressive theory of culpability explored
below, 11 4 the robber's moral fault lies in the social meaning of her
actions, the implication that her desires should have priority over the
safety of others. On such a view the actor is at fault not for the unexamined and yet tacit cognitive implications of her action, but instead
for the unexamined and yet tacit normative implications of her
actions. 115 So it seems that the legitimacy of the negligence component of felony murder liability will also depend on the choice between
cognitive and expressive theories of culpability discussed in the next
subpart.
Critics of felony murder tend to elide the difference between formal and substantive strict liability. By calling felony murder a strict
liability offense, critics create the impiession that felony murder rules
impose liability without moral fault. Often, however, their objection
really concerns only the form of the offense definition. In other cases,
the charge of strict liability disguises an objection to conditioning
criminal liability on negligence.
112 KATZ, supra note 82, at 164.
113 See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 7, at 593-98 (judging fault by role-based standards of conduct rather than by awareness of risk); Jeremy Horder, Gross Negligence
and Criminal Culpability, 47 U. TORONTO LJ. 495, 500-03, 507, 514-15 (1997) (viewing
the indifferent person as responsible for his or her conduct because he or she acts
contrary to the dictates of practical reasoning); cf R.A. DuFF, INTENTION, AGENCY AND
CRIMINAL LtAIuLITY 157-67 (1990) (describing the failure to notice a risk as a culpable
type of indifference); Huigens, supra note 7, at 1475 ("The reasonable person standard is but a particular expression of the demand implicit in all inculpation: in the
conduct of one's affairs, one must exercise sound practical judgment.").
114 See infra Part IV.
115 Duff offers such a view in Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability. See DUFF,
supra note 113, at 121-34, 158-63.
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Felony Murder and Two Conceptions of Culpability

Even if a critic were to concede that a felony murder rule conditioned liability on negligence with respect to a danger of death, and
that negligence is a legitimate form of culpability, she might still
object that negligence is not enough culpability to warrant murder liability. But I have argued that felony murder involves two kinds of culpability: negligently imposing a significant and apparent risk of death,
and doing so for a very bad motive. So the justice of felony murder
comes down to the question of the relevance of motive to culpability.
We have already noted that some theorists object to criminal negligence as not a purely cognitive mental state. 1 16 Based on such a
purely cognitive view of culpability, felonious motives cannot contribute to culpability either. Thus, the felony murder problem poses a
stark choice between two very different conceptions of culpability.
Suppose Brutus considers his country's leader a tyrant who rules
only because the people have grown too cowardly and corrupt to overthrow him. He plans an assassination attempt, which he expects will
prove futile and suicidal. He hopes that his martyrdom will demonstrate the regime's illegitimacy and inspire others to rise in resistance.
Suppose that, to his surprise and satisfaction, he succeeds in assassinating the leader. How culpable is he for this death? Not so much, if
we limit his culpability to his modest expectations, but much more if
we consider the grandiose purpose and meaning of his actions. Yet if
we are willing to consider Brutus' political motives in assessing his culpability, perhaps we should also evaluate them. Is the leader Hider or
Lincoln? The problem of Brutus' culpability illustrates the conflict
between two views of culpability. A test that considers only his expectations is purely cognitive. By contrast, a test that examines his reasons in order to identify and assess the values expressed by his act is
expressive.
The cognitive and expressive views of culpability reflect two competing approaches to conceptualizing subjective criteria of liability in
the criminal law, one descriptive and one normative. Criminal law
theorist George Fletcher explained this distinction in Rethinking Criminal Law, as follows:
One of the persistent tensions in legal terminology runs
between the descriptive and normative uses of the same terms. Witness the struggle over the concept of malice. The term has a high
moral content, and when it came into the law as the benchmark of
murder, it was presumably used normatively and judgmentally.
Yet... English jurists have sought to reduce the concepts of malice
116

See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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to the specific mental states of intending and knowing. California
judges, in contrast, have stressed the normative content of malice in
a highly judgmental definition, employing terms like "base, antisocial purpose" and "wanton disregard for human life." For the
English, malice is a question of fact: did the actor have a particular
state of consciousness (intention or knowledge)? In California, malice is a value judgment about the actor's motives, attitudes and per1 17
sonal capacity.
Fletcher found the same ambiguity in terms like "intent," "criminal
intent," and "culpability":
Thus the term "criminal intent" may mean the intent to act under
circumstances that make it just to treat the actor as a criminal in the
pejorative sense. . . . But it is equally plausible to use the term
"criminal intent" to refer to the intent or knowledge sufficient to
commit a crime as defined by the legislature.' '8
Fletcher traced the ambiguity of subjective liability standards to a fundamental theoretical disagreement:
Descriptive theorists seek to minimize the normative content of the
criminal law in order to render it, in their view, precise and free
from the passions of subjective moral judgment....
...
[T] he reality of judgment, blame and punishment in the criminal process generates the contrary pressure and insures that the
quest for a value-free science of law cannot succeed .... 119
The cognitive view of culpability aims at a value-free description
of culpability by reducing it to beliefs regarding the states of affairs
accompanying or resulting from conduct. It is based on a conception
of the liberal state as a value-neutral framework for the pursuit of private ends. This conception has roots in two nineteenth-century variants of liberalism, utilitarianism and rights theory. 12 0 Utilitarians held
that while acts could be judged better or worse on the basis of their
hedonic consequences for all, all acts were motivated by the same
morally neutral desire for pleasure. 121 Since the content of utility was
determined by desires, desires themselves could not be evaluated.
The utilitarian state could regulate harmful conduct, but not the
desires motivating it. Rights theory justified a limited state with only
those coercive powers rational individuals would concede in a state of

117
118
119

GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW

120
121

See supra note 16.
See infra Part II.A.

Id. at 397-98.
Id. at 400-01.
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nature to secure a sphere of freedom for each individual. 122 Within
this tradition, ends were private matters, beyond the competence of
the state to regulate. 12 3 Since individuals had a natural right of selfdefense against harm in a state of nature, they could delegate this
right to the state as their agent. Thus only harm to others could justify
the coercive and punitive power of the liberal state. Both utilitarianism and rights theory could support a conception of the criminal law
as a value-neutral scheme for regulating the harmful consequences of
action, without regard to its motivating ends. Indeed, the philosopher
John Stuart Mill invoked both traditions in articulating this "harm
principle." 12 4 Based on the harm principle, the cognitive view defines
culpability in terms of expected consequences rather than ends.
Thus, it focuses on the risk of harm apparent to an actor in choosing
one act over another, whether harm is conceived as disutility or rights
violation.
The harm principle has recently gained authority in American
criminal law as a result of the Supreme Court's widely hailed decision
in Lawrence v. Texas,12 5 striking down criminal proscriptions of private
consensual homosexual acts. 126 The Court reasoned that mere moral
disapproval was an insufficient basis for interfering with private conduct that plays an important role in the development and expression
of personal identity. 127 The State could not punish the pursuit of
such personally important ends merely because it disapproved them;
the State could only punish such conduct insofar as it threatened
harm to others. 28 On the other hand, the scope of this constitutional
harm principle remains uncertain. For example, in Wisconsin v. Mitch1 29 and Ohio v. Wyant 130
elP
the Court had previously upheld penalty
enhancements for otherwise harmful or dangerous offenses motivated
by bigotry. 131 The Court rejected the arguments that such hate crime
122 JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 136, 142-43 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1698).
123 For the influence of this conception of rights in nineteenth-century legal
thought, see generally Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in AnalyticalJurisprudencefrom Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 975, and Robert W. Gordon, Legal
Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise, 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS
AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70 (Gerald Geison ed., 1983).
124 See MILL, supra note 16, at 9-10.
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

539 U.S. 558 (2003).
See id. at 578-79.
See id. at 577-78.
See id. at 578.
508 U.S. 476 (1993).
508 U.S. 969 (1993).
See id. at 969; Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 488-90.
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enhancements infringed freedom of speech and improperly penalized unpopular political opinions. 1 32 Regardless of the scope and
authority of the harm principle in constitutional law, however, it has
13 3
broad support among contemporary criminal law theorists.
The cognitive conception of culpability is sometimes supported
by a second tenet of liberal criminal justice, which we may call the
choice principle. This is the principle that criminal liability should be
conditioned on willed conduct. Based on this principle, several theorists have adopted a "choice theory" of culpability, which limits culpable mental states to two kinds: (1) the decision to perform (or forgo)
an action and (2) expectations concerning the consequences of such
choices. 1 34 Choice theorists often exclude from culpable mental
states motives, emotions, dispositions, statuses, and most desires, on
the ground that none of these are chosen. 135 Notice that the harm
principle and the choice principle rest on somewhat contradictory
premises. The harm principle presumes that the choice of ends is an
important personal freedom that must be protected from government
coercion. By contrast, the choice principle presumes that ends are
unchosen so that punishing them is unfair and pointlessly cruel.
An exemplary cognitive view of culpability is set forth by legal theorist Larry Alexander in his article Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability.136 Alexander argues that all the
different forms of culpability can be reduced to one, "insufficient concern," by which he means the conscious imposition of a net risk of
harm.13 7 He begins with recklessness, defined by the Model Penal
Code as the conscious imposition of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk. l3 8 He argues that the substantiality and unjustifiability of the risk
should be seen not as two independent criteria, but as a single balancing standard.13 9 Thus, a substantial risk can be justified by a more
substantial expected benefit, whereas even a small risk is imposed
recklessly if there is no justifying purpose. A purpose of producing a
small benefit would be "insufficient" to justify a large risk. Alexander
sees knowing creation of harm as simply recklessness with awareness
132 See Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 488-90.
133 See Harcourt, supra note 16, at 131-38 (noting the ascendancy of the harm
principle in legal philosophy, criminal law scholarship, and actual criminal law).
134 MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME 405 (1997).
135 See id. at 405-06.
136 Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability,
88 CAL. L. REv. 931 (2000).
137 See id. at 931-32.
138 See id. at 933.
139 See id. at 934-35.
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of a very high probability of harm. 140 He argues that a purpose of
causing harm should be seen as pertinent to culpability only because
such a purpose implies (1) some conscious imposition of risk, how41
ever slight, and (2) that this risk, however slight, is unjustified.'
Alexander concludes that purpose is just "a special case of recklessness, in which the defendant's reason is presumptively unjustifying."'142 Alexander purports to combine culpable knowledge (i.e.,
expected harm) and culpable desires (i.e., "unjustifying" purposes)
into a single calculus. Yet what matters in Alexander's calculus of "sufficient concern" is only expectation, not desire. 143 For Alexander, a
harmful purpose is no worse than a neutral purpose: neither is sufficient to justify risk. 144 Dropping a brick onto a crowded street hoping
to kill someone is no worse than doing so hoping to make a loud
noise. And even a beneficial purpose is only relevant to the extent the
actor expects to achieve it. Ultimately, insufficient concern means
nothing more than expected net harm.
Alexander is concerned exclusively with the actor's subjective
expectations rather than the objective dangerousness or actual consequences of her conduct. 145 Accordingly, Alexander rejects negligence
as a form of culpability insofar as it imposes liability based on the
objectively apparent dangerousness of conduct rather than subjective
awareness of risk. 14 6 Similarly, he would punish completed attempts
as severely as completed crimes on the ground that both involve the
same subjective expectation of harm. 14 7 Indeed, since attempting to
cause harm is no worse than expecting to cause harm, he would
extend this principle to reckless conduct. Thus, he would punish
reckless endangerment of life as severely as reckless homicide.1 48
140 See id. at 942-43. Alexander concedes that under prevailing law the justifiability of that harm by expected countervailing benefits is considered separately, as part
of the issue of wrongdoing, rather than as part of the calculus of culpability. See id. at
943.
141

See id. at 943.

142

Id.

143

See id. at 942-44.

144

See id.

145

See id. at 936.

See id.
147 See Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 5 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 28
(1994); Larry Alexander & Kimberly D. Kessler, Mens Rea and Inchoate Crimes, 87 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1138, 1174-78 (1997); Alexander, supra note 109, at 101-03.
148 See Alexander, supra note 136, at 946-47 ("[B]ecause I would not distinguish
between 'attempts' and 'successes' [in complicity cases] . . . all that would matter is
what harms the defendant unjustifiably risked."); Alexander & Kessler, supra note
146
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Criminal law theorist Kimberly Ferzan embraces a similarly cognitive view of culpability. Criticizing Ken Simons' proposal that culpability be assessed on the basis of desires as well as expectations, Ferzan
writes:
If we are to rest culpability on desires, how should we do this in
those cases where the desires conflict? . . . Are we culpable only if

the stronger desire is the "bad" one? Arguably, it is the desire that
one acts upon that makes one culpable or not. But why? . .. Why

does it matter that one desire won the day? Here, the response
seems clear-because I chose to act on that desire. But then, it
seems that culpability is not dependent upon a ... desire state but
14 9
the choice that one makes.

In making this argument, Ferzan relies on criminal law theorist
Michael Moore's account of culpability as choice. Moore reasons that
only intentions should count as culpable mental states since only they
are chosen, whereas desires, emotions, and dispositions or character
traits are all beyond our control. 15 0 Posing the hypothetical case of a
defendant who is horrified upon fatally shooting her lover in a game
of Russian roulette, Ferzan asks, "Is the Russian roulette player less
culpable because she cries when her companion dies? Of course not.
[Such] desires are irrelevant because faced with the choice, the actor
chose to do wrong." 15 1 Ferzan argues that assessing culpability on the
basis of desire rather than choice may unfairly punish actors for
thoughts they are powerless to suppress or character traits they are
15 2
powerless to change.

Legal philosopher Heidi Hurd offers a similar argument in her
critique of hate crime liability. She characterizes a hostile motive
147, at 1176-78 (saying that recklessness should suffice for attempt liability "regardless of the mens rea required" for the completed crime).
149 Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Don't Abandon the Model Penal Code Yet! Thinking
Through Simons's Rethinking, 6 Burr. CrM. L. REV. 185, 209 (2002).
150 See MooRE, supra note 134, at 405-06.
151 Ferzan, supra note 149, at 210.
152 See id. at 209-12. Stephen Morse agrees that "affect and emotion" are "not
intentional and simply happen[ ] to us" and that "[ t ] houghts, desires, and character
are not primarily a product of our reason." Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results, and
CriminalResponsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 369. He would limit culpability to the
intent to do an act that unreasonably places another at risk. See id. at 376. Nevertheless his account of culpability falls short of a fully cognitive theory. For no articulated
reason he accepts the conventional view that purposefully creating a risk is worse than
knowingly creating it, even though he professes to think that such destructive desires
are unchosen and hence morally irrelevant. See id. He also holds that the actual
occurrence of harm is morally irrelevant so that homicides should only be punished
as attempts or acts of endangerment. See id. at 394.
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toward a group as a kind of emotion that is too imprecise to count as a
culpable mental state:
[H]ate/bias crimes are concerned with defendants' motivations for
action in a way that no other crimes have ever been concerned....
[These] motivations . . . are emotional states that attend actions

(rather than future states of affairs to which actions are instrumental means).... [T]he emotional states with which these crimes are
concerned constitute standing character traits rather than occurrent mental states (such as intentions, purposes, choices, etc.)....
[T]he additional penalties that are imposed on defendants who are
found guilty of hate/bias crimes constitute, in the end, punish153
ments for bad character.
According to this argument, enhancing the penalty for doing harm
because of an actor's political antipathies punishes her for emotions
that express enduring character traits:
[O]ne may form an intention to do an act ... without being disposed to do such an act .... But one cannot hate or be prejudiced
against Asians and women without being a racist and a sexist-that
is, without being disposed to ... believe derogatory things about
them and to act in ways that oppress them .... [Thus] hate/bias
54
crimes necessarily punish defendants for having bad character.1

Hurd sees such punishment as undesirable for two reasons. First, it is
unfair because racist and sexist political views, although reprehensible, are beyond the capacity of the perpetrator to control. 15 5 Second,
liberalism precludes punishing any such "conception of the good life"
because reasonable people can disagree about such views. 1 56 Hurd
struggles unsuccessfully to reconcile these contradictory views of
racism and sexism as (1) wrongful but involuntary emotions, and (2)
15 7
freely and reasonably chosen conceptions of the good.
On cognitivist premises, the worst possible culpable mental state
accompanying homicide is knowledge that the conduct would result
153
PHIL.

154
155
156
157

Heidi M. Hurd, Why Liberals Should Hate "Hate Crime Legislation, " 20 LAw &

215, 216 (2001).

Id. at 223-24.
See id. at 224-26.
Id. at 229.
Thus, Hurd offers the following bewildering conclusion:
Out of deference to the fact that persons' liberty to pursue their own conceptions of the good life is chilled by threats of strict liability, liberals typically predicate moral and legal responsibility on matters of choice. Because
persons cannot choose their character traits . . . virtues and vices have
appeared to liberals to be inappropriate candidates for praise and blame,
rewards and punishments.
Id. at 230.
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in death. A purpose to cause death should not aggravate the actor's
culpability, 158 because (1) one who knowingly causes a consequence
chooses it as much as one who causes it purposefully, and (2) liberal
neutrality precludes evaluating the actor's desires and hopes. The liberal state cannot condemn such a desire without judging and prescribing ends for its citizens. Thus, the cognitive model also treats the
offender as fully culpable for choosing to proceed in a course of conduct certain to cause death, even if he regrets that result. He is just as
dangerous to the utility or rights of a victim if he regrets the harm he
expects to cause as if he exults in it. Expected harm is the sole dimension of culpability.' 59 Thus, if knowingly causing death is murder,
causing death with any lesser expectation of doing so must be a lesser
crime. Causing death recklessly-i.e., with knowledge of a substantial
risk of death-should be manslaughter. Indeed, the logic of the cognitive model requires that a reckless killing should be no more than
manslaughter, even if the risk-taker hopes the victim dies and is gratified when she does. If even a purpose of causing death cannot aggravate one's culpability, it follows that a purpose of causing some other
harm, like taking property, or violating sexual autonomy, cannot
aggravate liability for negligent homicide. Thus, within the cognitive
model of culpability, a felony murder rule irrationally imposes murder
liability for merely negligent homicide.
While utilitarians and rights theorists may share an aspiration to
achieve a value-neutral liberal state and converge on a cognitive conception of culpability, they define harm very differently. This in turn
gives them very different accounts of how cognitive culpability makes
the wrongdoer responsible for harm.
Utilitarianism defines harm as net loss of aggregate utility and
culpability as expected net disutility. We shall see that this conception
of harm is prospective and speculative. 160 Based on such a conception, it is not possible to assign causal responsibility for particular
results. Instead, punishment can only be imposed justifiably for creating risk. Thus, even if utilitarianism could justify a purely cognitive
and so value-neutral conception of culpability, it would not be able to
apply that conception to crimes of result like homicide. 61
158 Moore and Hurd see a purpose of causing harm as culpable, but only because
it implies an expectation of causing harm. See MooRE, supra note 134, at 408-09;
Hurd, supra note 153, at 218, 223.
159 See DuIT, supra note 113, at 75-76, 109 (attributing this view of homicide to
utilitarianism and similar consequentialist views); Alexander, supra note 136, at
939-44; Ferzan, supra note 149, at 208-12.
160 See infra Part 1I.B.
161

See infra Part II.C.
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Rights theory, by contrast, defines harm as discrete rights violations and so defines culpability in terms of expectations of these particular results. We shall see that both defining particular results as
harms and assigning causal responsibility for harms involves the state
in evaluating actors' ends. 162 We shall also see that punishing actual
harm rather than risk is hard to justify without adverting to the actors'
ends or values. 163 Rights theory can only provide a persuasive account
of criminal responsibility for particular results if it evaluates actors'
ends, and so abandons a purely cognitive conception of culpability.
The cognitive theory of culpability for harmful results that
prevails among contemporary criminal law theorists is an incoherent
pastiche of these two inconsistent accounts of wrongdoing. It appears
that a purely cognitive account of culpability-even if achievablewould preclude liability for results. From the standpoint of such a
theory, felony murder liability would indeed be anomalous, but only
because all homicide liability would be anomalous. Conversely, a
coherent account of homicide liability would evaluate the ends pursued in causing death, as felony murder liability does.
Such a theory of culpability would be normative rather than
descriptive in its aspirations. The expressive theory defended in Part
IV of this Article is such a normative theory of culpability. It is expressive because it treats action as expressively as well as instrumentally
motivated. In other words, people do not act only in order to bring
about preferred states of affairs. They also act in order to identify
themselves with certain value commitments and social roles. By these
means they can realize their identities, achieve social status, and win
esteem. Thus, actors often participate in social practices that use
shared understandings to coordinate the actions of many people in
service to common values. Such action typically has communicative as
well as causal effects. By engaging in socially recognized normative
practices, actors express commitment to values and expect others to
judge them on the basis of these values. An expressive theory of culpability invites the criminal law to make use of such normative judgments in assigning blame and desert. It still inquires into the
expectations accompanying action, but only because this knowledge is
relevant in deciphering the values expressed by such action. After
interpreting actions to identify their expressed values, the expressive
theorist would assess the moral worth of those values. She would
assign causal or accessorial responsibility for harmful consequences
insofar as those consequences represent the values expressed by the
162
163

See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.C.
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offense. The expressive theory acknowledges thatjudgments of culpability, causal responsibility, and complicity are interpretive judgments,
inevitably guided by cultural norms and aesthetic criteria.
II.

UTILITARIANISM AND COGNITIVE CULPABILITY

A.

The Utilitarian Origins of Cognitivism

Utilitarianism justifies inflicting criminal punishment insofar as
the suffering avoided by thus deterring (and otherwise preventing)
criminal offenses outweighs the suffering imposed. Criminal offenses
are simply those likely harmful acts deterrable at reasonable cost by
proscription and punishment. Because utilitarianism aims at deterrence, it views the decision whether to offend as a rational calculus of
costs and benefits, and assesses it accordingly. The offender is not
punished for having selfish aims-that is expected and even necessary
if punishment is to deter. The offender is instead punished for failing
to consider and internalize the expected costs to others of pursuing
those aims. Thus he is punished only insofar as he is aware of these
expected costs, or would be with a reasonable investment in information. He is punished only if cognitively culpable.
The idea that the mental element of offenses should not include
motive emerged out of the utilitarian tradition. One of legal philosopher Jeremy Bentham's main goals was to develop a lucid, value-free
164
language for policy analysis, legal analysis, and legislative drafting.
In developing this language, Bentham distinguished motive from
intent. 165 Bentham drew many of his most fundamental ideas indirectly from the Swiss utilitarian, Baron Helvetius, 166 who argued that
the same basic human passions-the desire for pleasure and satisfaction, and the fear of pain and want-were the motivating force
behind both good and bad actions. 167 Differing environmental circumstances might channel the same passions into beneficial or harmful actions. Thus, the task of the moral philosopher was to design laws
that would shape incentives beneficially, rather than to denounce pas1 68
sions as immoral.
In designing criminal legislation, Bentham agreed that the passions motivating human behavior were an inevitable fixture of human
psychology, and so could not be used to distinguish criminal from
164
95, at
165
166
167
168

See Binder, Rhetoric of Motive, supra note 7, at 28; Binder & Smith, supra note
176-82.
See Binder, Rhetoric of Motive, supra note 7, at 28.
See Binder & Smith, supra note 95, at 156.
CLAUDE HELVETIUS, DE L'ESPRIT 229-35 (photo. reprint 1970) (1810).
See id. at 7, 10, 29, 39, 124-25.
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innocent behavior. 169 Bentham identified motives as the forces that
deterrent sanctions were designed to mobilize in controlling behavior;
but because these motives were both indestructible and useful, they
could not be punished. "[A] motive ... is to be understood [as] any
thing whatsoever, which by influencing the will of a sensitive being, is
supposed to serve as a means of determining him to act, or voluntarily
to forebear to act, upon any occasion."'17 0 Bentham objected to predicating liability on motives because he saw the language of motives as
saturated with normative judgment.171 Yet no motive, Bentham
argued, is bad in itself, because all motives are ultimately the same:
the desire for pleasure and the fear of pain. 172 An action is only good
or bad because of its hedonic effects, not its motives.
However, the irrelevance of motive did not mean that mental criteria of liability were useless. While the purpose of criminal law was to
deter harmful behavior, this could only be done by punishing behavior that actors expected to cause harm. Since deterrence operated on
the basis of actors' expectations, it could only work insofar as actors
knew they were or might be engaging in punishable conduct. 173 Thus
there was a utilitarian rationale for conditioning liability on either the
expectation of harmful results or knowledge of circumstances that
rendered action harmful. Deterrence did not require that punishment be conditioned on actual harm but merely on behavior the actor
expected would cause harm.1 74 Bentham referred to all expected
consequences of voluntary conduct as intended,175 and predicated
criminal liability on intentions rather than motives. In sum, Bentham's distinction between motive and intent combines three ideas:
(1) the criminal law should reduce discretion by precisely defining
offenses; (2) it should define offenses in neutral descriptive language
rather than normative language; and (3) it should define culpability
by reference to cognitive states like expectations, rather than desiderative states like purposes.
In his Lectures on Jurisprudence,legal philosopherJohn Austin further refined Bentham's distinction between motive and intent. Austin
169 See Binder, Rhetoric of Motive, supra note 7, at 29.
170 BENTHAM, supra note 15, at 97.
171 See id. at 101.
172 See id. at 100.
173 See id. at 161.
174 See id. at 143 ("The tendency of an act is mischievous when the consequences
of it are mischievous; that is to say, either the certain consequences or the
probable.").
175 See id. at 92.
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distinguished four concepts: act, volition, intention, and motive. 176
Acts were bodily movements only, as distinguished from any of their
consequences. 1 77 Volition was a desiderative state that could accompany such acts. 178 Intentions were cognitive states, involving awareness of willed acts and their consequences. 179 Finally, motives were
desiderative states which caused action,18 0 but did not include volitions. 81' Thus motives were desiderative attitudes towards the consequences of actions. A motivating desire could only be a desire for a
82
feeling of pleasure or gratification or relief from suffering or fear.
An expected (and so intended) consequence can also be a
desired or motivating consequence. Thus, "[w] here an intended consequence is wished as an end or a mean, motive and intention concur."'1 83 Nevertheless, even when intention and motivation coincide,

it is the intention that inculpates, rather than the motivation. The
desire for pleasure is a constant, and is not punishable. It is the
knowledge that gratifying that desire will have the collateral consequence of creating a proscribed harm or risk that subjects the actor to
punishment.
Austin is responsible for developing much of the modern conceptual vocabulary of culpability, later used in the Model Penal Code.
Austin pioneered the idea of tying every culpable mental state to some
state of affairs in the world. For Austin, acts are unlawful not in themselves, but only by virtue of their consequences. 8 4 It is only these
consequences that can be culpably intended or desired. A criminal
intent can only be knowledge of some probability of the consequences
of action that would render an otherwise innocent action unlawful. 85
Austin therefore distinguished a number of different levels of awareness of probable harm corresponding to the Model Penal Code's concepts of negligence, recklessness, and knowledge. 8 6 Austin also
permitted purpose or "design" as a criterion of liability in so far as it
176

1 JOHN

AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JUISPRUDENCE

London, John Murray 5th ed. 1885).
177 See id. at 414-15.
178 See id. at 414.
179 See id. at 421.
180 See id. at 419.
181 See id.
182 See id. at 418-19.
183 Id. at 423.
184 See id. at 418-24.
185 See id. at 459.
186 See id. at 425-34.

407-24 (Robert Campbell ed.,
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implied the expectation of harm, 18 7 while still insisting that motive is
88
irrelevant to liability.'
Herbert Wechsler's Model Penal Code represents an effort to
apply utilitarian premises in designing a penal code. 18 9 Reflecting
Wechsler's views, the Code presents the harm principle as fundamental. 190 It defines culpability primarily (though not exclusively) in cognitive terms, as purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence.' 9 ' It
rejects strict liability' 9 2 and felony murder, 19 3 deemphasizes negligence,' 9

4

for the most part equates knowledge and purpose, 195 and

defines knowledge as awareness of a high probability. 96 The Code
treats cognitive culpability as almost sufficient by itself for criminal
liability. Thus, if an actor undertakes an act in the mistaken belief it
will cause a proscribed result, or constitute a substantial step toward
such a result, she is guilty of an attempt' 97 -and is punished as
severely as if she had completed the crime by knowingly causing the
result.1 98 She is held causally responsible for a result if her act was a
necessary condition to it, and she expected such an event, or foresaw
or should have foreseen the risk of such an event.1 99

187
188

See id. at 424.
See id. at 496-98.

189 See Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARv. L. REv.
1097, 1105, 1108 (1952) (describing deterrence as the essential purpose of the Model
Penal Code and its requirement of culpability); Wechsler & Michael, supranote 89, at
730-61.
190 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(1)(a) (1962); Harcourt, supra note 16, at 136
(discussing the influence of the harm principle on the Model Penal Code); Herbert
Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code, 68
COLUM. L. REv. 1425, 1432 (1968) (stating that preventing harm is the underlying
purpose of the Code).
191 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02; Simons, Rethinking, supranote 7, at 466, 468-71
(discussing how the Model Penal Code emphasizes cognitive states of knowledge and
recklessness over noncognitive states of purpose and negligence).
192 See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(1), 2.05(1)(2)(a).
193 See id. § 210.2 cmt. 6, at 29 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
194 See id. § 2.02(4) (1962) (including recklessness as a default culpability
requirement).
195 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.03(2), 2.08(2), 210.2(1), 220.2(1).
196 Id. § 2.02(7).
197 See id. § 5.01(1)(b)-(c).
198 See id. § 5.05(1).
199 See id. § 2.03.
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The Normativity of States of Affairs, Expectations, Preferences, and
Utility

Utilitarianism's cognitive model of culpability appears to achieve
Bentham's goal of an objective assessment of wrongdoing by translating normative judgments about harm, causal responsibility, and culpability into psychological language so that they seem to be
measurements of sensation. It measures harm in hedonic terms as a
loss of utility. Utility can be defined in two ways: as happiness or as
preference satisfaction. 20 0 Modern economists and rational choice
analysts define utility in terms of preference, so the concept can be
used in predicting and explaining choice. 20 1 Economists also favor a
preference conception of welfare because they are "reluctant to make
substantive claims about what is good or bad for people." 20 2 Thus the

preference satisfaction conception of utility offers the promise of a
value-neutral account of harm. And yet insofar as economic models
assume that individual decisionmakers are rationally self-interested,
the preference satisfaction conception implicitly equates what people
20 3
want with what is ultimately best for them.
Because utility is a comparative concept, used for evaluating alternative acts, it is usually defined in terms of the satisfaction of desires
that remain stable over time and in alternative futures. 20 4 Such
"rational" desires supply each individual with hedonic evaluations of
every possible state of affairs. An act is harmful if it causes a state of
affairs yielding less total utility than a state of affairs that would result
from some alternative act.20 5 Based on utilitarian premises, culpability

is the predictable harmfulness of an action given the information
available to the actor at the time of action. This predictable harmfulness depends upon the utility of each state of affairs that could result
from an action multiplied by its probability. An actor is causally responsible for a harmful result if her action was a necessary condition for the
200
201

RICHARD B. BRANDT, MORALITv, UTILITARIANISM, AND RIGHTS 158-75 (1992).
See id. at 159; DANIEL M. HAUSMAN & MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 38-39, 73 (1996); S.L. HURLEY, NATURAL REASONS 55

(1989).
202 HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, supra note 201, at 72.
203 See id. at 72-73.
204 See id. at 77, 80 (showing how the possibility of changing preferences threatens
the idea of rational self interest with incoherence). The requirement of stability of
preferences is expressed formally in the conditions of transitivity, completeness, and
independence of irrelevant alternatives. See KENNETH J. ARRow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND
INDIVIDUAL VALTUES 9-11 (2d ed. 1963); HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, supra note 201, at

27-28.
205 See BENTHAM, supra note 15, at 143.
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result, and such a result was predictable.2 0 6 But notice that what
counts as a harm from a utilitarian standpoint is not a particular type
of injury, but any set of consequences producing net disutility. Thus,
given the utilitarian conception of harm, causal responsibility for a
harmful result should depend on the predictability of aggregate disutility rather than of particular types of injury.
This utilitarian model of culpability appears to purify criminal law
of value judgments by making blame a function of four kinds of facts
about psychological experience: states of affairs, expectations, preferences, and quantities of utility. Yet, on closer examination, these
"facts" are arguably figurative representations of experience, embodying value judgments.
The state of affairs is the unit of experience with respect to which
different individuals have preferences or hedonic evaluations. Thus it
is the common medium that enables utilitarian analysis to assimilate
together (1) the desires of different people, (2) the desires of each
person at different times, or (3) the expectations preceding and the
experiences resulting from action. Utilitarian psychology presumes
that rational actors assign a relative hedonic value or "utility" to every
imaginable state of affairs and that this hedonic evaluation is stable
over time. This enables rational actors to evaluate and choose actions
based on their probability of bringing about states of affairs of higher
or lower hedonic value to them. Moral actors and policymakers can
estimate and sum the hedonic value to all persons of each state of
affairs and evaluate actions according to their expected public utility. 20 7 Decisionmaking based on preference-satisfaction utilitarianism
assumes that when an action brings about an expected state of affairs,
it will in fact have the hedonic value to each person that he or she
earlier imagined. Also, it treats the state of affairs imagined and hypothetically evaluated and the state of affairs subsequently experienced
as somehow "the same."
It is tempting to view such states of affairs as objective realities
that all these mental states-expectation, evaluation, desire, and satisfaction-are "about." But a state of affairs is only a necessarily selective verbal description of reality. And because of the historical
206 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 (1962).
207 While economists are generally skeptical about the possibility of comparing
preference satisfaction across persons, some utilitarians have proposed that individual
decisionmakers can evaluate preference satisfaction for entire populations by consulting their own "extended preferences." See, e.g., JOHN HARSANYI, RATIONAL BEHAVIOR
AND BARGAINING EQUILIBRIUM IN GAMES AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS 57-60 (1977); Kenneth J. Arrow, Extended Sympathy and the Possibility of Social Choice, 67 AM. ECON. REV.
219, 224 (1977).
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contingency of language, no two speech acts are ever "the same" even
if they use the same words. 20 The decision to interpret expectations,
desires, consequences, or welfare states as equivalent for some analytic
purpose is, therefore, a normative decision. The common world that
different people inhabit is not a static arrangement of objects in
space, but a set of evolving social and legal arrangements that look
different from different points of view. My expectation and your suffering can be represented by the same words, but that does not make
them the same thing. Nor is my fear of harm the same feeling as my
reaction of sorrow, indignation, or diminished self-esteem after injury.
Individuals typically change their feeling about events after they
occur, incorporating them into their personal narratives and identifies, acclimating to gains and losses, learning from experience, adapting their tastes to new roles and associates. 20 9 The world of hedonic
experience simply does not have the objectivity implied by the scientific sounding term "states of affairs."
When we say that someone acted with an expectation or intention
regarding a result that came to pass, we are again speaking figuratively. While felony murder rules are criticized for "transferring
intent" from the felony to the resulting death, in fact all judgments of
culpability for particular results "transfer" it to some degree. Thus, a
gunman is held responsible for an intentional killing whether he hits
his intended victim or someone else entirely.2 10 He also "kills intentionally" if he misses his target, a victim's heart, and unintentionally
hits the same Victim's head on the ricochet. Suppose an arsonist
believes that a homeowner may be present in the house he torches
but does not foresee that the neighbor's house may catch on fire. If
the fire kills the neighbor rather than the homeowner we typically
"transfer" the arsonist's recklessness from the foreseen to the unforeseen victim. We treat mental states like intent to kill or reckless disre208 See HURLEY, supra note 201, at 20-28, 55-83 (applying the pragmatic language
philosophies of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Donald Davidson to decision theory and
arguing that preferences are subject to the "eligibility of interpretations" problem).
209 SeeJeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting, 80 IND. L.J. 155, 165-81 (2005); Mark Kelman, Hedonic Psychology and the Ambiguities of "Welfare, " 33 PHIL. & PuR. Aew. 391, 394-95 (2005); George Loewenstein &
David Schkadc, Wouldn't It Be Nice? Predicting Future Feelings, in WELL-BEING: THE
FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 85, 85-105 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds.,
1999).
210 See, e.g., State v. Hall, 722 N.W.2d 472, 477 (Minn. 2006) ("Transferred intent
can apply to first-degree premeditated murder. Premeditation will transfer with
intent if the perpetrator premeditated the murder of an intended victim but accidentally killed an unintended victim." (citation omitted)).
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gard of human life as abstractions referring to a class of morally
equivalent expectations.
That culpable expectations attach to event types rather than particular events is explicit in the Model Penal Code's provisions defining
causal responsibility. An offender is responsible for a result within his
"contemplation" or "within the risk of which the actor is aware or...
should be aware" or which differs from these events "only in the
respect that a different person or different property is injured" or
which "involves the same kind of injury or harm. ' 2 11 This is a variant

of a "foreseeability" standard, premised on philosopher David Hume's
conception of causation as a statistical correlation between classes of
antecedent and subsequent events. 2

12

It requires describing a wrong-

ful act by reference to a class of acts and a resulting injury by reference to a class of results, so that we can determine the probability of
such an injury as a result of such an act. However, as diverse theorists
agree, there is no objective way to choose which of the infinity of possible descriptions best applies to a defendant's act and a victim's injuries. If we describe any particular injurious result in sufficient detail,
it becomes improbable from an ex ante perspective. If we describe a
harm sufficiently generally, it becomes foreseeable.2 1 3 Thus utilitarianism offers no value-neutral way to determine whether any particular
act is responsible for any particular harm, or offsetting benefit. And
so it seems inevitable that moral judgments of the actor's aims will
shape our descriptions of what occurred, and so play the decisive role
in determining causal responsibility.
The concept of preference depends on normative criteria of rationality to solve two sorts of difficulties: indeterminacy and normative
211

MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 2.03.

212 See H.L.A. HART & ToNY HONORI, CAUSATION IN THE LAw 13-22 (2d ed. 1985)
(asserting that Hume conceived causation in psychological terms as a mental associa-

tion of event types and that John Stuart Mill developed Hume's conception into a
statistical relation between event types); DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 37-39 (Tom L. Beauchamp ed., Clarendon Press 2000)
(1748).
213 See HART & HONORf, supra note 212, at 256-57 (suggesting that foreseeability
is arbitrary, depending on the degree of specificity with which, and the point of view
from which, it is described); MOORE,supra note 134, at 363-99 (critiquing foreseeability in light of the "multiple description problem"); Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591, 595-96, 640-42 (1981)
(discussing how judgments of foreseeability depend on how narrowly or broadly the
result is defined); Clarence Morris, Duty, Negligence and Causation, 101 U. PA. L. REv.
189, 198 (1952) ("If the official description of facts adopted by the court is detailed,
the accident is called unforeseeable; if it is general, the accident is called
foreseeable.").
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implausibility. The indeterminacy problems arise because of the possibilities of changing and conflicting desires. 2 14 Presumably, we
should not force a couple to abide by their marital vows when they
cease to care for each other. Neither should we impose a lobotomy
on an unwilling patient merely because his simpler desires will be
more easily satisfied after the operation. The normative implausibility
problem arises because even consistent preferences can be based on
false belief; can arise from manipulation, oppression, or neurosis; or
can be self-destructive or antisocial. 2 15 We should not yield to the
desires of an addict, a sadist, or a happy slave. 2 16 For all these reasons,
concluded Daniel Hausman and Michael McPherson, " [i] t is more
plausible to maintain that well-being is the satisfaction of suitably
'laundered' self-interested preferences than to maintain that it is the
satisfaction of actual preferences." 217 At bottom, the decision to
equate preference satisfaction with well-being necessarily involves a
2 18
normative judgment.
Finally, the conception of harm as a relative decline in utility
requires aggregating together gains and losses to the welfare of different people. To thus aggregate utility we have to be able to commensurate the different desires of different people at different times on a
single scale, by translating them into numerical evaluations of the
same "states of affairs." The utility scale makes interpersonal comparisons of welfare possible by ascribing similar feelings and experiences
to different people. This supposed similarity enables us to evaluate
policy by a test that weighs everyone's welfare equally and adds them
all together. The familiar paradoxes of social choice demonstrate that
there is no mechanical or incontrovertible method of adding preferences unless they are put on a common scale of cardinal utility.2 19 Yet
any such scale for commensurating the different desires of different
people is an institutional construct like a poll, a price, or a class rank,
which represents a population by creating data about it that would not
214

See

HAUSMAN

& McPHERSON, supra note 201, at 75-77.

215 See id. at 77-80.
216 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 234-38 (1977) (arguing that
external preferences including sadism should not be credited in a utilitarian analysis);
DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES 2-3 (1989) (discussing the problem of consent to oppression);

GEOFFREY SCARRE, UTILITARIANISM

155-62 (1996) (arguing that preferences are

distinguishable from welfare); John Elster, Rationality and Addition, in DRUGS AND THE
LIMITS OF LIBERALISM 25, 25-45 (Pablo De Greiff ed., 1999) (discussing addictive
preferences).
217
218

HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON,

See THOMAS

219 See ARROW,
Theorem).

supra note 201, at 80.
166-71 (1986).

NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE

supra note 204, at 59 (explicating the General Possibility
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otherwise exist. Utility is not a fact about aggregate hedonic experience, but an artifact, representing hedonic experience figuratively so
as to render it tractable for policy analysis.
A cognitive conception of culpability as expected disutility is supposed to enable a value-neutral assessment of an actor's choices. Yet
neither the actor nor the legal system can determine the expected
disutility of an act without exercising normative judgment.
C.

Utilitarian Culpability and Punishmentfor Harmful Results

A utilitarian conception of culpability as expected disutility has a
more serious drawback for anyone trying to rationalize the law of
homicide. Because utilitarian analysis is essentially concerned with
risk rather than injury, a utilitarian theory of culpability cannot give a
coherent account of result crimes like homicide. Utilitarianism conceives harm in aggregate and comparative terms, as the net disutility
for all persons at all future times of all the consequences of choosing
one act over the optimal alternative. 220 But since the actual future is
always incomplete and the possible alternative futures are never
experienced, the actual harm resulting from any act can never be
known. 2 21 Thus utilitarianism can only evaluate actions prospectively,
on the basis of expected rather than actual cost. Accordingly, it can
never evaluate any particular injury-such as a death-as an actual
harm, since this cost may have been or may yet be offset by a greater
benefit. Moreover, since some social cost is inevitable in a world of
rivalrous demands for scarce resources, and since the actor is only
responsible for predicting the size of this cost, a utilitarian can never
judge that an actor should have foreseen and prevented some particular injury. Utilitarianism can only condemn particular actions as pre220
221

See, e.g., Seidman, supra note 79, at 319-34.
See W.D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 38 (Philip Stratton-Lake ed., 2002)

(claiming that the utilitarian calculus is indeterminate because the consequences are
infinite); Mark Kelman, The Necessary Myth of Objective CausationJudgments in Liberal
Political Theory, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 579, 579-80 (1987) ("These problems are most

widely recognized in cases involving toxic exposure where the impact of D's conduct
is simply to change the ex ante probability that P's 'holdings' will lose value, but there
is no way to tell, ex post, whether P's declining fortunes resulted from P's conduct, nor
any way to agree on what the shifts in ex ante probability of damage had been....
Similarly, in all 'economic loss' cases, our hypothesis about damages must be based on
uncertain counterfactuals about what P would have done with an opportunity D
destroyed or whether he'd have followed all the damage-reducing opportunities he
actually followed had D not destroyed some initially advantageous opportunity." (footnotes omitted)); see also id. at 618-19 (discussing epistemological barriers to quantifying risk and linking it to results).
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dictably harmful but cannot condemn particular results as harms. As
Herbert Wechsler argued:
From the preventive point of view, the harmfulness of conduct
rests upon its tendency to cause the injuries to be prevented far
more than on its actual results; results, indeed, have meaning only
insofar as they may indicate or dramatize the tendencies involved.
Reckless driving is no more than reckless driving if there is a casualty and no less if by good fortune nothing should occur.... [I]f
the criminality of conduct is to turn on the result, it rests upon fortuitous considerations unrelated to the major purpose to be served
by declaration that behavior is a crime.
...A major issue to be faced, therefore, is whether penal law
ought to be shaped to deal more comprehensively with risk crea22 2
tion, without reference to actual results.
Wechsler's critique of felony murder expressed this view that punishing dangerous conduct obviates additional punishment for causing
harm: "The underlying felony carries its own penalty and the additional punishment for murder is therefore gratuitous." 22 3 Wechsler's
approach to grading offenses in the Model Penal Code also reflected
this utilitarian focus on risk rather than result. Thus, in punishing
attempted and completed crimes equally, the Code essentially eliminates punishment for knowingly or purposely causing actual harm by
folding it into attempt liability. 224 The utilitarian legal philosopher
H.L.A. Hart agreed that outside of rare cases, "there seems no reason
on any form of deterrent theory . . . for punishing the unsuccessful
22 5
attempt less severely than the completed crime."
Criminal law scholar Stephen Schulhofer explained the connection between utilitarianism and a policy of punishing risk rather than
harm in his classic article Harm and Punishment. Schulhofer argued
that this policy comports with the deterrence theory principle that
increases in the certainty of punishment are more effective deterrents
than increases in severity. 2 2 6 The early utilitarian reform proposals of
22 7
Bentham and of Cesare Beccaria were premised on this principle,
which appears to be confirmed empirically. 228 As explained earlier,

222

Wechsler, supra note 189, at 1106.

223 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6, at 36 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
224 See id. § 5.05(1) (1962).
225 H.L.A. HART, Intention and Punishment, OXFORD REV., Feb. 1967, at 5, reprinted
in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 94, at 113, 130.
226 See Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 1533-57.
227 See CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 23, 48-50 (David Young ed.
& trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1986) (1764); BENTHAM, supra note 15, at 170, 183, 288.
228 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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the logic behind this principle is that increases in sentence length
have diminishing returns and are subject to a temporal discount,
while increases in certainty more clearly link the forbidden conduct to
the deterrent threat.2 29 Moreover, severe but uncertain punishment

seems arbitrary and unfair, can be resisted by discretionary decisionmakers, and can even glorify offenders as martyrs or high-stakes
gamblers. The principle that "mild but certain punishment deters
most efficiently" implies that all acts that foreseeably impose the same
risk of harm should be punished equally, regardless of whether they
actually cause harm. Schulhofer argued that conditioning punishment on harm rather than risk creates an inefficient "punishment lottery," punishing fortuitous factors beyond the control of the actor,
and hence also beyond the influence of the criminal law's deterrent
threats. 230 Utilitarian reformers first introduced the punishment lottery argument in criticizing felony murder liability for punishing
felons on the basis of the unintended results of their crimes. 23 ' Yet
the same "punishment lottery" critique is available whenever punishment is conditioned on actual results. By contrast, punishing culpable
risk rather than harm achieves the desired increase in the certainty of
punishment for conduct with negative expected utility.
Sanford Kadish's article, The CriminalLaw and the Luck of the Draw,
also expresses these affinities among the ideas of risk, cognitive culpability, and deterrence. 23 2 Like other utilitarians, 2 33 Kadish adopts a
mixed approach to punishment in this article, requiring that punishment serve utility without exceeding the limits of desert. 23 4 Although

he criticizes punishment for causing harm as both useless and undeserved, Kadish also rejects as "rationally indefensible" the retributivist
view that deserved punishment is an intrinsic moral good. 235 He

deems punishment, which has the necessary consequence of lowering
one person's welfare, as rational only insofar as it deters crime. 23 6
In rejecting punishment for causing harmful results as both
unfair and useless, Kadish reasons that an actor causes harm by creat229
230
231
232

See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
See Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 1565-69.
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
See Kadish, supra note 3, at 681, 686, 698.

233

See H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principlesof Punishment, 60 PROC. OF ARISTO-

1-26 (1960), reprinted in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note
94, at 1, 1-27; PACKER, supra note 90, at 39-57; Hart, supra note 90, at 409-11, 413.
234 See Kadish, supra note 3, at 680 ("[B]y ...not rationally supportable[,] I mean
that [the harm doctrine] does not serve the crime preventive purposes of the criminal
law, and is not redeemed by any defensible normative principle.").
TELIAN SOC'Y 1,

235

See id. at 697-99.

236

See id. at 684-88, 697-99.
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ing risk, and that an actor does so wrongly by acting with knowledge
(or reason to know) that the risk is excessive (i.e., not justified by
expected benefits). 2 37 The actor's culpability turns on the expectation of harm assignable to her, and her punishment properly turns on
her culpability. 2 38 Kadish argues that if an actor culpably imposes a
risk of harm in this sense, the actual occurrence of harm is a fortuity, a
species of "moral luck." 239 The actor has done wrong and earned a
deterrent sanction as soon as he or she commits an act imposing risk.
Whether risk subsequently becomes harm is out of the actor's control,
and so should not effect his punishment. Harm cannot add to the
actor's desert, and punishment cannot deter it.
This moral luck argument against punishing harm rests on the
probabilistic notion of the connection between action and consequence introduced by Hume. 2 40 From this viewpoint, the riskiness of
an act is a prerequisite to its harmfulness because without risk there
can be no causation. An action is essentially connected to the foreseeable consequences for an act of its type; it is only contingently connected to its actual consequences. This conception of action as a kind
of mental wager is quite prevalent among moral philosophers, even
those who do not consider themselves utilitarians. Thus, the ethicist
Michael Zimmerman argues that " [i] nsofar as what happens after one
has made a free decision is ...

up to nature, then these events ...are

strictly dispensable in the assessment of moral responsibility," 241 while
moral philosopher Joel Feinberg insists that "moral responsibility
is... restricted to the inner world of the mind, where... luck has no
place."

242

Kadish's critique of felony murder grows out of his moral luck
critique of liability for causing harm. If even an intentional killing is a
blameless and undeterrable fortuity, surely an unintended death
should not be held against a felon. Since, on Kadish's reasoning, the
occurrence of harm is irrelevant to the punishment deserved for
intentionally risking it, harm is also irrelevant to the punishment
deserved for any other act of wrongdoing. Thus, he rejects the doctrine that "if I do something I should not... I become guilty of any
237
238

See id. at 680-84.
Id.

239

Id. at 682. For explanations of the problem of moral luck, see THOMAS NAGEL,
24-38 (1979); BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK 20-39 (1982).
See HART & HONORE, supra note 212, at 13-22.
See Michael J. Zimmerman, Luck and Moral Responsibility, 97 ETHICS 374, 385

MORTAL QUESTIONS

240
241
(1987).
242 SeeJoel Feinberg, ProblematicResponsibility in Law and Morals, 71
(1962), reprinted in FEINBERG, supra note 20, at 25, 33.
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harm my action produced."' 243 Felony murder is rationally indefensible from the standpoint of deterrence theory, because that is true of
murder liability itself.
Critical legal theorist Mark Kelman has exposed still more fundamental tensions between utilitarian premises and liability for causing
injury in a critique of causation in tort. 244 Drawing on legal economist

Ronald Coase's analysis of harm as "social cost," 2 4 5 Kelman argues that
welfare loss is always caused by the interaction of two or more parties
with conflicting desires with respect to scarce resources. 24 6 Thus, acts
cannot be condemned as harmful merely because they resulted in the
frustration of someone's desire. Frustration for someone-which is to
say "social cost"-is an inevitable consequence of rivalrous desires,
regardless of how either rival chooses to act. 247 Even optimal actions

will produce such injuries, so injury should not be confused with
2 48

harm.

Because utilitarianism conceives harm as a net welfare loss rather
than as any particular injury, it cannot yield a determinate theory of
fault for such an injury. Harm in the utilitarian sense can never be to
an individual but is always a conclusion about the net effects of an act
on the welfare of all. Moreover, as noted above, whether an action is
optimal or harmful can never finally be settled. It depends on future
consequences and on the hypothetical consequences of alternative
courses of action.2 49 A utilitarian evaluation of an action therefore
concerns its expected future effects on all rather than its actual past
effects on a particular individual. 250 Thus, the very idea of discrete
injuries depends on recognizing entitlements or legal interests that
will trump utility in evaluating acts. Injury, in short, is a rights concept,
not a utility concept. This fundamental disjunction between the ideas
of disutility and injury makes it impossible to develop a stable conception of causal responsibility for injury on the basis of a culpability standard of expected disutility.
The problem can be illustrated with a thought experiment. How
might we develop an account of result offenses like homicide based
243 Kadish, supra note 3, at 695-97.
244 See Kelman, supra note 221, at 581-87.
245 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1, 1-8 (1960) (noting
that conflicting activities impose mutual "external" costs).
246 See Kelman, supra note 221, at 595-96, 600-01.
247 See id. at 579, 581-86.
248 See id. at 580.
249 See id.
250 See id. at 608 (asserting that the probabilistic conception of causation is
unsuited to determining causal responsibility for particular injuries).
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on a conception of culpable wrongdoing as foreseeably causing disutility? First, we would need some conception of a wrongful injury. We
might say that wrongful injuries include any welfare loss to an individual for which a wrongful act was a necessary condition, and that an act
is wrongful if its expected net effects are harmful. This formula looks
plausible, yet it yields four difficulties when we try to assign responsibility for particular injuries to particular acts. We may call these the
hypothetical alternatives problem, the accounting problem, the moral
demands problem, and the scope of the risk problem.
The necessary condition part of the standard is rendered indeterminate by the hypothetical alternatives problem. Sometimes we cannot
determine whether a particular injury would not have occurred "but
for" a defendant's dangerous act. 25 1 This problem is particularly

apparent with toxic exposures that correlate statistically with increased
rates of already common diseases. We cannot determine which actual
cases of illness and death would not otherwise have occurred. 252 The
problem is even more acute when multiple wrongdoers have exposed
a population to the same toxin. 2 53 Thus, for some of the worst cases
of risk imposition, we can never prove causation. Requiring causation
of harm therefore precludes deterrence where it seems most needed.
The accountingproblem concerns how much harm the offender is
causally responsible for. Let us say that an act, although expected to
be harmful in the aggregate, is expected to produce good as well as
bad consequences. And, let us say the act does indeed produce mixed
consequences, causing three broken legs, but preventing two broken
arms. It seems unfair (and excessively deterrent) to attach a penalty
to every injury produced when some injuries have also been prevented. That would make the wrongdoer responsible for more harm
than occurred. Yet if we choose to punish only certain injuries contributing to net harm, we have no principled way to choose which
injuries to punish and which to justify by reference to hypothetical
injuries prevented. This accounting problem gets even worse if we
imagine an act expected to be harmful in the aggregate that happens
to produce some injuries, but also produces benefits that outweigh
these costs. Our definition of wrongful injury now makes the offender
responsible for injuries even though no harm occurred. Moreover,
since we never know the complete welfare effects of any act, we never
251 See E. Wayne Thode, The Indefensible Use of the Hypothetical Case to Determine Cause
in Fact, 46 TEX. L. REv. 423, 431-33 (1968).
252 See, e.g., Michel F. Baumeister & Dorothea M. Capone, Admissibility Standards as
Politics-The Imperial Gate Closers Arrive!!!, 33 SETON HALL L. Rv. 1025, 1027-30
(2003) (recognizing the causation burdens facing toxic tort plaintiffs).
253 See Kelman, supra note 221, at 598-99.
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know that any wrongful act will prove harmful in the end. Thus, to
hold an actor responsible for a particular injury is not really to determine that she caused harm in the utilitarian sense, but simply to use
the injury as a metonymic representation of the net harm she
expected to cause. We are not really punishing harm but merely
using the injury to "dramatize the tendencies involved.

'25 4

The moral demands problem points to some necessary slippage
between the concepts of disutility and wrong. It invokes the standard
objection that act-utilitarian ethics make impossible demands on individuals. 25 5 Of all the possible choices available to us, may we really
choose only the one with the greatest expected aggregate utility?
Must all other choices be condemned as wrongful and punished?
Such a standard would leave each of us so little freedom to shape our
own lives and pursue our own aims that it would blight rather than
foster happiness. Utilitarians can respond that public utility is a policy
standard, not an ethical standard, and that individuals will of course
pursue private utility by maximizing their own happiness. 25 6 The
point of utilitarianism is to shape incentives to serve public utility by
enforcing utility-maximizing legal rules, but only insofar as this can be
done at a reasonable cost. Surely we cannot maximize public utility by
punishing all nonmaximizing conduct: in many instances the harm of
punishment will outweigh the harm of the crime, not to mention the
much smaller deterrent benefits achieved by punishing it. Thus a utilitarian criminal law will have to permit lots of nonmaximizing choices.
But if so, which ones? Is the standard for unacceptably harmful conduct quantitative? If so, is the wrongdoer responsible for all of the net
welfare loss she causes, or only for the net welfare loss that exceeds
the acceptable amount? If the latter, which particular injuries? Thus
the moral demands problem further complicates the accounting
problem. It leaves the utilitarian conception of wrongdoing too indeterminate to generate a standard of wrongful injury.

254

Wechsler, supra note 189, at 1106; see supra text accompanying note 222.
See RICHARD B. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT 276 (1979);
LIAM B. MURPHY, MoRAL DEMANDS IN NONIDEAL THEORY 3-25 (2000); David 0. Brink,
UtilitarianMorality and the PersonalPoint of View, 83 J. PHIL. 417, 431-38 (1986); Peter
Railton, Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
134, 138-46, 160-63 (1984).
256 For defenses of utilitarianism as a policy rather than an ethical standard, see
generally GOODIN, supra note 94, at 3-27 (arguing that utilitarianism "can be a good
normative guide to public affairs without its necessarily being the best practical guide
to personal conduct"); Binder & Smith, supra note 95, at 174-84 (recharacterizing
utilitarianism "as a theory of government rather than a general theory of value").
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The scope of the risk problem arises because a disutility standard of
harm makes it difficult to narrow causal responsibility on the basis of
foreseeable harm. As H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honor6 argue in their
classic study of legal causation, we cannot treat all necessary conditions as causes, because injuries typically have many necessary antecedent acts, including those of the victim.

257

Hart and Honor6 note that

a popular test restricts causal responsibility to those necessary conditions foreseeably likely to cause such a result. 258 As noted above, foreseeability standards are threatened by indeterminacy because any
result can seem foreseeable if described very generally, and unforeseeable if described very narrowly. 25 9 A solution to this problem
endorsed by Hart and Honor6, and employed by the Model Penal
Code, is to restrict foreseeable harms to those within the risk that rendered defendants' conduct culpable. 260 In this way, the Model Penal
Code connects causation to culpability by requiring the same expectation of harm for both. An offender is culpable insofar as she acted
with an expectation of causing a particular type of harm and causally
responsible only insofar as such an expected harm occurred. But if
harm is simply aggregate disutility, culpability means perceiving excessive risk of all kinds, rather than expecting any particular type of
injury to occur by any particular causal process. Any act expected to
be suboptimal is culpable and so is a candidate for causal responsibility. Any injury that occurs will be "within the risk" for any culpable
act. Thus the aggregate harm concept empties foreseeability of any
content, so it no longer limits causal responsibility at all. We have
imposed responsibility for results rather than risk only by defining virtually every event subsequent to a risky act as its result.
The difficulties we have making sense of liability for causing particular results within a utilitarian framework simply confirms what
Kadish, Schulhofer, and Kelman argue: that a utilitarian conception
of culpability as expected harm justifies punishing only risk, not harm
itself. But this means it is not only felony murder liability that seems
"rationally indefensible" from the standpoint of utilitarianism's cognitive model of culpability. A utilitarian account of cognitive culpability
condemns felony murder liability only because it cannot make sense
of murder liability of any kind. A theory of homicide must include an
257 See HART & HONORt, supra note 212, at 68-70.
258 See id. at 70, 106-07, 257, 259-75. They prefer a different test, however, that
focuses on the intervention of abnormal events. See infra notes 289-94 and accompanying text.
259 See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
260 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 (1962); HART & HONORP, supra note 212, at
257-58; MOORE, supra note 134, at 395-96.
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account of responsibility for culpably causing particularharms. Yet,
the next Part will argue, in a complex social world, the attribution of a
particular result to a particular actor's culpability depends upon evaluation of the actor's ends. Attribution of causal responsibility cannot
remain purely cognitive or value-neutral.
III.

RIGHTS THEORY AND COGNITIVE CULPABILITY

The utilitarian version of cognitive culpability theory rejects all
homicide liability as unnecessary for deterrence, but does not support
the prevailing view that felony murder in particular is uniquely unfair.
If cognitive culpability theory is going to attack felony murder liability
as less deserved than other forms of murder liability, it must be based
on some other conception of the liberal state and its authority to combat harm than utilitarianism, one compatible with a retributive view of
punishment. Insofar as such a theory embraces the harm principle
but also supports liability for crimes of result like homicide, it must
conceive harms as particularinjuries to discrete interests. By imposing
duties not to injure others in these interests, the liberal state would
also recognize rights not to be so injured. 26 1 Violations of these rights
would constitute harms, and the expected violation of a right would
be morally culpable and so, presumptively, deserving of punishment.
On a theory of harms as injuries to discrete rights, felony murder liability would be subject to criticism for improperly transferring culpability from one right to another. This Part explores whether such a
rights-oriented cognitive theory of culpability can (1) assign blame for
actual harm but (2) without evaluating actors' ends. It concludes that
a rights-oriented cognitive theory of culpability must evaluate actors'
ends, and that no theory of culpability can achieve both aims.
A.

ContractarianRights Theory and Cognitive Culpability

Rights theory can take libertarian and contractarian forms. 262 A
libertarian rights theory of criminal law justifies state punishment as
261 Wesley Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in JudicialReasoning, 23 YALE LJ. 16, 28-32 (1913) (arguing that rights and duties are jural

correlatives).
262 The leading contemporary contractarian theory is, of course, that of John
Rawls. See JOHN RAwLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 22-29, 259-88 (2005) [hereinafter
POLITICAL LIBERALISM]; JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3-29, 130-56,
496-511 (rev. ed. 1999) [hereinafter RAwLs, A THEORY OFJUSTICE]. Bargain and contract often play prominent roles in libertarian theories as well. See, e.g., DAVID
GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT 113-56 (1986); ROBERT NoZICK, ANARCHY, STATE,
AND UTOPIA 297-334 (1974). The difference is that libertarian theories distribute
natural rights in advance of the contracting process and allow them to be modified
RAwLS,
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the delegation to the state of individuals' natural right of self-defense
against harm, which includes the right to deter harmful acts by threatening and exacting revenge. Mill invoked such a delegated selfdefense theory in explaining the harm principle. 26 3 Because such a
theory rests on the natural rights of victims, it need not justify punishment on the basis of the offender's desert, or even his consent to the
authority of law.
The difficulty with such a theory, however, is that a natural right
of self-defense against harm is potentially so expansive that it sets no
limit to the criminal law and so reserves no sphere of liberty from state
coercion. As noted above, in a world of scarce resources and opportunities, any action can affect others and interfere with their aims,
thereby inflicting "harm. '2 64 A rights theory needs to set.some limit to
the proprietary domain of each individual for each to have any freedom of action within that domain. A natural rights theory derives
these limits from what is "naturally" due each human being. For Mill,
this natural due is what the individual needs in order to flourish and
fulfill her creative potential. 265 In addition, Mill limits this natural
due insofar as utilitarian regulation can foster human flourishing,
leaving the scope of liberty notoriously indeterminate and vulnerable
to ad hoc policyjudgments. 2 66 Thus, in a natural rights theory, which
rights the criminal law can legitimately protect from harm depends on
some evaluation of which ends best realize human nature. It seems
that a natural rights theory of harm cannot be value-neutral: it
requires a theory of the good.
Contractarianism seeks to rely on a theory of the right rather
than the good 26 7 to limit the rights the criminal law protects from
harm. It uses a regime of rights to establish what Rawls calls the "fair
terms of social cooperation, '268 seeking to secure to each individual
the broadest sphere of freedom compatible with like freedom for
others. Insofar as some forms of freedom can be enhanced through
cooperation in the production of public goods, social contractarians
only through voluntary transactions. By contrast, Rawls' contractarianism derives
rights from a hypothetical contract among featureless persons in order to ensure that
the process of defining rights is impartial among persons holding different values. See
RAWLS, POLITIcAL LIBERALISM, supra, at 271-81.

263 See MIL, supra note 16, at 9.
264 See Coase, supra note 245, at 1-8; see also Singer, supra note 123, at 984-89,
993-98, 1021-24 (arguing that there is a necessary indeterminacy of liberty rights
because of the inevitability of mutual interference).
265 See MILL, supra note 16, at 9-12.
266 See id. at 10-11, 95-104; Harcourt, supra note 16, at 120-22, 185-89.
267 See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 262, at 28.
268 RAW.s, POLrricAL LIBERALISM, supra note 262, at 16-35.
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could rationally undertake duties of cooperation and authorize the
state to coerce the performance of such duties. Indeed, the security
of individual rights is itself such a public good, enabled by the mutual
forbearance of contracting citizens and their acceptance of the coercive force of law.2

69 .

By virtue of their enjoyment of the rights and

other public benefits thereby secured, contracting citizens arguably
undertake a duty to cooperate in securing these rights-by obeying
2 70
law or suffering retributive punishment.
271
From a contractarian perspective, there are two kinds of harm.
Harm to individuals consists of the violation of their rights. 2 72 Harm,
even to individuals, is not a hedonic state: not all frustrations and disappointments constitute harms, but only those that result from violations of rights of a kind secured to all. 273 Such harm is a legal artifact
rather than a natural fact. 274 In societies with different assignments of

rights, different disappointments would count as harms.
Contractarianism also recognizes violations of public duties as
harms to public interests. 2 75 Such harm is always present whenever
the duty to respect individual rights is violated. Like harms to individuals, harms to public interests are also jural rather than hedonic.

2 76

Violations of public duties are wrongful, not because they affect the
welfare of particular individuals but because they violate a contractual
obligation to all other members of the public. 277 A violation of a public duty is a harm in itself; it is not merely the imposition of a risk that
might eventuate in harm. If an individual has a right against some
269 SeeJEFFR1E G. MURPHY, KANT: THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 108 (Mercer Univ.
Press 1994) (1970); RAwLs, A THEORY OFJUSTICE, supra note 262, at 239-41; ALLEN D.
ROSEN, KANT'S THEORY OF JUSTICE

10, 33-34, 62 (1996).

270 See KANT, supra note 19, at 116, 139, 142 (noting that benefiting from rights
obliges one to respect them or suffer punishment); MURPHY, supra note 19, at 77-92;
Binder, supra note 19, at 350-53 (arguing that the obligation to respect rights or
suffer punishment is rooted in a social contract in retributivism); Michael Davis, Criminal Desert and Unfair Advantage: What's the Connection?, 12 LAw & PHIL. 133, 141-43
(1993); Davis, supranote 19, at 736-46; DJ. Galligan, The Return to Retribution in Penal
Theory, in CRIME, PROOF AND PUNISHMENT 144, 152-63 (1981); Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra note 99, at 1336, 1339; Morris,
supra note 19, at 31-58.
271 See KANT, supra note 19, at 137-38 (distinguishing between private and public
crimes).
272 See id. at 46-47.
273 See id. at 116, 166-67.
274
275
276
277

See
See
See
See

id. at
id. at
id. at
id. at

118.
180-82.
116-17.
30-32.
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consequence of the violation of a public duty, this right-violating consequence would be a distinct harm.
Conceived as violations of rights and public duties, harms are discrete: they involve the violation of particular rights of particular persons, or particular duties to all. Criminal culpability with respect to
harm is therefore always about particular events. The mugger expects
to deprive his victim of her property; he should know he imposes a risk
of death by clubbing her with a tire iron. He is guilty of robbery, and
of negligent homicide, but not murder. Intention or knowledge cannot transfer from one type of harm to another. Some cognitive theorists go further, insisting that culpability should not transfer among
victims. Thus, a gunman misses victim A, whom he expected to kill,
but to his surprise kills B, who was standing nearby. He is guilty of
attempted murder against A and, perhaps, of negligent homicide
against B, but not of the murder of A. 27 8 Transfer of culpability cannot be avoided altogether: the gunman intends to kill by shooting A
in the head, but instead shoots A fatally in the heart.27 9 The intended
result is morally equivalent to the actual result because both violate
the same right. The contractarian might, on similar reasoning, transfer culpability from intended victim A to actual victim B, as long as the
2 80
right targeted and the right violated are of the same kind.
A contractarian conception of harms as particularjural violations
also helps explain the resistance of many cognitive theorists to criminal liability for negligence. 28 1 Certainly it explains disapproval of per
se negligence rules. I may knowingly violate a public duty to comply
with a public health regulation. If so, I have culpably brought about
harm to the public interest. Unless I understand how the regulation
protects against harm to individuals, however, I am not culpable for
any resulting injuries to them. But should I not have informed myself
about the risks I might impose by violating a law? The contractarian
answer is that if I have a public duty to educate myself, I can be punished for violating that public duty. Such duties can be enforced
through licensing requirements, with criminal sanctions attaching to
278 See A.J. Ashworth, Transferred Malice and Punishmentfor Unforeseen Consequences,
in RESHAPING THE CRMINAL LAW 77, 94 (P.R. Glazebrook ed., 1978); Dillof, supra note
18, at 503, 507-08, 520-22. Dillof rejects intent-transferring among victims because
he sees duties as running only to individual rightsholders, and so rejects the idea of
public duties to cooperative institutions. See id.
279 See Dillof, supra note 18, at 514.
280 See DRESSLER, supra note 10, § 10.04(A) (3) (b), at 133-34 (arguing that the
legally relevant intention is to cause a proscribed type of injury rather than to injure a
particular person); MooE, supra note 134, at 474-75 (same).
281 See, e.g., Hall, supra note 109, at 637-38.
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those who engage in regulated activity without a license, and presumptions of awareness of risk attaching only to duly trained and
licensed actors who violate regulations. On such reasoning, I can be
punished for culpably failing to inform myself about risk, but not for
culpably causing an injury I had no reason to expect. My actions may
be culpable with respect to a public duty and dangerous with respect
to an injury to an individual, but that does not make them culpable
with respect to the injury. For that, I must actually be aware that vio282
lating the duty will impose some risk.

Consider how these principles apply to felony murder. An armed
robber may not advert to the risk of death he is creating because he
deceives himself into believing he has more control over events than
he does. Intoxicated by power, he may expect that a gun will give him
command over events, and never imagine that threatened victims
might resist or flee, that confederates might get frightened or angry,
or that police might intervene. This kind of narcissistic blindness may
be morally reprehensible, but it does not amount to awareness of a
risk of death and so does not justify liability for homicide. Moreover,
as noted earlier, the risk of death from any given robbery is actually
not very high. 283 In judging armed robbery as negligent with respect

to a risk of death, our estimation of that risk is probably distorted by
our disapproval of the purpose for which it is imposed. If we then also
aggravate the robber's liability for negligently causing death because
of this same purpose, we are simply transferring culpability from the
robbery to what is, from the robber's narcissistically narrow viewpoint,
28 4
a completely unexpected and therefore accidental death.
B.

The Indeterminacy of ContractarianRights Theory

Can the contractarian theory outlined in the previous subpart
assign culpability for causing harm without evaluating an actor's ends?
This subpart will argue that it cannot. Contractarian reasoning can282 See Alexander, supra note 109, at 101-03 (arguing that punishing the failure to
inform oneself about risk is preferable to punishing inadvertent risk imposition);
Hall, supra note 109, at 638-39 (distinguishing the duty to inforn oneself from the
duty to avoid inadvertent risk); id. at 643-44 (discussing licensing enforcement as an
alternative to criminal negligence).
283 Marvin Wolfgang reports a rate of six deaths per thousand robberies. Marvin
E. Wolfgang, Victim-Precipitated Criminal Homicide, in CRIME AND JUSTICE AT THE Mw293, 297-98 (Robert A. Silverman et al. eds., 2002); see also Zimring & Zuehl,
supra note 9, at 8 tbl.1 (finding 5.2 "probable robbery killings" per 1000 robberies).

LENNIUM

284

See Dillof, supra note 18, at 506-07 (treating felony murder liability as a special

case of transferred intent, and condemning felony murder for "permitting punishment disproportionate to culpability").
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not determine which acts cause rights violations without evaluating an
actor's ends.
The problem begins with the indeterminacy of the equal freedom
the contractarian rights regime is designed to protect. Very different
regimes of rights and public duties can plausibly satisfy contractarianism's fairness test. Moreover, these different fair regimes of rights are
incompatible, because securing one kind of freedom for all limits
other kinds of freedoms for all. Thus, more freedom to transact
means less protection against coercion and fraud. Freedom to use
property in some ways interferes with freedom to use it in other ways.
In Coase's famous example, the freedom of a spark-spitting railroad to
use its narrow right of way is inconsistent with the freedom of neighbors to grow flammable crops nearby. 285 Similarly, public duties obviously interfere with some kinds of freedom, even though they may
enable others. And since the benefits of cooperation often depend
on adopting one among several possible arbitrary conventions (e.g.,
driving on the right) different inconsistent schemes of public duty are
possible. So disputants will be able to defend incompatible rights
claims with contractarian arguments.
Since what counts as harm depends upon a choice among equally
fair regimes of rights and public duties, the single value of "fairness" is
not sufficient to specify the harms justifying criminal punishment.
The legal system will have to make value choices favoring some ends
over others, treating some disappointments as harmful rights violations and dismissing others as fortuitous or self-inflicted. It will have
to choose between incompatible activities, or designate limited times
and places for each. The contractarian variant of rights theory cannot
achieve its aspiration to prioritize the right (fairness) over the good
(the choice of ends), because it needs some conception of the good to
286
give content to the right.
Moreover, the evaluation of ends required to specify a regime of
rights cannot be restricted to the legislative function. Our legal system leaves large portions of such important areas of law as constitutional rights and torts for judicial development. But even when
legislatures define rights, these are usually refined by judicial interpretation. 28 7 In addition, when widely valued freedoms conflict, demoSee David de Meza, Coase Theorem, in I THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF Eco270, 275 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
286 See Huigens, supra note 7, at 1429-37 (arguing that the conflict of rights can
only be resolved by the theory of the good).
287 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 13-47
(1994) (arguing that textualist and intentionalist statutory interpretation methodologies are necessarily indeterminate and incomplete).
285

NOMICS AND THE LAW
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cratically elected legislatures are unlikely to choose one and banish
the other. They will often protect both, obliging courts to resolve the
value conflict in individual disputes. 2 8 One disputant claims to have
been harmed by another; the accused claims to have acted within his
rights, bearing no causal responsibility for the claimant's bad luck.
Determining causal responsibility for harm in individual cases often
requires determining the precise scope of conflicting rights, thereby
choosing between the conflicting ends of the two parties.
In their study of causation in legal thought, Hart and Honor6
define a legal cause as ordinarily (1) an abnormal, 289 (2) voluntary
act 290 (3) necessary to 29 1 (4) an unusual

event, 29
293
experience,
and

2

(5) correlating with

such a result in normal
(6) not followed by
another abnormal (and so unforeseeable) cause. 2 94 The abnormal act
criterion privileges customary activities, making them ineligible as
sources of liability. It likewise excludes such customary activities as
intervening causes. But is normality just a matter of statistical frequency? Speeding, drunk driving, and jaywalking are abnormal
events regardless of how commonly they occur because they violate
legal norms. The claim that an activity is too "normal" to count as a
cause of harm is essentially a claim that the actor has a right to engage
in it because it serves a worthy end. The requirement of a "normal"
correlation with the result implicates normative judgment as well.
29 5
Cocaine use appears to be less dangerous than riding a motorcycle,
288 See id. at 23-34 (using the tension between affirmative action and antidiscrimination principles in Title VII to illustrate the tendency of legislatures to compromise on controversial issues by adopting equivocal language). Like any other legal
rules, legislative rules arguably frame, rather than resolve, intractable conflicts of principle. See generallyJ.M. Balkin, The Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought, 39 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1, 4-13 (1986) (discussing how rules resolving disputes of principle typically provoke further disputes over rule applications that invoke the same opposing principles); Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 75, 75-76,
90-104 (1991) (same).
289 See HART & HONORE, supra note 212, at 62 (distinguishing causes from neces-

sary conditions by their abnormality).
290 See id. at 41-44, 136-62, 326-40 (noting that legal causes are usually restricted
to voluntary actions).
291 See id. at 109-14.
292 See id. at 39-41.
293 See id. at 44-49 (defining this correlation as causal generalizations depending
upon common experience).
294 See id. at 162-85, 340-51.
295

Compare

OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES,

SUBSTANCE

ABUSE

&

MENTAL HEALTH

ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE 1998
NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE (1999), available at http://www.oas.

samhsa.gov/nhsda/98summHtml/NHSDA98SummTbl-06.htm#P2065-18890

(listing
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and yet a fatal overdose will be viewed by many as a probable rather
than accidental result. 29 6 As noted earlier, robbery is less dangerous

statistically, but more dangerous in common experience, than resisting
robbery.297 Inevitably the determinations of which events are abnormal and which activities are dangerous in normal experience are normative judgments requiring the evaluation of ends. 298 Indeed, Hart

and Honor conclude that the principles of legal causation
have aspects which are vague or indeterminate; they involve the
weighing of matters of degree, or the plausibility of hypothetical
speculations for which no exact criteria can be laid down. Hence

their application, outside the safe area of simple examples, calls2 for
99
judgment and is something over which judgments often differ.
A similar evaluation of ends is required in determining the
"scope" of the risk imposed by an actor, or in deciding whether to
"transfer" culpability. The problem is illustrated by the following
hypothetical: Officers A and B stop and question suspect C. Believing
C to be armed, A fires his pistol at C, intending to kill him and later
claims that C drew his own weapon first. He fails to notice that B is
close to his line of fire. The bullet grazes B's left armpit, inches from
his heart and strikes C in the abdomen, but not fatally. C goes into
shock and, in an unconscious state, draws and fires a pistol at B, kill-

the number of persons in 1998 age twelve and above who had used cocaine in the past
year at 3,811,000), and CDC Mortality Query Results, http://www.briancbennett.
com/charts/death/cdc/cocaine-yr.htm (last visted Apr. 2, 2008) (indicating that
there were 1802 cocaine induced deaths in 1998), with Bureau of Transp. Statistics,
Table 1-11: Number of U.S. Aircraft, Vehicles, Vessels, and Other Conveyances, http:/
/www.bts.gov/publications/national-transportation-statistics/2005/html/table 01
ll.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2008) (listing the number of motorcycles in 2004 at
5,780,870), and Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Traffic Safety Facts 1 tbl.1 (July
2007), http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/810791.pdf (listing the number of motorcyclists killed in 2005 at 4576).
296 Cf KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3436 (1996 & Supp. 2006) (defining, with reference
to other statutory provisions, various "inherently dangerous felon[ies]" including
manufacturing and possession of cocaine); MICHAELJ. HINDEIANG ET AL., U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1974, at 214 tbls.2.88 &
2.89 (1975) (noting the strong approval of harsh sentences for sellers of narcotics and
other "hard drugs").
297 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
298 See Kelman, supra note 221, at 586 (concluding that the Hart and Honor test
requires value judgments).
299 HART & HONORt, supra note 212, at 62; see also DUFF, supra note 113, at 65
("[Causation is] a normative, not a purely factual issue.., we select A, from the whole
range of causal factors which were involved, as 'the cause' of B.").
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ing him. 300 Did A cause B's death? If so, did he do so with purpose,
with recklessness, or with negligence? Hart and Honor6's test asks
whether the death was a normal consequence of A's act. But the
answer to this question depends on how we describe the result and
the act. Surely a death is a normal consequence of trying to kill someone, but surely the death of B is not a normal consequence of shoot30
ing C in the abdomen. '
Our contractarian theory precludes us from transferring culpability among violations of different rights, but gives us little guidance in
this situation, where we are trying to determine which violations of the
right to life A culpably risked when he fired at C. Perhaps the death
of B is a normal consequence of shooting in B's direction, or of
involving B in a gunfight. We must also decide whether C's shot is an
unforeseeable, abnormal event that breaks the chain of causation. Is
defensive violence a "normal" and "foreseeable" consequence of an
attack? Should we describe Cs shot as an instance of such selfdefense, or as an exceedingly improbable instance of automatism?
The Model Penal Code causation standard restates the scope of the
risk problem in explicitly normative terms. It asks whether "the actual
result differs from the probable [or designed] result only in the
respect that a different person... is injured ... or... the actual result
involves the same kind of injury . . . as the probable [or designed]

result and is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a
just bearing on the actor's liability." 30 2 What is the "same kind of
injury"? When is the "only" relevant difference between two injuries
the identity of the victim? When is a result not "too remote or accidental" to justly affect liability? These are obviously normative questions depending in part on our evaluations of the aims of the actors.
The normativity of ascriptions of causal responsibility also infects
assessments of culpability. If the concepts of harm, causation, and risk
all depend on normative judgments, then the ability of defendants to
anticipate the risks of their actions depends on their sharing these
normative judgments. If they merely know the probabilities, but lack
the proper normative interpretation of those probabilities, they may
not be aware of the risk of harm. To nevertheless deem them culpable is to blame them for their values under the guise of holding them
responsible for their expectations.

30

3

300 This hypothetical is loosely based on People v. Newton, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394,
397-401 (Ct. App. 1970).
301 See supra text accompanying notes 211-13 (describing the multiple descriptions problem).
302 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(3)(a)-(b) (1962).
303 See DUFF, supra note 113, at 156, 159, 166.
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Cognitive Culpability and Deserved Punishment for Harmful Results

We earlier saw that the utilitarian variant of cognitive culpability
is incompatible with punishing harmful results, including homicide.30 4 But is the contractarian variant of cognitive culpability compatible with punishing actual harm? Can it explain why offenders
deserve punishment not just for knowingly risking rights violations,
but for actually violating rights? The most fundamental contractarian
value is fairness, and we earlier encountered an argument that punishment for harm unfairly conditions liability on morally irrelevant luck.
Philosophers have offered several reasons to hold offenders morally
responsible for the harmful results of their crimes. We will consider
four responses to the moral luck objection: the determinist reductio,
the remorse analogy, the undeserved gratification argument, and the
undeserved status argument. To my mind, the last two best explain
why culpable injury merits retribution, Yet both arguments present
retributive punishment as a response to the desires and values motivating these injuries. Thus it seems that an account of culpability for
homicide based on retributivist and contractarian premises cannot be
purely cognitive.
The determinist reductio argument, offered by retributivist legal
philosopher Michael Moore, relies on an objectivist conception of
action. This argument rejects the claim that action inherently involves
risk but only contingently involves harm.3 0 5 Instead it begins with a
picture of action as embodied willing. 30 6 To act is to engage with a

physical world. Willing must produce some intended consequences to
count as action at all. 307 Reducing actual harm to a matter of luck
places the theorist on a slippery slope towards a deterministic view of
choice and character as matters of luck as well. If an actor cannot be
blamed for a consequence that would not have occurred under other
circumstances, why should she be blamed for creating a risk that
would have been less under other circumstances? Why should she be
blamed for a choice she would not have made under less tempting
circumstances, or with different physical abilities?30 8 To take an
example relevant to the felony murder context, suppose an armed
robber demands "your money or your life." Why should such a robber
be held responsible for killing a resisting victim if he would have left a
compliant victim alive, or if better opportunities would have drawn
304
305
306
307
308

See
See
See
See
See

supra Part II.C.
MOORE, supra note 134, at 192.
id. at 48.
id. at 49.
id. at 232-46.
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him away from a career as a robber? The point of this reductio is not to
say that only results matter. For Moore, desert is determined by the
actor's will-but willing is subject to punishment only insofar as it has
effects.3 0 9 What Moore's argument leaves unexplained is why wrongful injuries are the particular effects that should trigger punishment.
A second argument for punishing harm is the remorse analogy,
which appeals to common moral intuitions. If most people feel that
harm merits greater punishment,3 1 0 that may be because it is normal
to feel a greater sense of remorse when we cause harm, and a sense of
relief when our careless actions cause no harm. 3 11 Legal philosopher
Antony Duff reasons that one whose remorse for a careless action is
unaffected by its results fails to show the empathy expected of a morally developed person.3 12 Moore adds that regretting careless actions
but not harmful results expresses a narcissistic focus on one's own
moral state and repeats the same indifference to the welfare of others
that rendered the imposition of risk wrong in the first place. 3 13 Just as
we hold ourselves more accountable for harmful rather than for
harmless wrongdoing, we are more inclined to forgive others when
their wrongdoing proves harmless. Duff explains that when we punish
harm, we communicate to the offender that an extra measure of
regret is morally obligatory, as an expression of the empathy owed the
victim. 3 14 We tie the offender's welfare to that of his victim as an

expression that an attitude of indifference to the suffering of others is
unacceptable. This argument rejects the view that carelessness is fundamental and that harm is a contingent feature of careless acts. The
practice of punishing harm insists that moral reasoning begins with
the actual suffering of particular persons, and that the wrongness of
imposing risk on populations is derivative from the wrongness of
injuring persons.
Notice that insofar as this argument justifies punishing the
offender so as to force him to experience morally appropriate regret
for the harm he causes, it focuses on his desire states rather than his
cognitive states. This desiderative focus is more explicit in a third
argument for punishing harm, based on Kantian retributivism: the
undeserved gratificationargument. Within Immanuel Kant's moral phi309

310
311

See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 225-33.

& DARLEY, supra note 11, at 13-28, 74-79.
DUFF, supra note 113, at 189-90.
312
id. at 189.
313
MOORE, supra note 134, at 231.
314
R.A. DuFF, CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS 345 ( 1996); DUFF, supra note 113, at
191-92; R.A. Duff, Subjectivism, Objectivism, and CriminalAttempts, in HARM AND CULPABILITY 19, 37-39 (A.P. Semester & A.T.H. Smith eds., 1996).
ROBINSON
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losophy, a moral act is one determined by a "good will," one motivated by duties of fair cooperation.3 1 5 An immoral act is determined
by a bad will, one that yields to a desire incapable of realization if
universalized. 3 16 Punishment serves to enforce duties of fair cooperation by frustrating such anticooperative desires. 317 On these premises,
punishment for intentionally causing harm fairly corrects an
offender's undeserved gratification for causing it. If we punished
attempts and completed crimes equally, successful offenders would be
left more satisfied than unsuccessful attempters. Their regret at having been caught and punished would be mitigated by their pleasure in
having achieved their criminal aims. From this viewpoint, we are
obliged to punish the successful wrongdoer more than the attempter
lest we become complicit in his self-indulgence by permitting his
undeserved gratification.3 1 8 This is, in my view, a very strong argument that punishing harm is deserved. Indeed, H.L.A. Hart thought
it "the nearest to a rational defence" that he knew for "this form of
retributive theory."3 19 Yet this argument has not been appreciated as
such by some who regard themselves as retributivists. For example,
Kimberly Kessler writes that "whether someone benefits from a crime
is not the criminal law's concern."3 20 Andrew Ashworth agrees that
"the principles of profit deprivation and vindicative satisfaction
belong to a separate realm of principles ancillary to punishmentchiefly principles of compensation." 32 1 Stephen Morse also dismisses
this idea, reasoning that "[a] gents who fail may feel less satisfied ex
post than those who succeed, but such feelings do not affect the
agent's culpability at the time of the criminal conduct.

'322

It is odd, however, to find purported retributivists arguing that
the extent of the offender's suffering doesn't matter. While Kant
denied that punishment could be evaluated on the basis of its welfare
effects for persons other than the offender, he saw the offender's suffering as essential.3 23 The essence of wrongdoing was yielding to an
315

See

IMMANUEL

KANT,

GROUNDWORK

FOR THE METAPHYSICS

OF MORALS

9-21

(Alan W. Wood ed. & trans., Yale Univ. Press 2002) (1785).
316 See id. at 55-62.
317 See Binder, supra note 19, at 352-55.
318 Michael Davis, Why Attempts Deserve Less Punishment than Complete Crimes, 5 LAW
& PHIL. 1, 28-29 (1986).
319 HART, supra note 94, at 131.
320 Kimberly D. Kessler, The Role of Luck in the CriminalLaw, 142 U. PA. L. REv.
2183, 2219 (1994).
321 Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting Harm Under the
Code, and in the Common Law, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 725, 746 (1988).
322 Morse, supra note 152, at 427.
323 See KANT, supra note 19, at 138-39.
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immoral desire, and the point of punishment was to correct wrongdoing by resisting that desire and forcing the offender to regret his
choice. Kant therefore argued that no penalty should be imposed on
a drowning swimmer who wrested a plank from another, because no
subsequent penalty could possibly negate his desire to survive. 324 His
point was neither that the act was justified, nor that punishment
would have no deterrent effect on others. It was that such a penalty
could not even constitute punishment because it could not frustrate
the desire motivating the crime. Absent some such account of why
and how much the offender should suffer, a retributive theory cannot
justify punishment which imposes suffering as well as blame. Kant's
principle of frustrating the offender's attempt at undeserved gratification responds to this challenge. Based on this principle, the successful offender is owed more suffering than the attempter.
The undeserved gratification argument justifies punishing harm
on the basis of the actor's ends rather than merely her choices and
expectations. It is compatible with contractarianism, but not with a
purely cognitive theory of culpability. Yet it appears to justify punishing only purposeful harm, not knowing or reckless harm. If the actor
is indifferent to harm rather than seeking it, there is no extra satisfaction to frustrate through additional suffering. On the other hand,
there are some situations where the reckless imposition of risk
expresses hostility rather than indifference, for example when the
offender imposes risk sadistically in order to frighten, or contemptuously in order to humiliate and dominate. Such motives are often
present in unintended homicides charged as murder on the basis of
depraved indifference to human life.3

25

Similarly hostile motives fea-

ture in many felony murders as well. Criminologist Jack Katz's
research on robbery argues that it is often motivated more fundamentally by a wish for power and control over others than by economic
motives. 32 6 A desire to dominate and humiliate is apparent in rape as
27
well, particularly the kind of rape that endangers the victim's life.3

Where endangering a particular victim is a gratifying end in itself, we
may have some retributive justification for punishing harm to that vic324 See id. at 36.
325 See, e.g., Mayes v. People, 106 Ill. 306, 308-09, 311 (1883) (affirming a conviction for murder of a man who, motivated by anger, threw a beer glass at his wife who

was carrying an oil lamp and failed to aid her after she ignited); Commonwealth v.
Malone, 47 A.2d 445, 447 (Pa. 1946) (affirming the murder conviction of an individ-

ual who bullied a younger child into shooting himself).
326
327

(1975).

See KATZ, supra note 82, at 164-236.
See SusAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 194-97 (Fawcett Columbine 1993)
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tim. Moreover, where the offender has derived satisfaction from
asserting complete control over a situation, perhaps it is fair to attribute responsibility to him for the harmful results he permits to those
3 28
over whom he has asserted his dominion.
The undeserved status argument justifies punishment for actual
harm as necessary to correct the effects of successful crime on the
social status of victims, offenders, and anyone identifying with them.
It draws on Jean Hampton's expressive account of punishment as
"defeat."32 9 This argument presumes that when one person wrongfully harms another, this is understood to express a kind of insult.
The wrongdoer treats the victim as a person of lesser status, 330 whose
interests do not count as much as his own. This is an insult felt by the
victim or anyone who identifies with the victim. In some societies, the
wronged party is obliged to demand, and if necessary coerce, redress
from the wrongdoer.3 3 1 If he fails to do so, he accepts the insult and
reveals his cowardice, thereby lowering his status and perhaps inviting
more abuse from others. 33 2 The wrongdoer may gain in status if his
wrong is left unredressed and he can become an increasing threat to
others. This dynamic explains the practice of vengeance as an effort
to restore the preexisting status equilibrium.3 33 In some societies, a
patron undertakes to protect the status of dependents by exacting
vengeance on their behalf.3 3 4 In a modern liberal society, private vengeance and private dependence (among competent adults) are suppressed, thus depriving victims of a self-help remedy for status
degradation. The liberal state purports to guarantee all adults an
328 This is one way of making sense of the somewhat puzzling attribution of causal
responsibility for death in the famous Stephenson case, where the victim of a kidnapping and attempted rape died primarily as a result of voluntarily ingesting poison
while under her assailant's control. See Stephenson v. State, 179 N.E. 633, 635-36
(Ind. 1932).
329 See HAMPTON, INTRINSIC WORTH, supra note 20, at 116-42; Hampton, Moral
Education Theory, supra note 7, at 208, 217, 227; Hampton, The Retributive Idea, supra
note 20, at 111-61.
330 On the concept of social status and its importance in explaining behavior, even
in modern liberal societies, see Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J.
1, 31-48 (1992).
331 SeeJACK HENRY ABBOTT, IN THE BELLY OF THE BEAsT 75-76 (1981) (discussing
social pressures on prison inmates to avenge insults and injuries).

332 See id.
333 See generally WILLIAM IAN MILLER, BLOODTAKING AND PEACEMAKING 179-220
(1990) (defining and explaining the retributive practices of feuding and vengeance);
BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN, SOUTHERN HONOR 262-434 (1982) (detailing studies of vengeance in honor-based societies).
334 See, e.g.,
William Ian Miller, Choosing the Avenger: Some Aspects of the Bloodjeud in
Medieval Iceland and England, 1 LAW & HIST. REV. 159, 160 (1983).
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equal status and the state asserts an exclusive right to protect that status by exacting vengeance on behalf of victims. This monopoly
implies an undertaking to vindicate particular victims by avenging
actual harms, rather than merely deterring the imposition of risk
against the public at large. 335 Such deterrence may reduce injury, but

does nothing to restore the status of those who have been wrongly
injured. A monopolistic state may only justly claim the loyalty and
demand the forbearance of victims if it fulfills its undertaking to vindicate them.
Retributivists have sometimes scorned this sort of argument as a
form of revenge utilitarianism, justifying unfair punishment in order
to reduce a supposed danger of retaliatory vigilantism. 33 6 Yet the
argument is not ultimately concerncd with consequences or welfare
effects. It concerns the fairness and integrity of an institution that has
undertaken to stand up for the equal status of potential victims while
precluding them from doing this for themselves. Like the undeserved
gratification argument, it is compatible with contractarianism. But
rather than punishing harm on the basis of the offender's desires, it
punishes harm on the basis of the expressive meaning of harming a
victim, and of permitting such harm to go unredressed.
We can combine the undeserved gratification argument with the
undeserved status argument. If a punishment scheme is indifferent to
the wrongdoer's undeserved gratification, it allows a wrongdoer to
treat the penalty for wrongdoing as a price. This literally "sells out"
the victim by enabling anyone to purchase a license from the state to
degrade her. By punishing harmful results, the state prevents this
commodification and thereby stabilizes the meaning of punishment as
a restoration of the victim's status. This in turn enables the state to
offer state punishment to citizens as an institution that underwrites
civic status more securely than a system of private vengeance. In recognizing the equal status of its citizens, the state offers them a powerful moral motive to identify and comply with the criminal law. The
state thereby persuades citizens to view respecting the rights of others
as a public duty inhering in their own status as equal citizens. In pursuing this strategy of social control, the state overtly attempts to influence the moral values of its citizens, less by threatening them with
punishment than by offering to punish on their behalf.
The strongest arguments for the fairness of punishing harmful
results rely on moral assessments of the values implied by injurious
acts and condemn the harm inflicted as an expression of those values.
335
336

See Hampton, The Retributive Idea, supra note 20, at 124-30.
See MooRE, supra note 134, at 207-08; Kessler, supra note 320, at 2216.
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They support a richer conception of culpability than that offered by
the cognitive theory. While the cognitive theory appears to provide a
value-neutral assessment of culpability for harm, that appearance is an
illusion. It is based on conflating utilitarianism's cognitive conception
of culpability for risk with a contractarian conception of culpability for
harm that requires the moral assessment of meaning and motive. It
appears that we cannot make sense of homicide liability on a purely
cognitive basis.
IV.

A.

ExPREssIVE CULPABILITY

Expressive Culpability and Felony Murder

This subpart presents an expressive account of culpability that
candidly judges the values expressed by actions, and shows how such
an expressive account can defend felony murder liability as deserved.
My purpose in explicating this argument is not to persuade the reader
that our legal system should adopt felony murder liability. My purpose is to develop a principled basis for the felony murder liability
that already prevails. Such a principled account of felony murder is a
prerequisite to a genuine debate about its merits. More importantly, a
principled account of felony murder is necessary if we are to interpret
and apply our existing felony murder rules justly. A theory of felony
3 37
murder enables us to make it "the best it can be."

An expressive account of culpability begins with a conception of
action as expressively, rather than instrumentally, motivated. On this
view, action expresses value by identifying us with normative social
practices. In The Morality of Freedom, the legal philosopher Joseph Raz
denies that our desires determine our goals, and argues instead that
our desires often flow from normative beliefs about what is best for
us. 33 8 Thus, he contends, we act on the basis of normative reasons or
values, rather than unreflective wants. 339 In Value in Ethics and Econom-

ics, the moral philosopher Elizabeth Anderson offers an institutional
account of value as a social practice of recognizing certain kinds of
goods, which in turn shape social relations. 340 To value is to partici337 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 50-69 (1986) (presenting an "aesthetic
hypothesis" that "constructive interpretation" should make "the best" of received legal

materials by articulating principles with which future decisions can maintain "integrity"); see also GuYoRA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISMS OF LAW
169-76 (2000) (explicating Dworkin's hypothesis).
338 SeeJOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 288-320 (1986).
339 See id. at 300-13.
340 See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE INETHICS AND ECONOMICS 6-7, 11-15 (1993).
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pate in such a social practice by assuming a certain role, entailing rela34
tions with and responsibilities toward others. '
On this account of action as value-motivated, valuing does not
mean merely harboring a mental state-an opinion or demand
curve-somewhere in one's head. Instead, valuing requires identifying oneself with a social practice through action in relation to
others. 342 Thus, to bargain is to value economically by participating in
the institution of market exchange; to love is to participate in the very
different evaluative practices of romantic courtship or familial attachment. To worship a deity or appreciate art is similarly to participate in
the conventions of some cultural community. By contrast to the
exclusively instrumental conception of rational action employed in
economic analysis, then, Raz and Anderson offer an expressive conception. According to this expressive conception, to act rationally is
to express values one reflectively endorses, to identify oneself with corresponding roles with respect to corresponding goods, and to fulfill
3 43
the responsibilities attendant upon those roles.
Based on similarly expressive conceptions of action, the philosopher Jean Hampton has offered an account of criminal culpability as
the expression of contempt for or "defiance" of values she sees as particularly important in a liberal political community.3 44 Thus, drawing
on contractarian ideas, she portrays criminal law as a cooperative institution investing certain rights and public duties with significance as
symbols of mutual regard in a society of equally free persons. 34 5 On
this view, to commit a criminal act is to express disrespect for the
3 46
equal status of others; to punish is to reassert their equal status.
Such an expressive model of culpability can account for the criminal law's attribution of responsibility for causing harm because it does
not pretend to achieve value neutrality. Instead, it can acknowledge
the social cost and scope of the risk problems that preclude cognitive
culpability theory from achieving value neutrality. In other words, it
recognizes that all action imposes risk to the welfare of others, so that
harm always involves the interaction of competitive activities. Because
harm cannot be quantified without evaluating the desires frustrated
by competing activities, neither can risk. Attributions of responsibility
for causing harm therefore depend on evaluations of the underlying
341

See id. at 11-15.

342

See RAz, supra note 338, at 307-13.
See ANDERSON, supra note 340, at 17-43.
See HAMPTON, INTRINSIC WORTH, supra note 20, at 102-06 (explicating the

343

344

"defiance" conception of criminal culpability).
345 See id.
346 See id. at 134-50.
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activities of both "offenders" and "victims." An expressive model can
acknowledge that these attributions of causal responsibility depend on
irreducibly subjective or aesthetic judgments of analogy between
unworthy aims and unfortunate results. Where such an aesthetic analogy can be found between a coercive or destructive felony and a
resulting unintended death, an expressive account can attribute the
requisite culpability and causal responsibility for an aggravated homicide offense. Thus, if robbers and rapists do not advert to risks
because they wish to claim for themselves a transcendent power to
control events, it may seem just to blame them for the harms they
thereby inflict on those whom they coercively recruit into their fantasies of dominion.
By contrast to cognitive theory's aspiration to value neutrality, an
expressive conception of culpability overtly defines action as culpable
insofar as it expresses a commitment to unworthy values. The evaluative focus of an expressive conception is ultimately on the reasons for

action. The various mental states excluded by a cognitive conception
of culpability-malign desires, motives, or emotions-are not culpable in themselves, any more than an expectation of harm is culpable
in itself. These mental states become culpable when an actor allows
them to guide action. In so doing, the actor accepts them as valid
reasons for action, reasons that outweigh countervailing considerations. Thus, the offender repudiates institutional practices of valuation that acknowledge others as equally free, or identifies himself with
institutional practices of valuation, such as gangster roles, that disrespect others. By identifying himself with particular institutional practices of valuation, the actor expresses value judgments. These value
judgments are attributable to the actor, but they are characteristics of
a particular act rather than manifestations of the actor's character.
Such expressed value judgments may of course be influenced by persistent character traits of the actor, but the actor is blamed for a particular act that expresses bad values, not for persistently adhering to
bad values.
On this view, conduct is culpable if done for reasons reflecting a
lack of proper regard for others' welfare, autonomy, or equal citizenship.3

47

Thus it is culpable to purposely reduce the welfare of others,

or to knowingly harm or endanger that welfare for an unworthy purpose. It is similarly blameworthy to deprive someone of a basic right
secured to all, whether purposefully or as an expected consequence of
action taken for some other unworthy or insufficient purpose. It is
347 The arguments in this paragraph draw on
note 20, at 120-34.

HAMPTON, INTRINSIC WORTH,

supra

2oo8]

THE

CULPABILITY

OF FELONY

MURDER

1035

reprehensible to act with the aim of establishing personal dominion
or authority over an equal citizen. One may exercise legitimate
authority as an agent or delegate of a democratic polity, for a limited
and publicly determined purpose. However, to assert dominion over
another without such authorization and limitation is to impugn the
other's autonomy and equality, and to displace all democratic citizens
from their proper role in establishing and delimiting such authority.
Similarly, to exercise such power for an unauthorized purpose or in
defiance of its prescribed limitations is to express disrespect for the
autonomy, equality, and citizenship of others. In addition, when a
democratic polity has duly imposed public duties on all citizens, knowingly evading those duties for an unworthy purpose disrespects one's
fellow citizens as equal participants in collective decisionmaking.
Finally, a democratic polity may associate duties of care with certain
public offices or private positions of trust. To neglect these role
responsibilities in favor of other purposes and pursuits is to improperly value these roles and the persons who rely on their fulfillment.
This expressive conception of culpability does not blame actors
only for causing-or risking-a harmful state of affairs. First, it recognizes that a wrongdoer's contribution to wrong need not be causal.
Thus, we blame accomplices for identifying themselves with a wrong
rather than for causing it. An accomplice can become a party to
crime by providing redundant assistance to a principal, or by encouraging an already resolute principal. Legal philosopher Christopher
Kutz has used the firebombing of Dresden to illustrate how multiple
actors can participate in producing harm without any individual bearing causal responsibility. 348 Thus, no single bomb was either necessary or sufficient to produce the catastrophic firestorm that consumed
the city and killed tens of thousands of victims. Each act of releasing a
bomb linked a bomber crew to these deaths expressively rather than
causally. 349 No individual participant authored the result, but each
authorized it, identifying himself with values that would justify or permit it.
Second, wrongs are not limited to undesirable physical events or
changes in "states of affairs." As legal philosopher Meir Dan-Cohen
argued in his provocative essay Harmful Thoughts, we can be made
worse off by changes in how other people think and feel. 35 0 I am
worse off if a romantic partner ceases to love me, or if my professional
348
349
350

See CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY 116-24 (2000).
See id.
See MEIR DAN-COHEN, HARMFUL THOUGHTS 183-85 (2002).
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reputation declines. 35 1 Others' thoughts may affect my opportunities,

or may sadden me if I know about them, but their harmfulness to me
does not seem reducible to these effects on my experience. 352 DanCohen agrees with philosopher Joel Feinberg that if I seek esteem, I
3 53
can be harmed by a bad reputation even after I am dead.
In various ways, then, my well-being depends not just on how the
world is but also on how others interpret and evaluate the world.
Some of these interpretive constructs are, like the firebombing of
Dresden, products of collective action.3 5 4 Thus philosopher John

Searle defines institutions as social practices organized by norms
applied on the basis of interpretive judgments.3 5 5 The existence of an
institution depends on its acceptance by some community of persons.
Such socially contingent "institutional facts" include linguistic meaning, market value, legal authority, and social status.35 6 Just as the Dresden bombers could participate in wrongful collective action without
causing its effects, an individual may participate in an institutional
wrong like slavery, gender hierarchy, or mob rule without necessarily
causing any particular harmful consequence. By committing an act of
violence in order to demean or demoralize a group, one identifies
oneself with an unjust institution. In so doing one does not merely
express a political opinion. One participates in an injustice.
In the case of a hate crime, a diffuse wrongful aim (to
subordinate a group) changes the normative meaning and aggravates
the wrong of causing harm intentionally. In the case of felony murder, a more precise wrongful aim (e.g., to expropriate property, to
violate sexual autonomy, to destroy a building) changes the normative
meaning and aggravates the wrong of causing harm negligently. Why
should the criminal law consider the offender's ends in negligently
imposing a fatal risk? Because imposing such a risk for an evil purpose expresses reprehensible values. This is especially true when the
risk arises from the deliberate use of force. Force has destructive
potential, of course, but it also has a political meaning that transcends
351 See id.
352 Just as I am diminished by the loss of a loved one and injured by a violation of
my consent, even if I never find out about them. See id. at 174-78; see also HAMPTON,
INTRINSIC WORTH, supra note 20, at 120 (arguing that moral injury does not depend
on psychic pain or knowledge of being injured).
353 See DAN-COHEN, supra note 350, at 178; JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 83-91
(1984).
354 See DAN-COHEN, supra note 350, at 185-86.
355 SeeJoHN SEARLE, THE CONsTRucTION OF SoctAL REALITY 27 (1995) (defining
institutional facts as those that can only exist within human institutions); id. at 40-47
(describing statuses as institutional facts).
356 See id. at 31-58.
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its destructive effects. Force is the language of rule, of political superiority. It is therefore an anomaly in a liberal society of political equals,
where it can only be authorized by democratic assent and justified by
good reasons. The coercive power of the criminal law is authorized
on just such a basis. As I have argued, people obey law more because
they identify with it than because they fear it.3 5 7 This suggests that the

criminal law's expressive content is central to its role in controlling
crime. Whether or not the criminal law can deter, it sets a standard of
conduct for society by identifying certain conduct as wrong and
expressing a collective determination to oppose such wrongs by force.
In establishing and enforcing such a norm, the law constructs an institutional fact. Offenses that use force as an instrument of wrongful
ends challenge the criminal law's expressive content, using the law's
own idiom of coercion. They challenge the criminal law with rival
institutional constructs. To use force in furtherance of a felony is to
misappropriate the democratic polity's force in opposition to its values. A felony murder rule responds to this challenge to the authority
of the democratic sovereign and its central value commitments. It
reasserts that only a democratically enacted law can determine the
ends for which coercive force may be used.
The moral depravity of felony murder is most apparent when an
offender uses fatal violence to coerce a victim's cooperation or overcome her resistance during a crime like rape or robbery. Feminist
analysis of the crime of rape has revealed that it is not merely a selfish
act of sexual gratification.35 8 It is also a political act, in which an
assailant asserts dominion over a fellow human being (of either sex)
on the basis of gender hierarchy. The rapist simultaneously controls
the victim and degrades her status. 35 9 Think of the way rape is used in
prison to permanently lower the victim's status and mark him as one
who must obey; 360 or, think of what soldiers express about the political
status of an undefended civilian population when they use rape as an
instrument of war. 36 1 The rapist's violence strips the victim of her civil
357

See supra note 90 and accompanying text.

358

See BROWNMILLER, supra note 327, at 15;

HAMPTON, INTRINSIC WORTH,

supra

note 20, at 131; CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 7 (1987).
359 See HAMPTON, INTRINSIC WORTH, supra note 20, at 131.
360 See BROWNMILLER, supra note 327, at 257-68; Helen M. Eigenberg, Rape in Male
Prisons: Examining the Relationship Between Correctional Officers' Attitudes Toward Male
Rape and Their Willingness to Respond to Acts of Rape, in PRISON VIOLENCE IN AMERICA
145, 145-61 (Michael Braswell et al. eds., 2d ed. 1994); Daniel Lockwood, Issues in
Prison Sexual Violence, in PRISON VIOLENCE IN AMERICA, supra, at 97, 97-102.
361
See KELLY DAwN ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN 261-82 (1997) (detailing
the use of organized mass rape as a military and political weapon during the Yugoslav
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status and makes her his subject and dependent. Within the rapist's
domain, the victim is at his mercy: the victim's safety and survival
depend on the rapist's choices, not her own. In using force as an
instrument of governance, the rapist not only demeans the victim, he
also challenges the sovereignty of the democratic state.
The criminologist Jack Katz offers a related account of armed
robbery.3 62 Robbers differ from other thieves in that they publicly
announce their criminal intentions, waving their weapons and shouting commands. 363 The robber's first aim is to establish control over a
situation, over a place and the people in it. 3 64 The victims of a rob-

bery-and the potential victims of a felony murder-often include
everyone on the scene, whether or not they control the loot. According to Katz, robberies are difficult to explain instrumentally. The take
is small, 365 and successful robbers typically squander the proceeds
immediately. 366 The risks are great: robbers draw attention to themselves, inviting identification.3 67 They place their trust in collaborators who are violent, dishonest, and instable. 368 Their menacing
behavior can provoke violent resistance. 369 Robbers often compound
these risks by persisting in the face of resistance and often use violence against uncooperative victims who pose no real threat to
them. 3 70 According to Katz, the seemingly irrational project of robbery grows out of an existential choice to cope with the chaos of life in
the underclass by assuming the persona of an indomitable "hardman."3 7 1 Having cultivated a character capable of transcending danger with implacable violence, however, the robber invites danger so as
to occasion the performance of such a character. 372 Like the rapist
then, the robber uses violence expressively and politically, carving out
space for his own identity in a society that has no use for him, by
establishing his dominion over others. Like the rape victim, the robbery victim finds himself at the mercy of the offender's fantasies. In
conflict); BROWNMILLER, supra note 327, at 31-113 (detailing the use of rape in wartime to dominate and intimidate enemy civilians).
362

See KATZ, supra note 82, at 176-78.

363 See id.
364 See id.
365 See id. at 164.
366 See id. at 215-18.
367 See id. at 164-65 (discussing the high risk of apprehension associated with
robbery).
368 See id. at 191-92 (noting the unpredictability of accomplices).
369 See id. at 187-89 (discussing the high risks of resistance during robberies).
370 See id. at 178-87.
371 See id. at 185-87.
372 See id. at 218-36.
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both cases, the victim's exposure to danger constitutes the very power
by which the felon achieves his wrongful aim. If this danger materializes and the victim dies, it seems fair to attribute the death to the felon
who claimed mastery over the situation, and who reduced the victim
to an instrument of his will.
Not only is such a felony murderer harming the interests of a
victim; he is also violating an important political principle. The felony
murderer arrogates to himself the power to coerce other citizens that,
in a democracy, is properly vested only in a democratic state subject to
constitutional controls. Moreover, the felony murderer uses this
power for purposes that the democratic polity has determined to
oppose by force. In this sense, the robber and the rapist challenge the
rule of law itself, like hoodlums who intimidate witnesses or voters, or
like members of a lynch mob. On a small scale, the robber and the
rapist establish a rival regime that repudiates the ordinary grounds of
political legitimacy in consent, welfare, and liberty. The felon's "political" motive for using violence aggravates his culpability in the same
way as that of the traitor, the terrorist, or the Klansman, although not
necessarily to the same extent.
On the cognitive conception, however, the offender's purpose in
risking harm is irrelevant to her culpability for causing harm. According to this conception, the criminal law has no business judging the
values expressed by acts of treason, terror, persecution, and felony
murder. We have seen that cognitivists offer two contradictory arguments against conditioning punishment on the actors' ends. One
argument is that the choice of ends is the exercise of a freedom fundamental to liberal society, which should not be chilled by the threat of
criminal punishment.3 73 This argument is considered below, in Part
IV.C. The other argument is that values should not be the object of
blame because they are not chosen, but instead are inherent charac3 74
teristics of the person.

Does liability for crimes of motive like genocide and felony murder punish character rather than choice? Not if by "motives" we mean
"reasons for action." We may entertain a desire, an opinion, or an
affective attitude without choosing it. Indeed, we may resist such feelings or struggle to rid ourselves of them. 3 75 But when we choose to

express such feelings through action, we endorse those feelings asjus-

373
374
375

See supra notes 156 & 157 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 155 & 157 and accompanying text.
See VICTOR TADROS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 44 (2005).
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tifying reasons and identify ourselves with them as values. 376 We are
just as responsible for the values we express through our actions as we
are for the thoughts we express in speech.
Some cognitivists argue that offenders should not be blamed for
illicit desires because they may be helpless to avoid them; and that evil
desires by themselves are innocent because an actor may experience
such desires and yet resist acting on them.3

77

Yet these arguments

militate only against punishing unexecuted desires. They offer no
reason to absolve offenders who choose to gratify desires they should
resist. The expressive account proposed here blames actors only for
the values they express by acting on the basis of bad reasons. It does
not blame them for harboring fantasies they don't act on.
Some cognitivists distinguish diffuse motives like bigotry from the
"specific intentions" required for many conventional crimes. Thus
Heidi Hurd and Michael Moore argue that hatred and bigotry are
affective attitudes that cannot be equated with specific goals like extermination of a group.3 78 They argue that such affective attitudes are
not easily controlled or eliminated because they are emotions rather
than thoughts. 3 7 9 For Hurd and Moore, bigotry causes action involuntarily rather than providing a reason for voluntary action. 3 80 Even if
accepted, this argument would not cut against felony murder, which
aggravates negligent homicide based on the specific intentions
required for other conventional crimes.
Nevertheless, this argument should not be accepted, for two reasons. First, hate crimes are not simply assaults accompanied by an
inner feeling of hostility. They are assaults aimed at the expressive
goals of demeaning a group and demeaning a victim because of membership in this group. Other political motives like terrorism and treason can be defined with similar precision. Second, evaluative attitudes
like hostility, anger, resentment, and contempt should not be seen as
irrational just because they involve emotion. As Martha Nussbaum
and Dan Kahan argue in Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law,
emotion is an inherent aspect of evaluative reasoning. 38 1 An emotional reaction like outrage upon witnessing cruelty to a child reflects
376 See Durr, supra note 113, at 47-51 (suggesting that the reasons for which we
act are putative justifications); TADROS, supra note 375, at 31-34 (arguing that those
desires acted upon are accepted as values by the individual).
377 See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 134, at 405-06; Ferzan, supra note 149, at 209-12.
See Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Punishing Hatred and Prejudice, 56
378
STAN. L. REv. 1081, 1105, 1128-29 (2004).
379 See id. at 1118-29.
380 See id. at 1121-29; Hurd, supra note 153, at 223-26.
381 See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 7, at 285-97.
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a moral judgment, while moral reasoning can assess the propriety of
such evaluative emotions. 38 2 Evaluative emotions do not merely cause
action: they offer reasons for action that can be evaluated as better or
worse. Kahan and Nussbaum argue that action motivated by a justified evaluative emotion should be seen as less culpable, as when provoked intentional killings are mitigated to manslaughter.3 8 3 By the
same logic, an unjustified evaluative emotion like racial animus
should aggravate liability when it motivates crime.
Finally, cognitivists sometimes equate motives with enduring dispositions. Thus, Hurd poses the following question:
At the moment that a defendant is about to throw a rock through
his neighbor's window, we are reasonably sure that he can will to do
otherwise; but at that moment, can he will away his hatred of his

neighbor as a Jew? Can one simply decide not to be selfish, or
greedy, or narcissistic? I suspect anyone who can is not very selfish,
greedy or narcissistic!

84

Hurd concedes that we may be faulted for not having taken measures
to develop a better character, but reasons that when tempted to do
wrong, "[w]e cannot abandon our emotions and (dispositional)
beliefs the way that we can abandon our goals-i.e., simply by
3 85
choice."
This argument conflates the values expressed by an act with an
actor's inherent or essential identity. The social meaning of action is
an institutional phenomenon, not a hidden, psychological phenomenon. The actor constructs and portrays a contingent identity through
action, rather than revealing an essential and authentic self.38 6 In

treating anti-Semitism as a personality trait rather than an institution,
Hurd reduces persecution to an act of vandalism that happens to
involve a bigot and so reduces an event like Kristallnachtfrom a statusaltering pogrom to a mere wave of delinquency. Thus, in treating the
meaning of action as a psychological trait of the actor, Hurd segregates the act from its social meaning. However, an act is not antiSemitic because it is committed by an anti-Semite. It is anti-Semitic in
so far as it expresses anti-Semitism by identifying an actor with an antiSemitic movement or practice. An individual can choose to express
values without adhering to them consistently over time. For example,
382 See id. at 285-90.
383 See id. at 305-21.
384 Hurd, supra note 153, at 224-25.
385 Id. at 225-26. For a further discussion of choice and emotion, see Hurd &
Moore, supra note 378, at 1129-31.
386 See Guyora Binder & Robert Weisberg, Cultural Criticism of Law, 49 STAN. L.
REv. 1149, 1155-65 (1997) (discussing identity as role-performance).
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in a stratified society, any individual who can be identified with a
subordinate group is vulnerable to degradation by anyone (even a fellow subordinate) whether or not that person has any prior history of
bigotry. Anyone in competition with such a vulnerable person can
exploit this vulnerability to gain an advantage, without necessarily
holding bigoted views. The wrong of degrading someone in this way
consists in playing a bad character, not in having a bad character.
Similarly, a felony murder rule should not be seen as some sort of
recidivist statute aimed at incapacitating habitual criminals because of
their characters. Felony murder rules aggravate negligent homicide
because it is committed in pursuit of a felonious purpose, not because
it is committed by a felon. We have seen that for the paradigmatic
predicate felonies of robbery and rape, the pursuit of a felonious purpose involves performing a role claiming dominion over victims. The
felon whose coercion causes death is blamed for choosing to act in a
destructively domineering way, not for having a domineering
personality.
This idea of culpability as role performance resonates with Hampton's conception of culpability as the defiance of legitimate authority.
Hampton describes an action as culpable when the actor knows what
an important value-rationality, morality, or law-demands of her
3 87
and chooses to act on the basis of some other motivating principle.
Hampton views this choice in political terms as overthrowing an
authority and choosing to obey the practical dictates of a rival authority that indulgently approves the forbidden act as good. 38

8

In so

choosing, an actor expresses allegiance to a value. Just as Kant asks us
to test the moral worth of acts by hypothetically universalizing their
motivating principles, 38 9 Hampton asks us to test acts by imagining
social practices of valuing based on their motivating principles.3

90

To

express a value is to play the role of a participant in such a social
practice.
This idea of role playing helps explain negligence as a form of
expressive culpability. Jeremy Horder views criminal negligence as a
failure to fulfill duties of care inherent in the performance of a role
one has knowingly undertaken. 39 1 Such a duty of care requires not
just avoiding dangerous practices, but maintaining active attention
towards certain risks. For example, surgeons and drivers are licensed
387

See HAMPTON,

388
389

See id.
See KANT4-,
supra note 315, at 37.

390
391

See HAMPTON, INTRINSIC WORTH, supra note 20, at 85-101.
See Horder, supra note 113, at 514-17.

INTRINSIC WORTH,

supra note

20, at 77-78.
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only after having been taught to pay attention. For one who has
undertaken such a duty, a failure to advert to these risks therefore
becomes a culpable choice to shirk the obligations of a role. Hampton explains much imprudent behavior as arising from the performance of a different kind of role, an egoistic fantasy of transcending
mundane causal laws:
[A] person can postulate a kind of magical control over the world,
so that doing what he wishes will also seem consistent with the commands of practical reason....
Or people can decide to believe that they are permitted to try a
forbidden activity because they are exempted from the sorts of
problems that normally plague those who engage in it. For example, drug users often claim that other people get addicted to her39 2
oin, but not them.
Hampton explains "inadvertent negligence" as culpable on the
ground that the unreasonable actor is responsible for having "defiantly" developed an imprudent character.3 9 3 Yet, thus conceding the
ground of choice to cognitive theorists seems unnecessary: the imprudent actors Hampton describes make culpably irrational choices to be
guided by a magical sense of destiny rather than by causal laws.
We can give an expressive account of the felony murderer's negligence with respect to a risk of death by combining Horder's and
Hampton's conceptions of negligence. The driver who runs a red
light is culpable for a resulting collision even if he confidently believes
he "can make it." He knows what the law requires of him and is
obliged to inform himself about the risks he creates in violating it.
Unlike drivers, armed robbers are not licensed after taking a course in
safe theft. But in assaulting and stealing they are violating basic civic
duties. They know they are violating the law and probably know they
are committing predicates for felony murder. It is fair to expect them
to inform themselves about the risks involved in an activity the law so
emphatically condemns. Instead, they blind themselves to such risks
by defiantly adopting a role-the ruthless, implacable "hardman"expressing indifference to the welfare of others and arrogantly claiming an impossible mastery over events.
An expressive theory of culpability measures an actor's culpability
for causing harm along two dimensions: her expectation of causing
harm, and the moral worth of her reasons for imposing that risk. A
392

HAMPTON, INTRINSIC WORTH,

393

Id. at 105-06; see also Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Criminal Negligence, 1 BUFF.

supra note 20, at 80.

CmJM. L. REV. 431, 447-55 (1998) (discussing the philosophical grounds for a character theory of negligence).
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felony murder rule conditions liability for death on a negligent disregard of the substantial risk imposed by a fatal act, and a very depraved
motive for the act. The dual character of expressive culpability
explains a traditional feature of felony murder liability that has long
puzzled scholars: the requirement of an "independent felonious purpose.13 9

4

Under this doctrine, felony murder liability cannot be predi-

cated on a felony that simply attacks or endangers the homicide
victim's body. Thus, offenses like assault and manslaughter are said to
"merge" with the homicide. 395 Even the traditional predicate felony
of burglary-breaking into a home to commit a felony-could merge
with the homicide if the intended felony was itself an assault or homi39 6
cide, rather than a theft or a rape.

Legal philosopher Claire Finkelstein has recently sought to
explain this merger doctrine by hypothesizing that felony murder
requires two separate acts: an act that constitutes a felony and a dis397
tinct act committed in the course of the felony that causes death.
On this basis she argues that the traditional predicate felony of
arson-setting a fire to destroy a building-should be deemed to
merge with any resulting homicide, since the homicide would result
from the same act as that intended to destroy the building. 398 Yet she
offers no moral reason why two acts are necessary for the felon to
deserve murder liability for causing death. Indeed, she implies that
she doubts felony murder liability is deserved. 399 Moreover, her
doubts are understandable, because she accepts the myth that felony
murder liability holds felons strictly liable, rather than requiring negligence. Not surprisingly, given this ahistoric conception of felony murder, Finkelstein finds the prevalent requirements of a dangerous
felony and a causal connection between this felony and the death to
be pointless and unnecessary. 40 0 She would drastically alter the criteria of felony murder liability, not to conform to any sincerely held
394

See, e.g.,
People v. Burton, 491 P.2d 793, 801-02 (Cal. 1971) (en banc).

395 See People v. Ireland, 450 P.2d 580, 589-91 (Cal. 1969) (en banc); State v.
Heemstra 721 N.W.2d 549, 556 (Iowa 2006); State v. Lucas, 759 P.2d 90, 95 (Kan.
1988); State v. Shock, 68 Mo. 552, 555 (1878); People v. Moran, 158 N.E. 35, 36-37
(N.Y. 1927); People v. Rector, 19 Wend. 569, 605 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838).
396 See, e.g., People v. Wilson, 462 P.2d 22, 27-30 (Cal. 1969) (en banc).
397 See Claire Finkelstein, Merger and Felony Murder, in DEFINING CRIMES 218,
218-40 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2005).
398 See id. at 224-25, 231, 238-39 (criticizing Murphy v. State, 665 S.W.2d 116
(Tex. Crim. App. 1983), and People v. Billa, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 842 (Ct. App. 2002),
which reject application of the merger doctrine to arson).
399
400

See id. at 218-19.
See id. at 237.
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vision of desert, but simply to resolve what she regards as the puzzle of
merger.

401

Yet from the standpoint of the expressive theory of culpability,
neither the merger doctrine nor the dangerous felony requirement is
puzzling. Rather than viewing felony murder as a combination of two
acts, the expressive theory of culpability explains the merger doctrine
as a requirement that the fatal felony combines two culpable mental
states- indifference to a risk of death, and an independent depraved
purpose. The combination of these two mental states ensures that the
fatal felon is sufficiently culpable to deserve murder liability. Felony
murder is not two acts, a felony and a killing. It is a negligent act,
combined with a foreseeably fatal result, and a purpose to achieve
some other very wrongful result.
This expressive account of the merger rule explains why arson
has been a traditional predicate for felony murder, and why courts do
not see it as merging with the resulting homicide. Thus, the purpose
of destroying a building is the additional bad end that makes fatal
arson worse than reckless manslaughter. Such an independent felonious purpose renders the felon who negligently or recklessly causes
death culpable enough to deserve murder liability. Her culpability for
causing death carelessly is aggravated by the depraved end she seeks.
Moreover, as the next subpart argues, this expressive account of felony murder liability as deserved punishment for acting on bad values
is compatible with Finkelstein's own account of excuses as deserved
exculpation for acting on good values. Thus, the expressive theory better explains felony murder law than Finkelstein's two act theory and
does it on the basis of a moral principle Finkelstein herself seems to
support.
While the expressive theory of culpability outlined here explains
the basic structure of felony murder liability, it also limits it. Obviously, the requirement of an independent felonious purpose is one
such limit, restricting liability to offenders who coerce or exploit victims by forcing them to bear the fatal risks of violent or destructive
means to wrongful ends. Another important limit is the traditional
requirement of inherent dangerousness, 40 2 which should be narrowed
to require a felony inherently involving violence or destruction. Rape,
robbery, arson, kidnapping, and murder (of a different victim) would
therefore qualify as predicate felonies. 40 3 Aggravated witness tamper401
402
403
rather

See id. at 228-39.
See LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 14.5(b), at 745-47.
"Transferred" malice should be recharacterized as a species of felony murder,
than as a legal fiction.
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ing, escape, and resisting arrest could also be predicate felonies, if
defined so as to include acts of violence or destruction. On the other
hand, drug distribution felonies should be excluded. These offenses
impose relatively small risks, and with the apparent consent of the victim. This exclusion would dispose of a major class of cases of unwarranted felony murder liability. 40 4 Burglary, although a traditional

predicate felony, should also be excluded unless the entry was
intended as a means to a further felony involving violence or destruction. Murder liability for killings in the course of home invasions
should be predicated on robbery or some other coercive crime, rather
than on burglary. This exclusion would dispose of another major
class of troubling cases of felony murder liability: accessorial murder
40 5
liability for lookouts or getaway drivers in surreptitious burglaries.
By limiting the predicate felonies to violent or destructive felonies
involving a purpose independent of physical injury to the victim, we
could ensure that accomplices in predicate felonies would always
share in the dual culpability required for felony murder.
Finally, the expressive theory limits causal responsibility to those
deaths that illustrate the felon's culpability. Thus, if the felon's negligence is established by the element of violence or destruction in the
predicate felony, death must foreseeably result from the violent or
destructive act. Accordingly, felons should not be held liable for
deaths resulting unpredictably from a victim's emotional response to
violence. We can reasonably hold felons causally responsible for
deaths resulting from efforts to flee or resist violence, but not for
heart attacks. 40 6 These deaths may result from a predicate felony, but
they do not illustrate-they do not express-that felony's depravity.
The limitations imposed by the expressive theory of culpability
reconcile felony murder with desert. Yet they are not external constraints at odds with the principles of felony murder liability. Instead,
an expressive account of felony murder insures that the limits of
40 7
desert inhere in the principles of felony murder themselves.
B.

Expressive Culpability in American Criminal Law

Cognitivists claim their model of culpability provides an accurate
description of American criminal law. Thus, Hurd and Moore rest
their case against hate crime liability on the charge that it violates the
404
405
406
407
porary

See supra note 59.
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
See supra note 59.
The implications of this expressive theory of culpability for reforming contemfelony murder law will be developed in much greater detail in a future article.
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value-neutral approach to defining crime that they claim prevails in
American criminal law. 40 8 They ultimately concede that a bad motive
aggravates the moral culpability of an offense:
Notwithstanding the relative inelasticity of character, we are
sympathetic to the view that moral culpability is largely a function of
the reasons for which persons act and the emotions that attend
Inasmuch as we can distinguish the mercy killer
their actions ....
from the contract killer only by reference to their relative motivations, and inasmuch as the mercy killer appears as nonculpable as
the contract killer appears culpable, our theory of moral culpability
clearly departs from our doctrines of legal culpability by weighting
an actor's motivations for action far more heavily than the inten40 9
tionality of his actions.
With this concession, Hurd and Moore admit the general principle
that badly motivated offenders deserve more punishment. But, they
contend, it is invidious and illiberal to single out bigoted motives for
more punishment. If bigoted motives aggravate crime, they ask, why
should not other bad motives affect liability? The simple answer is
that other bad motives do affect liability: assessment of motive pervades American criminal law. Cognitivists fail to see this for two reasons. First, they artificially separate inculpatory standards like
depraved indifference from exculpatory standards like necessity or
provocation that are governed by similar moral principles. Second,
they dismiss obviously expressive standards of inculpation like felony
murder as anomalous. However, there are too many such anomalies.
Indeed, an expressive conception of culpability better accounts for
prevailing rules of American criminal law than does a cognitive
conception.
The defenses of self-defense and necessity are obvious examples
of doctrines conditioning liability on evaluation of purposes and
desires rather than on the simple expectation of harm. It may be
objected that killing in self-defense and stealing a car to rush a heart
attack victim to a hospital are approved on the basis of their consequences rather than their motives. Yet motive determines whether a
particular life is worthy of defense and so what counts as a good consequence. 4 10 Thus, we approve the killing of multiple assailants to repel
a rape, and disapprove the rapist killing a resisting victim to save his
own life. In the context of necessity, a good motive is often more
important than a good consequence. Thus, we approve the car theft
408
409
410

See Hurd & Moore, supra note 378, at 1118, 1122-23, 1133-38.
Id. at 1130-31.
See Huigens, supra note 7, at 1429-30.
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even if the patient dies on the way to the hospital, but disapprove a car
theft committed before the heart attack occurs, even if it turns out to
save a life. 4 11 We limit both defenses to courses of action that express
worthy values.
The defense of duress, which excuses coerced crime, is also conditioned on worthy reasons for action. First, the defendant must act
out of fear: 4 12 if she bargains for a share of the loot, she gets no
defense. Second, she must have a good reason for fear, based on a
credible, imminent threat of violence. 4 13 A threat to expose an
embarrassing secret will not suffice. 414 To do great harm to others
because of a minor threat to one's own interests is to indulge an
unworthy emotion-to yield to cowardice rather than coercion. 4 15 As
about
with self-defense, we preclude duress if the defendant brought
4 16
example.
for
gang,
a
joining
by
offending,
of
the necessity
The defense of provocation, which mitigates liability for murder
on the basis of the offender's anger, also depends on the grounds for
the offender's emotion. A recent unprovoked assault suffices; romantic rejection does not.4 17 Since the offender has no right to his vic-

tim's affection, the loss of it gives him no justification for losing his
temper. 4 18 Provocation depends not just on strong emotion, but on
4 19
justified strong emotion.
When we move from defenses to offense definitions, we find the
same concern with the offender's reasons and purposes. This is clearest with the purely inchoate crimes of attempt, conspiracy, and solici411 See Claire Finkelstein, Excuses and Dispositions in CriminalLaw, 6 Burr. CRIM. L.
REV. 317, 344-55 (2002) (arguing that offenses should be excused if motivated by

"rational" dispositions that would usually yield the best outcome).
412 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (1962).

413 See id.
414 See id. (requiring a threat of force that a "person of reasonable firmness" would
be unable to resist).
415 See Finkelstein, supra note 7, at 269-70.
416 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(2) (indicating that the defense of duress is

unavailable if the actor recklessly or negligently placed himself in a situation in which
it was probable he would be subjected to duress).
417 See CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN 230-35 (2003).

418 See id.
419 See id. (arguing that the reasonableness of response to provocation is an inherently normative standard); Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 7, at 305-21 (stating that
the provocation defense is traditionally based on justified anger, not the mere loss of
control); Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation
Defense, 106YAL L.J. 1331, 1368, 1392-94 (1997) (endorsing the conception of provo-

cation as justified anger rather than as loss of control).
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tation. 420 A mere expectation of doing harm will not suffice for these
offenses. Only a purpose of doing harm can turn harmless conduct
4 21
into a punishable attempt.
Purpose and other desiderative attitudes are also important in
crimes of result. Traditionally, harm has been seen as most culpable
when caused on purpose. 422 The cognitive conception equates knowing and purposeful harm, reasoning that only the expectation of
42 3
Yet
harm, not the desire for it, makes purposeful harm culpable.
we punish the intentional wrongdoer for her reprehensible aims, even
if their accomplishment seemed unlikely ex ante. Moreover, we don't
punish the knowing wrongdoer merely because of her knowledge, but
because of the values expressed by her acting in the face of that
knowledge. Thus, we would not punish a horrified bystander who
anticipated a fatal accident but was helpless to prevent it. We punish
the knowing wrongdoer because in choosing to cause harm, even
reluctantly, she accepts it as the price of some other end she cares
4 24
about more.
The same is true of those who inflict harm recklessly or negligently: in proceeding with their projects in the face of foreseen or
foreseeable risk, they overvalue their own ends and undervalue the
welfare of others. 425 Even according to the Model Penal Code, these
risks must be unjustifiable and unreasonable in light of the nature and
purpose of the actor's conduct. 4 26 This unreasonableness is notjust a
matter of the quantity of risk, because when conduct is customary, its
dangers-even if great-will be attributed to victims who could have
foreseen and avoided them. 42 7 If customary conduct is seen as part of
a valued social role or institution, its risks are seen as "reasonable" and
its harms are seen as costs of other conflicting activities. By contrast
the risks imposed by robbery will not be ascribed to imprudent vic420 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-4-2 (LexisNexis 2005); CAL. PENAL CODE § 653F
(West 1999); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.03 (Vernon 2003).
See, e.g., State v. Lyerla, 424 N.W.2d 908, 912-13 (S.D. 1988).
421
422 See generally Leonardo Augusto Zaibert, Intentionality and Blame: A Study on
the Foundations of Culpability (June 13, 1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State
University of New York at Buffalo) (on file with author) (arguing that purposeful

wrongdoing was the paradigm of culpability in many different ethical and legal systems across history).

423 See supra notes 141-44, 149-52 and accompanying text.
424 See Michaels, supra note 7, at 960-70 (arguing that a desiderative attitude of
acceptance explains retributive condemnation of knowing wrongdoing).
425 See Simons, Rethinking, supra note 7, at 486-90 (discussing the indifference
conception of recklessness).
426 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (d) (1962).
427 See Simons, supra note 4, at 1123-25.
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tims. Whether costs are assigned to an activity depends on its moral
428
worth.
This kind of evaluation of ends is particularly important in deciding what risks are reckless enough to justify second-degree murder
liability. 429 A disappointed suitor sets fire to a Christmas tree inside
his date's apartment building;430 a losing gambler shoots up carnival
trucks with a shotgun; 43 1 a bored youth forces a child to play Russian
roulette; 43 2 a greedy surgeon delegates dangerous procedures to
untrained assistants. 43 3 These cases all exhibit the requisite "depraved
indifference to human life" or "abandoned and malignant heart," but
what do they have in common? In each case, the murderer imposes a
great risk of death for a particularly unworthy reason. Some jurisdictions make this requirement of a depraved motive explicit, requiring
an "antisocial purpose" as well as recklessness for depraved-indifference murder. 434 Felony murder involves a similar kind of culpability,
but requires a felonious rather than a merely antisocial purpose, combined with merely negligent rather than reckless indifference to
human life.
These homicide offenses may seem anomalous because they
aggravate responsibility for harm an actor did accomplish based on
another harm she wanted to accomplish. But this is true of many partially inchoate crimes that require a result as a means to some other
unfulfilled end. The burglar wants to acquire, but merely breaks
43 6
in; 435 the robber wants to acquire, but need only threaten or injure;
the thief wants to acquire, but need only succeed in moving; 437 the

witness tamperer wants to suppress testimony, but need only threaten

428

See id. at 1121-24 (arguing that a smaller risk of harm suffices for negligence if

the purpose of a risky activity is worse).
429 See PILLSBURY, supra note 3, at 161-79; V.F. Nourse, Heart and Minds: Understanding the New Culpability, 6 BUFF. CmiM. L. REV. 361, 366-79 (2002).
430
431
432

See State v. Joy, 452 A.2d 408, 410 (Me. 1982).
See State v. McCrary, 675 P.2d 120, 121 (N.M. 1984).
See Commonwealth v. Malone, 47 A.2d 445, 446-47 (Pa. 1946).

433

See People v. Protopappas, 246 Cal. Rptr. 915, 918 (Ct. App. 1988).

434

See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 261 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1953) (en banc); Protopappas,

261 Cal. Rptr. at 920.
435 See LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 21.1, at 1017.
436 See id. § 20.3, at 996-97.
437 See id. § 19.8, at 975-77; see also Smith v. United States, 291 F.2d 220, 221-22
(9th Cir. 1961) (upholding a larceny conviction where the defendant merely moved a
bag of money towards himself several inches).
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the briber wants to influence, but need only offer to

Finally, partially inchoate offenses include controversial crimes of
44 1
440
civil
crimes against humanity,
political motive such as genocide,
44 2
4 43
4 44
rights violations,
terrorism,
and treason,
as well as offenses
aggravated under hate-crime statutes. Such political offenses aggravate conventional crimes of violence based on an interpretive judgment that they express certain political values. An occupying army
singles out civilians of particular ethnicity or religion, shooting the
men and raping the women. 445 A planter and his overseers horsewhip
ex-slaves lining up for work outside a mill. 446 A dissident group
bombs a subway on the eve of an election 44 7 or holds a theater audi-

438 See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(2) (Supp. IV 2004) (stating that the mere "threat of physical force" with the intent of preventing a witness from testifying is sufficient for a
conviction of witness tampering).
439 See id. § 201 (b) (1) (2000) (defining a bribe as an offer or promise made to a
public official with the intention of influencing an official act).
440 See id. § 1091 (a) (defining genocide as acts committed with the "intent to
destroy, in whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group").
441
See London Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis art. 6(c), Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 1547, 83
U.N.T.S. 270, 288 (defining crimes against humanity as "persecutions on political,
racial, or religious grounds").

442 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6(a) (West Supp. 2007) ("No person ... shall by
force or threat of force, willfully injure, intimidate, interfere with, oppress, or
threaten any other person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege
secured . . . by the Constitution or laws of this state . . ").
443 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-56, § 802, 115 Stat. 272, 376 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331, 3077 (Supp. IV
2004)) (defining domestic terrorism as an illegal act intended to "influence the policy
of a government by intimidation or coercion" or by "affect[ing] the conduct of a
government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping").
444 SeeFLETCHER, supra note 117, § 3.5, at 205-17 (explaining that an overt act and
adherence to the enemy are required for commission of treason).
445 See Kitty McKinsey, Mass Rape in Bosnia: 20,000 Women, Mostly Muslims, Have
Been Abused by Serb Soldiers, SOUTHAM NEWS, Jan. 23, 1993, http://www.peacewomen.
org/news/BosniaHerzegovina/newsarchive/massrape.html.
446 This scenario is based on Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 2-4 (1906), overruled in part byJones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
447 See Dominic Bailey, Spain Votes Under a Shadow, BBC NEWS, Mar. 14, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3509744.stm (noting that general elections
took place on March 14, 2004, three days after a dissident group's bombing of the
Madrid subway).
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ence hostage to its political demands. 448 In all these cases, a larger
context gives particular acts of violence a political meaning. The specific act of violence is part of a collective program of degrading,
excluding, or intimidating a population. This political meaning is
part of the offender's culpability, providing a moral ground for a
higher sentence, 449 or an extended statute of limitations, 450 or an
extraordinary extension of jurisdiction. 45 1 These political crimes
therefore involve two forms of culpability, aiming at specific violence
but also at a larger and still ongoing political project.
Felony murder liability is not anomalous in conditioning liability
on a bad motive as well as expected harm. The moral evaluation of
desires, purposes, and projects is found throughout criminal law. Bad
motives do aggravate the moral culpability of offenses, as even cognitivists concede. The only remaining question is whether it is politically illegitimate to incorporate such moral judgments into our
criminal law.

C.

PunishingMotives in the Liberal State

Does liberalism require a value-neutral criminal law? Does it preclude the evaluation of motives for acts of violence? Not according to
Hampton:
It is currently fashionable for many liberals (for example Rawls) to
portray the liberal state as "morally neutral"-one that does not
take moral sides as it governs a pluralist society. However, were a
state to try to be morally neutral, it would be unable to inflict retributive punishment. The demands of retribution require a legal institution not only to take moral sides, but also to strive to implement a
moral world in which people are treated with the respect their value
requires.
As I see it, no liberal state would be worth supporting if it did
not assume this role. A state that would truly be neutral about
morality could not be animated by any conception of its citizens'
worth as it punished offenders, and whatever its punishment goals,
448 See Chechen Gunmen Seize Moscow Theater, CNN.coM, Oct. 24, 2002, http://
archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/10/23/russia.siege/ (reporting the seizure
of a Moscow theater by Chechen rebels on October 23, 2002).
449 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.7 (West Supp. 2007); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.31
(McKinney Supp. 2007).
450 See Guyora Binder, Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity at the Trial of Klaus
Barbie, 98 YALE L.J. 1321, 1330-34 (1989) (discussing the extended statute of limitations for crimes against humanity in France).
451 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 404 (1987) (arguing for
universal jurisdiction to punish the slave trade, genocide, war crimes, and certain acts
of terrorism).
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could not be properly responsive to that which matters most deeply
4 52
to all of us: our value.
Hampton offers here a vision of a liberal state as one that actively
fosters a liberal political community in which each person is recognized as having equal status. She presents state punishment as a crucial expressive medium for reducing the status of those who have
asserted mastery over others, and restoring the status of their victims.
She acknowledges no unfairness in the state taking sides between
those who claim a superior authority to govern others and those who
assert merely an equal right to govern themselves.
Why then should the liberal state be neutral? Neutrality might
serve to legitimize the liberal state in two ways: as a foundational principle limiting the legitimate competence of the state, or as a practice
instrumental to certain values that contribute to legitimacy. If neutrality is a foundational principle, it applies to all state functions, including punishment. But if neutrality is simply a pragmatic device, it need
not characterize every institution of the liberal state, and the desirability of a value-neutral criminal law becomes a practical question.
Why might we view the state as fundamentally incompetent to
regulate values? Perhaps we are value skeptics, holding that values are
simply arbitrary matters of taste that cannot be validated or criticized.
But if value judgments cannot be rationally defended, it is hard to see
how we can defend the value of the liberal state. 45 3 Thus, the principle of value-skepticism would seem to preclude any defense of the
legitimacy of the liberal state and the obligation to obey its law.
Legitimating the liberal state in the face of cynicism is not merely
a theoretical problem. Since the end of the Cold War, liberals have
had to learn that liberalism is a feature of societies, not just of states.
The fate of putatively liberal governments in transitional societies like
post-Soviet Russia and post-invasion Iraq has shown that the power
and authority of the liberal state is precariously dependent on widespread public attitudes of mutual tolerance and respect for law. Without a sufficiently "civic" culture, 454 governing institutions will dissolve
or become instruments of corruption, coercion, or chauvinist demagoguery. Thus, liberalism would be pointlessly self-defeating if it
demanded an attitude of tolerance and impartiality only of the state,
452 HAMPTON, INTRINSIC WORTH, supra note 20, at 149-50.
453 See Stephen A. Gardbaum, Why the Liberal State Can PromoteMoral Ideals After All,
104 HARV. L. REv. 1350, 1356, 1359 (1991) (arguing that value pluralism is compatible
with promoting some values (e.g., tolerance) over others; but that value subjectivism

is not, and so precludes any defense of a value-neutral state).
454 See generally GABRIEL ALMOND & SIDNEY VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE 5-10 (1963)
(characterizing the kind of culture vital to the success of modem democracies).
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but not of its citizens. As I have argued, the criminal law influences
behavior far more effectively by inculcating values than by threatening
punishment. 4 55 Indeed, a polity that relied primarily on coercion
rather than social norms to maintain social control would be a police
state, not a liberal state. Thus, a liberal state that undertakes to secure
a life of freedom for its citizens cannot afford an attitude of indifference to their values. It cannot treat those values as given, but must
make them an object of public policy.
Several liberal political philosophers have drawn on such arguments in denying that liberalism requires value neutrality. Thus, William Galston has argued that purportedly value-neutral accounts of
the liberal state treat certain goods as fundamental, such as the fulfillment of human purposes. 456 Galston argues that the case for liberal
government ultimately rests not on any principle, but on its ability to
secure a number of different goods. 45 7 These include social peace;
the security and predictability provided by a rule of law; tolerance and
inclusion of members of diverse communities; protection from
extreme poverty, epidemic disease, and private violence; scope for
personal development; freedom of inquiry and discussion; and access
to information. 4 58 On this conception, liberalism involves both a
vision of a good-or at least an adequately decent-society, and views
about some of the constituents of a good life. A good enough society
is one in which members can flourish in certain ways, particularly by
making informed, uncoerced choices about their own development.
This conception of liberalism as the means to a good society suggests
several reasons why a liberal state can legitimately take an interest in
the values of its citizens.
First, liberal views on the good society and on human flourishing
have implications for what individuals should value. If liberalism is
right that a good society enables individuals to develop autonomously,
it follows that individuals should aspire to do so. Insofar as autonomous development depends on living in a culturally diverse society,
individuals should appreciate diversity. If liberal society should protect liberty rights and provide a rule of law, it follows that individuals
should value these as well. If liberal society should be decently
humane, individuals should respond compassionately to extreme suffering. If a liberal society properly treats its members as political
455

See supra Part II.
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equals, those members should also treat each other as equals and
should not endeavor to rule one another. In short, if liberalism is
justified by the fact that liberal society is a good, it follows that everyone has reason to realize the good of liberal society, not just the state.
Stephen Macedo develops such an argument in Liberal Virtues.459
Macedo associates the liberal values of autonomy and equality with a
practice of rational discourse among disparate normative viewpoints. 4 60 Macedo acknowledges that the citizens of a liberal society
are never free of the mutual interference and frustration implied by
the problem of social cost. 461 But when they resolve their conflicts

through an appeal to reason, they confirm their status as political
equals, ruled by a collectively produced law rather than by a political
superior. 462 Thus the loser of a dispute may suffer injury, but not the
additional insult of subordination. To claim status as an equal subject
of law, however, commits the liberal citizen to respect the rights and
the rationality of her equals. 463 Although legal institutions help constitute the good of mutual respect among political equals, individuals
express that respect any time they make an appeal to reason in interacting with others. 464 Macedo adds that the good of liberal autonomy
is not simply a matter of not being ruled. 46 5 The autonomous subject

determines her own values and commitments through an internal
process of deliberation modeled on the debate among diverse views
she witnesses throughout liberal

society. 4 6 6

Thus, for Macedo, the

good of liberalism is maximized insofar as liberal principles are
reflected not only in the design of institutions, but also in the culture
of society generally, and in the principles and practices of its members. 467 So the belief that liberal values are good provides a prima

facie reason for the liberal state to encourage liberal virtues among its
citizens.
A second reason for the liberal state to take sides on value questions is that it arguably cannot realize the good of liberal society without ensuring the prevalence of certain values and virtues among its
population. Legal philosophers Joseph Raz and Stephen Gardbaum
both argue that far from being indifferent to the moral views of indi459
460
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viduals, liberalism requires a pluralistic society containing a range of
moral views, all bounded by the liberal values of mutual tolerance and
respect. 4 6

In The Morality of Freedom, Raz presents liberalism as cen-

trally concerned with realizing the values of autonomy and dignity by
fostering social conditions enabling individuals to shape their own
ends through meaningful choices. 469 This requires the liberal state to
support education, to foster a plurality of social institutions offering
fulfilling roles, and to protect individuals from private coercion, which
attacks both autonomy and dignity. 4 70 The liberal state discourages

private coercion primarily through the criminal law, which deploys
both disapprobation and coercion. 47 1 While Raz concedes that coercion by a democratic state infringes autonomy, he argues it does not
infringe dignity by subordinating one person to another. 472 Moreover, because Raz views autonomy as a positive good, dependent on
actual social conditions, rather than as a negative right against state
interference, his view of state coercion is pragmatic. 473 Thus, the state
is free to inculcate liberal moral views, even by coercive means, if it
thereby enhances autonomy overall. 474 Raz has a similarly pragmatic
47 5
view of neutrality as a policy instrument rather than a principle.
Thus, the state may advance autonomy by creating locally neutral arenas for choice among certain alternatives, while making value choices
476
in defining, organizing, and protecting those arenas.
Of course it might be objected that the state is the wrong institution to teach liberal values, and liberal values are best inculcated
exclusively through exposure to a pluralistic private sector. Yet political philosopher Patrick Neal responds that the liberal state cannot
47 7
help influencing values, so that a value-neutral state is not possible.
Neal argues that individual ends depend upon socialization in an institutional context that is largely shaped by law. 478 He reasons that even
if government may be neutral among the preferences that prevail in a
modern market society, it cannot be neutral toward other preferences
468 See RAz, supra note 338, at 132-33, 407, 424-25; Stephen Gardbaum, Liberalism, Autonomy, and Moral Conflict, 48 STAN. L. REV. 385, 400-01, 405-06 (1996).
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
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477
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See id. at 124-33.
See Guyora Binder, The Poetics of the Pragmatic: What Literary Criticisms of Law
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See id. at 673-74.

2008]

THE CULPABILITY

OF FELONY

MURDER

1057

that would prevail in a very differently organized society. 4 79 Neal
invites us to imagine that
Ralph, who wishes to lead a virtuous life... [has a preference] for a
small, socially homogeneous polis in a preindustrial setting, for only
in such a setting does he think it possible to develop the moral
virtues ....
...
Ralph can express his preference [in contemporary American society] but he can in no way live it. Nor should we say liberalism allows him to pursue his conception of the good privately,
because his conception of the good entails an alternative understanding of the nature of "private" and "public" to that of the liberal. Ralph's conception of the good cannot be translated into a
liberal language of private preferences without losing its essential
character ....
In order to respond to Ralph the liberal needs a
defense of this translating activity and ... of the form of life which
480
results thereby, not an invocation of neutrality.
Rather than offering its members a choice among all possible conceptions of the good life, liberal society offers only a life of gratifying
private preferences by choosing among different purchases, investments, occupations, avocations, and social attachments. These
choices are available within arenas constructed by legal rules defining
competence, consent, coercion, and fraud. Thus, whether or not liberal lawmakers intend to inculcate moral values, they inevitably do so
simply by establishing institutions that enable the pursuit of some values while precluding the pursuit of others.
Taken together, these arguments tend to refute the view that the
liberal state must, on principle, maintain strict value neutrality in all
its actions. If we accept the premises that (1) the liberal state exists to
realize the good of liberal society, (2) the good of liberal society
depends upon widespread support for liberal values, and (3) the liberal state cannot avoid inculcating some values, it follows that the liberal state may inculcate liberal values. Where, when, and how it
should do so, however, is a pragmatic question. Thus, even if value
neutrality is not a defining principle of liberalism, it could be good
policy in the area of criminal justice.
Should the liberal state use the coercive means of the criminal
law to inculcate liberal values? One argument against doing so is that
freedom of speech is a centrally important good in liberal society.
Thus, a pragmatic liberal state might best achieve the good of a liberal
society by defining political debate as an arena for unrestricted
479
480
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choice, even at the cost of permitting illiberal hate speech that undermines the dignity and equality of some citizens. But the pragmatic
decision to protect and value speech without regard to its content
does not imply equal respect for every value expressed in speech. Nor
does it require the liberal state to maintain the same neutrality toward
values expressed through violent conduct.
Consider the implications for criminal law of Bruce Ackerman's
procedural theory of justice in a liberal state. Ackerman views justice
as the outcome of a rational and neutral discursive process, defining
rationality and neutrality as follows:
Rationality. Whenever anybody questions the legitimacy of
another's power, the power holder must respond not by suppressing the questioner but by giving a reason that explains why he
is more entitled to the resource than the questioner is.481
Neutrality. No reason is a good reason if it requires the power
holder to assert:
(a) that his conception of the good is better than that asserted by
any of his fellow citizens, or
(b) that, regardless of his conception of the good, he is intrinsically
48 2
superior to one or more of his fellow citizens.
Notice that Ackerman's neutrality principle implies that neither
expressions of bigotry, nor expressions of conceptions of the good
make any positive contribution to a legitimate political process.
Because his rationality principle militates against punishing such
expressions, Ackerman's liberalism forbids punishing hate speech.
But, surprisingly, it has the opposite implication for hate crimes, that
is, crimes of violence that express bigotry. Ackerman's rationality
principle draws a fundamental distinction between two different
modes of advancing political views: persuasion and coercion. Since
hate crimes express political views by means of coercive force rather
than rational persuasion, they are not protected by Ackerman's neutral dialogue.
The liberal state has a right not only to suppress violence, but also
to discriminate among the ends promoted by violence. In assuming
the power to punish, the liberal state acknowledges that violence may
be used legitimately for certain ends, and also claims a monopoly on
the legitimate use of violence. When anyone uses violence, she
assumes the liberal state's enforcement power and exercises a kind of
governance, a power properly subject to democratic supervision in a
liberal state. In such a state, violence is only legitimate insofar asjusti481
482
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fled by democratically chosen reasons that are consistent with achieving some version of the good of liberal society. By usurping the
liberal state's monopoly on violence, private actors properly subject
their ends to the same kind of political evaluation applied to public
policy. The democratic public has a responsibility to consider
whether the actor's ends justified, mitigated, or aggravated every act
of violence. Liberal criminal law therefore should assess the values
expressed by violence in imposing punishment. This principle supports aggravating liability for crimes of violence that express group
hatred, or other antiliberal values. It also justifies aggravating homicide liability when violence is used to enable some other wrong forbidden by democratic decision, like a serious felony. A felony murder
rule therefore fits within a democratic state's exclusive competence to
determine the ends for which violence should and should not be
used.
CONCLUSION

A near consensus of the criminal law academy holds that felony
murder liability is undeserved. 48 3 Because this consensus is rarely
challenged, and because felony murder is usually dismissed as "rationally indefensible," the case against felony murder is rarely spelled out
in any detail, or examined critically. This Article has served two aims.
First, it has explicated the case against felony murder and
exposed a contradiction at its heart. The view of felony murder liability as undeserved presumes a purely cognitive model of culpability as
expected danger. Such a cognitive model of culpability, however,
proves too much: it rejects liability for causing harmful results in favor
of liability for imposing risk. Thus, it rejects not just felony murder
liability specifically, but homicide liability of any kind. A theory of
culpability for homicide must assess the offender's aims as well as her
expectations. It must then determine if the fatal result sufficiently
expresses the values on which she acted to warrant attributing that
result to her. This inherently evaluative question is unavoidable in
any criminal justice system that punishes for actual harm.
Second, this Article has offered a rational defense of felony murder liability as deserved, based on an expressive theory of culpability
that assesses ends as well as expectations. This theory understands
rational action as motivated by the desire to express identification
with values one endorses upon reflection, by carrying out the responsibilities of a role within a normative social practice. To compel
483
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another by force to acquiesce in the violation of an important right is
to express contempt for a victim's autonomy and status by asserting
mastery over him or her. The death of a victim under the offender's
dominion and as a result of the offender's coercion, typifies the
wrongfulness of assuming power over another's fate in order to wrong
her. Felony murder rules appropriately impose liability for negligently causing death for a very depraved motive, as long as the predicate felony involves coercion or destruction, and a felonious purpose
independent of the fatal injury. In evaluating the offender's motives,
felony murder rules are compatible with other rules of American
criminal law, and with the limits of criminal law in a liberal state that
promotes autonomy and that fairly distributes the burdens and the
authority of democratic citizenship.

